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A bstract
This thesis examines how information costs, minimum quality standards and 
electoral incentives affect international trade and trade policy choice.
First, a new pairwise matching model with two-sided information asym­
metry is developed to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous 
network-building and matching by information intermediaries. The framework 
innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade 
intermediation, thereby endogenising the pattern of direct and indirect trade. 
The model is extended to analyse the strategic interaction between two in­
formation intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, 
giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure.
Second, unilateral minimum quality standards are endogenously deter­
mined as the outcome of a non-cooperative standard-setting game between 
the governments of two countries. Cross-country externalities from the imple­
mentation of minimum quality standards are shown to give rise to a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma structure in the incentives of policy-makers leading to inefficient pol­
icy outcomes. The role of minimum quality standards as non-tariff barriers 
is examined and the scope for mutual gains from reciprocal adjustment in 
minimum standards analysed. Asymmetric externalities make a cooperative 
agreement at the world optimum infeasible.
Third, a new multi-jurisdictional political agency model is developed to 
analyse electoral incentives for trade protection in an electoral college. A
4
unique equilibrium is shown to exist where political incumbents build a rep­
utation for protectionism through their policy decisions in their first term of 
office. A spatial dimension is introduced that shows how trade policy incen­
tives hinge on the distribution of swing voters across decisive, swing states. 
The empirical analysis augments a benchmark test of the “Protection for Sale” 
mechanism to include a measure of how industries specialise geographically in 
swing and decisive states. The findings lend support to the theory.
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Introduction
In this thesis I theoretically examine how information costs, minimum quality 
standards and electoral incentives affect international trade and trade policy 
choice.
Chapter 1 present a new pairwise matching model with two-sided infor­
mation asymmetry that is used to analyse the impact of information costs 
on endogenous network-building and matching by information intermediaries. 
The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incen­
tives for trade intermediation, thereby endogenising the pattern of direct and 
indirect trade. The analysis delivers four key results. First, intermediation 
unambiguously raises expected trade volume and social welfare by expanding 
the set of matching technologies available to traders. Second, convexity in 
network-building costs is necessary for both direct and indirect trade to arise 
in equilibrium. Third, under assumptions of convexity in the intermediary’s 
technology, optimal network size and hence the equilibrium pattern of trade 
is shown to depend on the level of information costs as well as the relative 
effectiveness of direct and indirect matching technologies with changing infor­
mation costs. Finally, the model sheds light on the relationship between infor­
mation frictions and aggregate trade volume, which may be non-monotonic as 
a result of conflicting effects of information costs on the incentives for direct
13
and indirect trade.
Chapter 2 extends the model to analyse the strategic interaction between 
two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and net­
work size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The analysis 
delivers the following results. First, the model suggests that network compe­
tition between information intermediaries has a distinctive market structure, 
where intermediaries are monopolist service providers to some contacts but 
duopolists over contacts they share in their network overlap. Second, the 
coordination game of traders presents the possibility of coordination failure 
between trade pairs, even though both traders are members of both networks 
and this is known to both. Third, we show that intermediaries’ inability to 
price discriminate between the competitive and non-competitive market seg­
ments, gives rise to an undercutting game, which has no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The incentive to randomise commission rates yields a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, competition is affected by the technol­
ogy of network development. The analysis shows that either a monopoly or 
a fragmented duopoly can prevail in equilibrium, depending on the network- 
building technology. Under convexity assumptions, both intermediaries invest 
in a network and compete over common matches, while randomising commis­
sion rates. In contrast, linear network development costs can only give rise to 
a monopoly outcome.
Chapter 3 extends a well-established vertical product differentiation model
14
to an international setting in order to analyse governments’ incentives for 
the unilateral setting of minimum quality standards, as well as the scope 
and effects of international cooperation on welfare and international trade. 
National standards are endogenous and result from a standard-setting game 
between governments. The analysis delivers four results. First, there exist 
four unregulated Nash equilibria in minimum standards, two symmetric and 
two asymmetric, depending on the quality ranking of firms in each market. 
The analysis establishes that in all four cases, unilaterally selected minimum 
quality standards are inefficient as a result of cross-country externalities. Sec­
ond, minimum quality standards are shown to operate as non-tariff barriers 
to trade. Third, the world welfare maximising symmetric standard can be 
reached through reciprocal adjustments in national minimum standards from 
either of the two symmetric Nash equilibria. Finally, the scope for mutu­
ally beneficial cooperation is shown to be significantly restricted when cross­
country externalities are asymmetric.
The final chapter of the thesis develops a new multi-jurisdictional polit­
ical agency model for analysing electoral incentives for trade protection. A 
unique equilibrium is shown to exist where political incumbents build a rep­
utation of protectionism through their policy decisions in their first term of 
office. The spatial dimension of the multi-jurisdictional framework shows how 
the incentives driving trade policy hinge on the distribution of swing voters 
across swing and decisive states. Finally, the theoretical hypothesis is tested
15
empirically and the findings provide support for the theory highlighting an 
important, and previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection.
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1 Inform ation C osts, N etw orks and Interm ediation  
in  International Trade
This chapter analyses the role of information costs on the incentives for infor­
mation intermediaries to emerge as trade facilitators and addresses a broad 
range of issues in a tractable, unified, theoretical framework. First, the model 
sheds light on how barriers to information flow can affect trade patterns and 
the organisation of trade, either directly, or indirectly through an intermedi­
ary. Second, it explores the incentives for contact-building and intermediation 
with varying levels of information costs and for a broad range of parameter 
values reflecting different network-building technologies. The pairwise match­
ing model developed contributes to the literature by showing how information 
costs affect the realisation and organisation of trade transactions, for a given 
set of trade opportunities, in a framework where the pattern of information 
intermediation is determined endogenously.
The model is particularly applicable to international trade in differenti­
ated goods for which information about product characteristics is important. 
The model can also be applied more broadly to intermediated markets where 
contact-building and matching are key. Examples may include headhunters in 
the job market, real estate agents in the housing or rental market, charterers 
in the transportation market, matchmakers in the marriage market (in some 
cultures), among others.
There is a broad literature addressing the many functions of middlemen.
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They have been shown to reduce search costs (Rubinstein and Wolinksy, 
1987; Yavas, 1992, 1994), to offer expertise in markets with adverse selection 
(Biglaiser, 1993), to operate as guarantors of quality under producer moral 
hazard (Biglaiser and Friedman, 1994), as well as to operate as investors in 
quality-testing technology (Li, 1998). More recently, Shevchenko (2004) en- 
dogenises the number of intermediaries who buy and sell goods and examines 
the optimality of the size and composition of their inventories. Common to 
all of these works is the exploration of the role of middlemen as buyers and 
sellers of goods. In contrast, this chapter explores the role of intermediaries 
as brokers of information.
Information is required to identify profitable trading opportunities and lo­
cate suitable trading partners, particularly where goods are differentiated and 
information about product characteristics is important. Information asymme­
tries, coupled with costs of acquiring information, can hinder the matching of 
agents with opportunities and prevent prices from allocating scarce resources 
across countries. Portes and Rey (2005) point to a lack of information about 
international trading opportunities and the need to tap into ‘deep knowledge’. 
In such a setting, international trade can be facilitated through intermediaries 
who invest in information networks or contacts and match agents with suitable 
opportunities for a fee.
Rauch and Watson (2002) present some summary statistics from a Pilot 
survey of international trade intermediaries based in the US. Despite the small
18
number of observations, their evidence suggests that 50% of trade intermedi­
ation in differentiated products does not involve taking title of goods and 
reselling, as compared to only 1% for homogeneous-goods. Moreover, 36% of 
the revenue from trade intermediation of differentiated products is reported 
to come from success fees based on the value of transactions, while the figure 
for homogeneous-good intermediation is only 1%. This is consistent with the 
search based or network view of trade, pioneered by Rauch (2000), Rauch and 
Trindade (2000) and others, that posits that the information requirements for 
differentiated goods are much greater due to the need to match specific char­
acteristics. The evidence to date supports this, pointing to a more pronounced 
role for information intermediaries in the trade of differentiated goods.
The facilitation of trade through information networks has only recently 
begun to be formally developed. Recent literature on networks in international 
trade (Casella and Rauch, 2002) focuses on gaining insight on how information- 
sharing networks among internationally dispersed ethnic minorities or business 
groups can overcome informal trade barriers such as inadequate information 
about trading opportunities and weak enforcement of international contracts 
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002).
Casella and Rauch (2002) develop a model where output is produced 
through a joint venture and agents cannot judge the quality of their match 
abroad. They show that introducing a subset of agents with social ties, who 
have complete information when it comes to matching with other group mem­
19
bers, increases aggregate trade and income, but hurts the anonymous market. 
More recently, Rauch and Watson (2002) model the supply of ‘network in­
termediation’ where agents endogenously choose whether to be producers or 
intermediaries, depending on their endowment of contacts. The emphasis of 
the existing literature has largely been the effects of pre-existing social ties 
or contacts on trade. This chapter contributes to the literature by analysing 
the incentives for contact-building and exploring how trade intermediation 
can offer a more efficient means of trade matching, without relying on any 
pre-existing ties between agents.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 intro­
duces the intermediation model. Section 2 extends the network-building cost 
specification giving rise to a richer set of results. Section 3 concludes.
1.1 T h e  M odel
This section introduces a pairwise matching model with a continuum of im­
porters and exporters, and a single trade intermediary. The framework cap­
tures the incentives for network-building and intermediation when there are 
barriers to the flow of information and sheds light on the role information costs 
play on the organisation of trade.
1.1.1 M odel Set-up
Consider a two-sided market where importers and exporters match in pairs 
to exchange a single unit of output. Let there be a continuum of exporters
20
(X ), distributed uniformly, and with unit density, over the interval [0,1] and a 
continuum of importers (M), also distributed uniformly, with unit density over 
[0,1]. Suppose that for each trader there is a unique partner on the other side 
of the market with whom they can trade. Each trade transaction generates 
a joint surplus S  > 0, but if agents fail to locate their match they receive a 
payoff of 0. Moreover, assume all market participants are risk-neutral.
The framework best reflects trade in differentiated goods where specific 
characteristics have to be matched, whether these are feature of the product, 
timing of delivery etc. In the absence of trade frictions, importers and ex­
porters identify each other costlessly and all trade opportunities are exploited 
generating a total surplus of S.
Suppose there is two-sided information asymmetry such that traders on 
both sides of the market do not know the location of their partner on the 
other side of the market. Within the set of infinitely many traders, the prob­
ability of each exporter (importer) locating her partner by selecting a random 
trader from the measure of importers (exporters) is zero. Any pair j  of trade 
partners (X j , M j ) is assumed to be able to match through a direct match­
ing technology, however, which achieves successful matching with probability 
q(i), where parameter i E [0,1] reflects the level of information costs or bar­
riers to information flow between the two sides of the market. Let q'{i) < 0, 
so a higher prevailing level of information costs implies a lower probability of 
matching for each pair. Parameter i may be interpreted as reflecting the state
21
of information and communication technology (ICT). An ICT improvement 
reflects a decline in i ,which in turn implies a higher probability of a direct 
match. Further, let q(l) =  0 and g(0) =  1, so information cost level i = 1 
prohibits any matching, while i = 0 corresponds to the full information case 
where all trade opportunities are exploited. q(i) is also the expected trade 
volume and q(i)S the expected joint surplus from direct trade. The two-sided 
market is represented in figure (1).
Importers (M)
q(i)S
Exporters (X)
Figure 1: The two-sided market with pairwise trade matches.
Suppose the market has a single intermediary (/) with access to a tech­
nology for developing contacts with importers and exporters and finding out 
their trade characteristics (location, product features etc.). The intermediary 
incurs a set up cost, F, for creating a network and a marginal cost of network 
expansion, c(i), where d  (i) > 0 and c(0) =  0. The cost of making contacts 
is assumed to increase monotonically with the level of information costs; but 
assumed to be entirely costless when i — 0.
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The intermediary’s network is denoted by a measure of importers, Pm , and 
a measure of exporters, Px,  where Pm  £ [0,1] and P x  6 [0,1], contacted by 
incurring cost c (i) Pm  and c ( i)P x ,  respectively. Let C (P x ,Pm ) denote the 
intermediary’s total investment cost for building a network of contacts of size 
{Px, Pm }, where this is linear and described by (1):
C{Px ,P m ) = F  + c ({)(Px  + Pm ) (1)
Once network investment costs are sunk, it is assumed costless for the in­
termediary to match trade pairs from within his network of contacts. The 
intermediary’s marginal cost of trade intermediation is zero. The proportion 
Px  also reflects the ex ante probability that any particular exporter X j  is a 
network member. Similarly, Pm is the probability that any particular importer 
M j  is a network member. Thus, PxPm  describes the joint probability that 
both trade partners in pair (X j , M j ) are contacted by the intermediary, for 
given network size. Once uncertainty regarding the identity of network mem­
bers is resolved, the intermediary is able to match trade pairs from within his 
network1 with probability 1.
The intermediary raises revenue by charging a commission for matching 
trading partners through his network. Let a j  denote the share of trade surplus, 
or commission rate, that the intermediary demands for successful intermedia­
tion of trade. The intermediary’s power to extract trade surplus through c*j
1 This assumption can easily be relaxed so that indirect matching takes place with a 
probability less than or equal to 1 but higher than the probability of a direct match.
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is constrained by the traders’ outside option to trade directly with probability 
q(i). In particular, as direct matching prospects worsen with i, the highest 
commission rate consistent with trader participation increases. The commis­
sion rate is thus described as a function of information cost i , a /(i) , where 
olj{i) > 0. The level of information costs i therefore affects the intermediary’s 
profit through two channels. First, through network-building cost, c(i), and 
second, through commission rate
T im ing  o f th e  G am e The timing of the game between traders and inter­
mediary I  is as follows:
S tage 1 - N etw ork  investm ent: The intermediary invests in a network of 
size {Pxi Pm } by contacting a proportion of importers and exporters. 
Network investment costs, C (P x ,Pm )? are sunk. The intermediary of­
fers contacts a take-it-or-leave-it contract specifying commission rate a j  
for successful matching.
S tage 2 - C on tracting : Traders in receipt of a contract accept or reject it.
S tage 3 - In d irec t trad e : Uncertainty over which trade matches are feasi­
ble through the network is resolved. The intermediary matches pairs of 
traders in his network, provided both parties accepted in stage 2.
S tage 4 - D irec t trad e : Any unmatched traders trade directly with proba­
bility q(i).
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E quilib rium  C oncep t The solution concept used is subgame perfect equi­
librium (SPE) and the method used is backward induction. A strategy for 
intermediary I  is a set {Px(i),  Px(i),&i{i)}  that describes network size and 
commission rate, given information costs i . A strategy for trader j  is described 
by a rule Ra for accepting or rejecting a contract in stage 2, if such a contract 
is received. A set of strategies {P£  , ctj(i), R*} can be said to form a
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game if under these strategies the expected 
profit of the intermediary and the expected trade surplus of each trader are 
maximised, given the strategies of all other players.
1.1.2 D irect and  Ind irec t T rade
The pool of unmatched traders in the final stage of the game includes three 
groups of traders: (a) those not contacted in stage 1, (b) those contacted 
but who rejected the contract in stage 2, and (c) those who were contacted 
and accepted, but could not be matched through the network in stage 3. 
Unmatched traders can expect to match directly with probability q(i) in the 
final stage of the game. Each direct match generates S, so the ex ante expected 
surplus from the direct trade route is q(i)S. Let a x  and a ^  denote the 
surplus shares of exporters and importers, respectively, where a x  +  «m =  1- 
For simplicity, assume both parties have equal bargaining power so gains from 
any transaction are split evenly2, such that a x  — &m  — The expected
2The particular values of o t x  and o l m  have no bearing on the intermediary’s investment 
decision, or choice of commission rate. Symmetry is assumed for simplicity.
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payoffs from direct trade for importers and exporters, denoted by E d t (Hm ) 
and E DT(Ux )y respectively, can thus be expressed as:
E m ( nx) = EOT(nM) = \q ( i )S  (2)
Intermediated trade transactions in stage 3 between network members who 
accept in stage 2 also generate S  per match. Since traders axe identical in 
terms of their future trade prospects, they all either accept or reject the take- 
it-or-leave-it offer in stage 2. The intermediary maximises stage 1 expected 
profit subject to participation constraints, thereby ensuring that all traders 
contacted by the intermediary find it optimal to accept in equilibrium. Let 
denote the share of trade surplus captured by j ,  given information costs 
i, where j  = {X, M, /} . As with direct trade, exporters and importers are 
assumed to split (residual) surplus equally, so a x ( i ) =  % ( i )  =  ocrii)- It 
follows that:
2 a T{i) +  aj(i)  =  1 (3)
The intermediary’s share, a j( i), is determined endogenously and depends 
on i. It follows that ar(i)  also depends on the prevailing level of information 
costs. Traders’ expected payoffs from indirect trade, denoted by E i t (Hm ) 
and E i t (Hx ), respectively, can thus be expressed as:
26
E JT(a x ) = E ,T (n M) = ^ [ i - a I ({)]S (4)
The measure of intermediated transactions, for any given network size, will 
vary in stage 3 depending on the degree of overlap between the two groups of 
contacts. Hence, the measure of intermediated trade matches, denoted by Tj, 
is a random variable. For any network of size (Px ,P m )> the largest measure of 
matches possible through the network is min {Px, Pm }, reflecting the maximal 
measure of overlap between importer and exporter contacts. Similarly, the 
smallest measure of matches that may arise is max {P x  +  Pm  ~  1, 0}, where 
mismatch between the two contact groups is greatest.
For any pair (X j , M j ), the ex ante probability of matching through the 
intermediary is given by the joint probability of both partners being contacted 
by the intermediary in stage 1, P xP m - The probability of any pair j  matching 
is integrated over the range of possible pairs to give the expected measure of 
intermediated matches E ( T i ) = PxPm-
In equilibrium, the intermediary builds contacts symmetrically in order to 
maximise E ( T j ) ,  for any given network investment. Thus, P x = Pm = P- 
Hence, the expected measure of intermediated matches is E ( T j ) =  P 2.
Proposition (1) establishes the optimality of a symmetric network, allowing 
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy set to be redefined as {P*(i), a j(i) , f?*}
P ro p o sitio n  1 It is optimal for the trade intermediary to invest symmetri­
cally in network-building on both sides of the market, such that P x = Pm  =  P,
27
where P  E [0,1].
Proof. Consider a network of size (P x ,P m ) from which a measure of trade 
matches E(Tj) = PxPm  is expected. The intermediary can maximise the 
return from his network investment by choosing P x  and Pm to maximise 
E {Tj), given C  (P x , Pm) — F  -\-c(i) (Px +  Pm)- The first order conditions of 
the constrained optimisation yield P x  =  Pm as the trade maximising network 
configuration. Proposition (1) follows directly. ■
For any exporter (importer) evaluating whether to sign up with the inter­
mediary in stage 2 , the probability of her partner also being in the network is 
P. Each exporter (or importer) can expect to receive E IT(Hx) (or E i t (Um)) 
with probability P  and E DT(H x) (or E d t (Um)) with probability 1 — P. 
Hence, the expected payoff of exporter X j  (or importer M j ), conditional on 
being contacted by the intermediary in stage 1, is given by:
E { u Xi \X j  € P )  =  E ( a Mj \Mj  e  P )  =  ± [P (1 -  a , («)) +  (1 — P)?(i)] S  (5)
Contrasting the expected payoffs described by equations (2) and (5) yields 
proposition (2).
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the intermediary offers contracts demanding 
commission rate a*j(i) =  1 — q(i). All contracts are accepted.
Proof. To ensure trader participation in stage 2, the intermediary must set 
ai(i) sufficiently low so that expected payoff from signing up to the network,
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described by equation (5), is at least as large as the expected payoff from an 
exclusively direct trade route, described by (2). The highest commission rate 
consistent with trader participation is thus:
oti{i) <  1 -  q{i) (6)
Hence, traders’ optimal acceptance rule R* in stage 2 is ‘accept the contract if 
a j(i)  <  1 — q{i)\ reject otherwise’. Anticipating the traders’ incentives in stage 
2 , the intermediary sets the largest participation-consistent commission rate3. 
Hence, the intermediary selects a j( i) =  1 — q(i) in stage 1 and all contracts 
offered are accepted in stage 2 . ■
The intermediary is constrained by traders’ outside option to trade di­
rectly, which in turn depends on the level of information costs. The worse 
are the traders’ prospects in the market, the higher the commission rate the 
intermediary can charge and still ensure participation. Even though a larger 
network improves the chances of an indirect trade match, the option to trade 
directly remains available, so a}(i) is independent of P. Moreover, since all 
surplus over and above that generated through direct trade is appropriated 
by the intermediary, all traders are indifferent between trading directly or the 
possibility of trading through the network.
P ro p o sitio n  3 In equilibrium, importers and exporters are indifferent ex ante
3 Assume that when indifferent between the two modes of trade, traders sign up with the 
intermediary. Alternatively, the intermediary could offer an infinitesimally small additional 
amount, e,  to ensure traders sign up to the network.
between the prospect of direct matching only and having the opportunity to 
trade both directly and indirectly.
Proof. At the outset of the game, anticipating a network of size P , any pair 
(X j , M j ) can expect to find themselves in one of four possible positions: (i)
with probability (1 — P )2, both trade partners are outside the network; (ii)
with probability P(1 — P), M j  is inside the network and X j  outside; (iii)
with probability P(1 — P ), X j  is inside the network and M j  outside, and
(iv) both partners are members of the network, with probability P 2. The 
expected payoff for each partner is ^q(i)S in (i)-(iii) and \  [1 — a/(i)] S  in 
(iv). Weighing the expected payoffs with their respective probabilities yields 
the ex ante expected payoff to any trader j  at the outset of the game, given 
P . This is summarised by:
E(UXj | P) =  E(TiMj | P) =  |  [9(i)(l -  P 2) +  [1 -  <*,(*)] P 2] S  (7 )
Anticipating that a*T(i) =  1 — q(i), (7 ) simplifies to give E (U x  | P ) =  E(Hm  | 
P ) =  \q{i)S  = E d t (Ux) = E d t (Hm)- Hence, traders are indifferent between 
having the prospect of intermediated trade, or not. ■
1.1.3 Equilibrium Network Size
The intermediary chooses P  € [0,1] to maximise expected profits (net of net­
work investment cost), E (H j), subject to a}(i) =  1 — q(i) and P*, where 
expected profit can be expressed by:
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£7(11/) =  [1 -  q(i)} S P 2 -  2c(i)P -  F  (8)
The specification does not yield an interior equilibrium for P , as verified 
by the non-negative second order condition4. Hence, the intermediary chooses 
to develop contacts with all traders, or none, depending on the level of infor­
mation costs. When profitable at the margin, the network expands to include 
all traders, provided the measure of trade matches is sufficiently large to cover 
set up costs. Otherwise, no contacts are developed at all, and the intermediary 
is inactive. Which of the two corner equilibria prevails hinges on the relative 
magnitude of two conflicting effects of i on expected profits. The greater the 
prevailing barriers to information flow, the higher are the costs of network 
development. At the same time, traders’ direct matching prospects worsen, 
thereby allowing a higher commission rate to be charged. The net effect of 
information costs on E(U i) thus depends on the relative impact of i on q{i) 
and c(i). This is summarised formally in proposition (4).
Proposition 4 Expected profit from intermediation is monotonically increas­
ing with the level of information costs i f  d  (i) < —^ fq ' (i), for P  > 0 .
Proof. Partially differentiating (8) with respect to i yields:
= -  [2d  (i ) + PSq' (i)] P  (9)
4 The second order condition is non-negative for all values of information cost i and net­
work size P: d = 2 S [ \  — q (i)] >  0.
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It follows directly from (9) that E(U j) is monotonically increasing with i, if:
c' (i) < — — q' (i) , for P  > 0 (10)
■
Let P*(i) describe the intermediary’s optimal network investment strategy 
for any i G [0,1]. This defines the equilibrium network path P*(i) in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium. The parameter space can be partitioned into 
two sets; the set of parameters for which condition (10) is satisfied, denoted 
by (AO), and the set for which it is not, denoted by (BO). For each set there 
exists a unique equilibrium pattern of intermediation.
Equilibrium path (AO) arises for parameter values that satisfy condition 
(10) and thus for which the intermediary’s expected profit is increasing in in­
formation costs i. Hence, for sufficiently small network set-up costs relative 
to trade surplus, there is a threshold level of information costs, i G [0,1], 
above which the intermediary finds it profitable to invest in an information 
network spanning the entire market and below which the intermediary is inac­
tive. Moreover, the higher the trade surplus relative to fixed costs, the lower 
the threshold above which the intermediary is active.
Equilibrium path (B0) arises where expected profit fails to satisfy condition
(10), so expected profit is decreasing with information costs. This describes the 
case where the negative effect of higher i on network investment cost outweighs 
the positive effect on revenue from the ability to set a higher commission rate.
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Hence, for sufficiently small network set-up costs relative to trade surplus, 
there is a threshold level of information costs, i 6  [0 , 1], below which the 
intermediary finds it profitable to invest in an information network that covers 
the entire market. The intermediary’s network investment is constrained by 
market size, yielding a constrained expected profit E(Uj)^P=i, which is non­
monotonic in i, and which yields a threshold level i < i, below which the 
market size constraint is so restrictive that positive profits cannot be attained. 
Hence, in equilibrium (BO), a trade network is only viable for values of i that 
lie between the two thresholds.
Propositions (5) and (6) characterise the two equilibrium patterns.
P ro p o sitio n  5 I f  expected profits are monotonically increasing in i, then equi­
librium network size, P*, expected trade, E*(T), and expected welfare, E*(W), 
are:
y/c(i)2 +  [1 — S F  — [1 — g(i)] S, above which E(Hi) > 0.
P roof. Setting expected profit in equation (8) to zero, £ ”(n /) =  0 simplifies
where i is the positive threshold level o f information costs that solves c(i) +
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to give the following quadratic expression in P :
[1 -  q(i)] S P 2 -  2c(i)P  -  F  = 0 (11)
Equation (11) describes the combinations of i and P  for which E(H i) = 0. 
Equation (11) therefore reflects the iso-profit contour in (z, P) space, along 
which expected profits are zero. Let P(i) denote the positive, real root of
(11), in terms of z and parameters of the model, where:
P(i) gives a measure of the market size that would, given z, generate exactly 
enough revenue to cover the network set-up cost and variable costs. It can be 
interpreted as the minimum network size consistent with E(Hj) > 0, given z. 
If P(i) < 1, then the revenue generated from the unit measure of traders is 
sufficient to cover network costs so the intermediary invests in a trade network 
spanning the entire market. Conversely, for z where P(i) > 1, the measure of 
traders is not large enough for a viable network, so P* = 0.
If condition (10) holds for all values of i > 0 , then there is a unique value 
of i, z, that solves P(i) = 1 at which E(Hj) = 0. It follows that £'(11/) >  0 for 
i > i and £ (IIj)  < 0 for i < i. Hence, P* — 1 for values of i where P(i) < 1 
and 0 otherwise.
If P* = 0, then there is no intermediated trade. Expected trade volume
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is thus q (z) direct matches, generating an expected surplus of q (z) S. If P* — 
1, then the intermediary can match all pairs. It follows that all trade is 
intermediated and trade volume is 1. The expected welfare is the surplus 
generated from trade, S, less the network costs incurred by the intermediary. 
Hence, E*(W ) = S  — 2c(z) — F  when the intermediary is active. ■
Proposition 6 I f  expected profits are non-monotonic in i, then equilibrium
network size, P*, expected trade, E*(T), and expected welfare, E*(T), are:
0 z/ z G [0, min (z, 1)]
1 i f  i G [min (i, 1), min (z, l)]
0 z/z G [min (z, l)  , l]
q(i) i f i  G [0,min(!, 1)]
1 i f i £  [min (i , 1) , min (z, l)] 
q{i) i f i  G [min (z, l)  , l] 
q(i)S if  i G [0, min (i, 1)]
S  — 2c(i) — F  i f i E  [min (i, 1), min (z, l)] 
q(i)S i f i  G [min (7, l)  , l]
P* =
E*(T) -  <
E*(W) = <
where i and i are positive roots ofc(i) +  y/c{i)2 +  [1 — q(i)] S F  =  [1 — <?(«)] S, 
between which P (n /)  > 0 .
P roof. If d  (z) < —^rq[ (z) for z G 0, z and c' (z) >  (z) for z GP S j z,l
given P  > 0, then expected profit is non-monotonic in z and there are, in 
general, two positive, real roots of P(z) =  1. Let the two roots be defined as z 
and z, respectively, where z > i > 0 and i G [z,Tj. It follows that P (n /)  > 0
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for i £ [i,IJ, and E (H i) < 0 , otherwise. Hence, P* =  1 for i £ [i, I ] , and 0 
otherwise. E*(T ) and E*(W ) follow directly. ■
T rade an d  W elfare Since any unmatched network members in stage 3 
continue to have the opportunity to trade directly in stage 4, expected trade 
can never be lower with an active intermediary in the market than without. 
This is formalised in proposition (7).
Proposition 7 An active intermediary raises expected trade volume unam­
biguously compared to expected trade when only direct trade is possible.
Proof. Let E(T) denote expected trade volume. Investment in a network of 
size P , where P  £ [ 0 ,1], generates P 2 expected indirect matches in stage 3. 
A proportion q(i) of the remaining 1 — P 2 pairs trade directly in stage 4. It 
follows that:
E(T) = q(i) + P2 [l -q(i} ]  (13)
>  q(i) =  E ^ i T )
Expected trade volume with an intermediary is thus at least as great as when 
only direct trade is possible, for any choice of network size P. Moreover, 
expected trade is unambiguously higher when the intermediary is active. ■ 
The intermediary exploits his monopoly power and sets a commission rate 
that leave traders as well off (in expected terms) under the intermediation
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contract as through direct trade. Hence, the intermediary’s expected profit 
represents a pure welfare gain. The gain arises from the fact that the in­
termediary expands the set of possible production technologies for matching, 
while his exclusive appropriation of these welfare gains stems from his market 
power from being a monopolist provider5 of the indirect matching technology. 
Proposition (8) formalises this discussion.
P ro p o sitio n  8  An active intermediary raises expected welfare unambiguously 
compared to expected welfare when only direct trade is possible.
Proof. Let E DT(W ) denote expected welfare arising from direct trade, with­
out an intermediary. This mirrors expected trade, and is given by:
E d t (W) = q(i)S  (14)
Further, let E(W )  denote expected welfare with a trade network of any size P , 
where P  G [0,1]. The total surplus generated from direct and indirect trade is 
P 2S  and q(i) ( l — P 2) S, respectively. Subtracting the intermediary’s network 
costs gives:
E (W ) -  (1 -  P 2) q(i)S  +  P 2S -  2c{i)P -  F  (15)
5 Chapter 2 analyses the competitive interaction of two intermediaries in the two-sided 
market. For equilibria where both intermediaries are active, traders with access to  inter­
mediation services are, on average, strictly better off than those with access to  direct trade 
only.
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Rearranging (15) gives:
E (W ) = q{i)S +  [1 -  g(i)] S P 2 -  2c(i)P -  F  (16)
In equilibrium, P* > 0 if ^ (II /)  > 0, in which case (8) implies that [1 — q(i)] S  (-P*)2 > 
2c(i)P* — F. Moreover, for all values of i where E(Hj) <  0, P* = 0. Hence:
£*(W ) =  g(i)S  +  [1 -  ?(i)] S ( P ' f  -  2c(i)P* -  F (17)
> g(i)S  =  E d t (W)
Equilibrium expected welfare with an intermediary is thus at least as large 
as expected welfare when only direct trade is possible. Moreover, for levels 
of information costs where P* > 0, expected welfare is unambiguously higher 
with the intermediary. Proposition (8) follows directly. ■
Illustrative Examples To provide further intuition an illustrative example 
is provided for each of the two equilibrium patterns of intermediation. To add 
structure to the discussion, let marginal cost of network expansion c(i) and 
direct matching probability q(i) be specified as c(i) =  ia and q(i) — 1 — is, 
respectively, where a , 5 > 1. For these specifications, equilibrium pattern (AO) 
arises where 6 > a , while equilibrium pattern (BO) arises for parameter values 
where a > S. For sufficiently large trader surplus S  relative to network set-
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up cost F, the lower threshold levels of information cost above which the 
intermediary is active lie within i G [0,1]. Consider the following illustrative 
examples for each case.
Equilibrium Interm ediation Path (AO) Figure (2) illustrates the 
equilibrium path of network size with information costs, for which6 5 > a  
and thus where condition (10) is satisfied. A map of iso-profit contours is 
depicted where the lowest corresponds to zero profits, and illustrates P(i), the 
minimum network size that allows the intermediary to break even. Threshold 
i corresponds to P(i) = 1, below which the intermediary is inactive and above 
which network size is 1. The higher cost implications of higher prevailing 
information costs axe dominated by the commission effect through condition 
(10), so the intermediary is active for all i G i, 1 .
The corresponding expected trade pattern, E(T), is illustrated in figure 
(3). E d t (T) depicts the declining expected trade path that would prevail 
without an intermediary. Despite the relatively low level of information costs 
that prevail when the intermediary is inactive, a proportion of trade matches 
1 — q(i) is lost due to information frictions. As barriers to information flow 
worsen, an increasing measure of transactions fail to materialise, enabling the 
intermediary to become active beyond threshold i. The network enables all 
trading pairs to match indirectly, raising trade volume to 1, despite the larger
6All figures for equilibrium (A) are illustrated for S  =  9, q(i) =  1 — i4, c(i) — i2 and 
F  =  0.001.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium AO: path of network size with information costs.
frictions that a higher i implies. Moreover, Figure (4) illustrates the positive 
welfare effect of the intermediary’s investment. Since profits from intermedi­
ation are monotonically increasing in i, the welfare gain from intermediation 
increases as the barriers to information flow become more severe.
E quilibrium  In term ed ia tion  P a th  (BO) Consider the iso-profit map7 
in figure (5 ) which reflects the intermediary’s incentives where 6 < a. For 
relatively low levels of information costs i, expected profit is increasing with i. 
For this range of information costs the revenue effect of increasing information 
costs outweighs the cost effect. The trade-off between the two effects worsens 
with i , however, for any given network size P > 0, until eventually the cost
7All figures for equilibrium (B) are illustrated for S  = 1.2, q(i) =  1 — i3, c(i) = i6 and 
F  =  0.005.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium AO: expected trade path.
effect outweighs the revenue effect. A trade network is thus unviable when 
information costs are very low (i < i), or very high (i > i).
Figures (6) and (7) illustrate the corresponding expected trade volume 
and welfare effects. The trade network represents a more efficient informa­
tion technology than direct matching, thereby improving welfare, but over a 
limited range of i. The pattern of trade in equilibrium (B0) indicates that 
even small changes in information costs may have dramatic implications for 
the organisation of trade between direct and indirect as a result of pivotal 
thresholds that trigger network investment or, indeed, network collapse.
The model points to the possibility of a complete reorganisation of trade 
beyond threshold levels of information costs. The dramatic swings between 
direct trade and intermediated trade result from the linear network cost spec-
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Figure 4: Equilibrium AO: expected welfare path.
ification. Since both direct and intermediated trade is observed in practice, 
it is important to examine the conditions under which an interior equilibrium 
exists and how it may be affected by information costs. In the next section, 
network size is introduced as an argument of the intermediary’s cost function 
and the interior equilibrium solved analytically under convexity in network- 
building costs. Note that core propositions (7) and (8) do not rely on any 
assumptions on costs and q (i), so continue to hold.
1.2 Convex Network-Building Costs
This section allows the intermediary’s costs to depend on network size, P, in 
addition to information costs i. In particular, let marginal costs of network
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Figure 5: Equilibrium BO: path of network size with information costs, 
expansion be denoted by c(i,P), where:
c(0 ,-) =  0 ;c ( . ,0) =  0 
C i(t,P )>  0 ;Cit- ( i ,P )> 0  (18)
Cp(i,P) > 0 ; Cpp(i,P) > 0 
Cip(i,P) =  Cpi(i, P) > 0
As described in (18), c(i, P) is monotonically increasing in i, for any given 
network size P, and monotonically increasing in P, for any given level of 
information costs. Convexity in network size P  (but not i) is necessary in 
order to generate an interior equilibrium. Let c(i, P) be specified by equation 
(19), which satisfies the conditions in (18):
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Figure 6: Equilibrium BO: expected trade path.
c(i,P ) = 7 iapP, where a > l,j3 > 2 and 7  > 0 (19)
Parameter a  is the elasticity of cost c{i,P )  with respect to information 
costs i and /3 is the elasticity of cost c ( i,P ) with respect to network size P. 
Coefficient 7 is a shift factor, which raises (or lowers) network investment cost 
for given i and P. Total network investment cost C (P) = F  +  2ryiapP+1is 
thus convex in P.
Further, let q{i) be described by:
q(i) =  1 — is, where <5 >  1 (20)
Hence, from proposition (2), the commission rate demanded by the inter-
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Figure 7: Equilibrium BO: expected welfare path.
mediary in equilibrium is a}(i) = is. Parameter <5 thus denotes the elasticity 
of the equilibrium commission rate with respect to information cost i.
Substituting (19) and (20) into equation (8) yields the following expression 
for expected profits:
£(11/) =  [1 -  q(i)] S P 2 -  2Pc(i, P) — F
= S isP 2 -  27iapP+l -  F  (21)
Maximising (21) with respect to P  yields equilibrium network size in terms 
of a, /?, 7 , <5 and S. Analytically, this can be expressed 8 by:
8 A derivation of (22) is included in Appendix B.
45
p  = S is~a
i-i
> 0 (22)
.7(0 +  1).
Equilibrium network size is given by (22)y provided E (Ilj) > 0 and P  <  1, 
which shows that the equilibrium pattern of intermediation and trade depend 
on the relative values of 5 and a. The convexity of network investment costs 
gives rise to an interior equilibrium, subject to the constraint imposed by the 
size of the market and provided set-up costs F  are sufficiently low relative to 
trade surplus S .
Proposition (9) describes the necessary condition for expected profit in the 
interior equilibrium to be increasing in i.
P ro p o sitio n  9 Unconstrained expected profit is monotonically increasing with 
the level o f information costs i f  (/3 +  1)5 > 2a.
P roof. For proof see Appendix A. ■
Condition ((3 + 1)5 > 2a: implies that as information costs increase, the 
direct matching route worsens relatively more than the cost of network provi­
sion. This gives rise to higher expected profits for the intermediary by relaxing 
the constraint on the commission fee the intermediary can demand.
The analysis proceeds by distinguishing between four distinct equilibrium 
patterns of network investment. The parameter space can be split into four 
ranges, denoted by (Al)-(Dl), each corresponding to a different set of incen­
tives for network investment. These are discussed in turn.
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(A l)  5 > a > 1: For this parameter range, the elasticity of the intermediary’s 
optimal commission rate with respect to information costs, 5, exceeds 
the elasticity of the intermediary’s marginal cost of network expansion 
with respect to information costs, given by a. Hence, as information 
costs worsen, the increase in the commission rate the intermediary can 
command exceeds the increase in networking cost c(i, P ), making a net­
work expansion profitable. For this parameter range, optimal network 
size is increasing with i.
(B l)  <5 =  a > 1: If the elasticities of the commission rate and c(i, P ) are 
exactly equal, then the effects of changing information cost i on the in­
termediary’s cost and expected revenue exactly offset each other. Hence 
the intermediary’s optimal choice of network size is unchanging with i. 
Note, however, that while the intermediary’s investment decision is unaf­
fected at the margin, it follows from proposition (9) that unconstrained 
profits are increasing with i.
(C l)  < 5 < a: If the elasticity of marginal networking cost c(i, P) ex­
ceeds the elasticity of the commission rate with respect to i, then it 
is optimal for the intermediary to contract network size as information 
costs worsen. Despite the contracting network size, unconstrained ex­
pected profits are increasing with i. Recall that /3 is the elasticity of 
c(i, P) with respect to network size P. Since (ft +  1)£ > 2a holds, then 
within this range of parameter values, cost c(i, P) is sufficiently elastic
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with respect to network size P , so as to offset the effects of information 
cost i on c(i,P ), thereby raising equilibrium profit overall.
(D l)  5 < For this range of elasticities, the commission rate is less re­
sponsive to information cost i than is networking cost c(i, P ) and more­
over, the responsiveness of c(i, P ) with respect to P  is not sufficient so 
as to allow a contraction to offset the negative effect on expected profit. 
Hence, equilibrium (unconstrained) expected profit is decreasing with i.
The four equilibrium patterns of intermediation, (A l)-(Dl), shed light on 
how information frictions affect direct and indirect matching technologies. The 
model thus suggests that we can learn about the relative elasticities of the costs 
of network provision and the probability of direct matching from an empirical 
examination of the impact of changing information costs on intermediation.
The rest of the section formally characterises the interior equilibrium path 
of network size, expected trade and expected welfare for parameter ranges, 
(A l)-(Dl). Further intuition is provided through the discussion of illustrative 
examples.
1.2.1 E quilib rium  P a tte rn  of In te rm ed ia tio n  (A l)
P ro p o sitio n  10 I f  5 > a > 1, then the interior equilibrium is characterised 
by the following:
(a) Network size is increasing in the level of information costs i and trade 
surplus S  and decreasing in cost parameters j3 and 7 .
(b) The proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the level of 
information costs i. The relationship between total expected trade and infor­
mation costs is non-monotonic.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive and increas­
ing in the level of information costs i.
Proof. Formally, network size, P*, expected trade volume, E*(T), and ex­
pected welfare, E*(W ), are described by:
I f  0 < 2 < m i n | i , l j
1-1 i f  min l |  < i < min l j
i f  min |7 , 1 j  <  i < 1
q^ S—a
E*(T) -  <
i f  0 < i < min 1 j
E*(W) =  <
1 - t *
1 ~ i S +  Q^3+ij 7=1 i * / m i n |z , l |  <  2 <  m in |? , l |
1 i f  min |7 , 1j < i < 1
( l — is) S  i f  0 <  2 < min l |
( l  — 25) S  +  26SA&-1 — 2 'y A '^ i0‘ — F  i f  min 1 j- <  2 < min l |
S  — 272“ — F  i f  min |7 , 11 < 2 <  1
where A = =
2 /  \  /  „ \  ff+1 1 6{ P+  l ) - 2 a
7 *  £  W )  > 0
and 2 = > 0
For a full proof of the above see Appendix B.
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It follows from the interior equilibrium that:
{5 -  a) SdP* _
di 7  (/3 -  1) (0 +  1) V7(0 +  !) 
dP* n dP* „ dP* 
dS  > ’ d7  < 5 a/3 <
2-1
(3 — 1 /3 + l+ (g -----a )
i p- 1 > 0  when <5 > a
(23)
Moreover, E*{T) can be decomposed into direct and indirect equilibrium trade. 
Let direct9 and indirect trade in equilibrium be denoted by,£’| )(T),and EJ(T), 
respectively, where:
E b(T) = { l - i s) 1 -
S is~a
l i f t  +  !).
E}(T) = S is~a V - 1
7 (/? +  1)
(24)
(25)
Let the equilibrium direct and indirect trade shares be denoted by sp  and sj, 
respectively, where:
„ - E h ( T )
$ D  =
q(i) [l -  (P*)2]
E *(T ) q(i) [l -  (P*)2] +  (P*):
si = (P*);E (T ) q(i) [l — (P*)2] +  (P*)'
(26)
(27)
It is straightforward to show that < 0 and ^  > 0. Higher information
9 E&(T)  is not to be confused with E d t (T).  E p (T )  represents the equilibrium measure of 
direct trade matches, as a component of equilibrium total trade E*(T).  In contrast, E d t (T ) 
represents the measure of equilibrium total trade if there were no intermediary in the market.
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costs correspond to both a larger network size and a lower probability of direct 
matching. Both effects drive the result that the proportion of indirect trade 
to total trade is increasing in the level of information costs. Moreover, for 
2 6  [7, l ] , where P* =  1, all trade is intermediated, so sp = 0 and sj =  1. 
Recall that E DT(W ) is the expected welfare that would prevail if there were 
no intermediary in the market. It follows from (17) that E*(W ) — E DT(W) — 
£*(n) is a measure of the intermediary’s contribution to social welfare. More­
over, since 5 > a  > 1, it follows that 5 > Hence, from proposition
(9), E*(Uj)  is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium, so the contribution 
of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing in the level 
of information costs, where the intermediary is active.
■
Illustrative Example Figures (8) - (10) illustrate equilibrium network size, 
expected trade and expected welfare, respectively, for i 6  [0 , 1], for parameter 
values /? =  2 , 7  =  1, 5 =  4, a — 2, F  = 0.001 and S  - - {2.5,3,4), which satisfy 
S > a > 1 and the convexity assumption /? > 2 .
Figure (8) illustrates the positive relationship between optimal network 
size and prevailing information costs where the elasticity of the intermediary’s 
commission exceeds the elasticity of cost c(«, P) with respect to i. The fixed 
set-up cost F  implies that information costs must be above a threshold level for 
intermediation to be profitable in the two-sided market. The optimal network 
path is illustrated for (a) S  =  7 (/? +1), (b) S  > 7 (/3+ 1) and (c) S  < 7 (/?+ 1),
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verifying that network size and threshold level i are increasing in S  relative to 
cost parameters (3 and 7 .
Figure (9) illustrates the effect of intermediation on total expected trade 
between the two sides of the market. The intermediary’s network investment 
provides access to a more efficient matching technology than direct trade, 
thereby raising total trade relative to access to direct matching only. The 
relationship between expected trade volume and information cost i is non­
monotonic due to the conflicting effects of information cost i on the constituent 
parts of expected trade. For this range of parameters, the intermediary finds it 
optimal to increase network size with i , thereby increasing the expected mea­
sure of intermediated trade matches. The impact on direct trade is twofold. 
First, higher information cost worsens the probability of a direct match, and 
second, the expansion in network size results in a smaller expected pool of 
unmatched traders in stage 4. The net effect is ambiguous, giving rise to a 
non-monotonic relationship between i and total expected trade E (T ) in equi­
librium.
Figure (10) shows that intermediation is welfare improving and that it 
more so when information cost is higher.
1.2.2 E quilib rium  P a tte rn  o f In te rm ed ia tio n  (B l)
P ro p o sitio n  11 I f  6 =  a  > 1 and S  < 7 (^ +  1), then there exists an interior 
equilibrium characterised by the following:
(a) Network size is independent of the level of information costs i, increasing
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Al: path of network size with information costs.
in trade surplus S  and decreasing in cost parameters (3 and 7 .
(b) The measure o f intermediated transactions is independent o f the level o f 
inform ation costs but represents an increasing proportion o f total trade, which 
is unambiguously decreasing in inform ation costs i.
(c) The contribution o f intermediation to social welfare is positive and increas­
ing in the level o f inform ation costs i.
P ro o f . If 5 = a  > 1 and S  <  7 ( /3  +  1), then equilibrium network size, P * , 
expected trade  volume, E * (T ), and expected welfare, E *(W ), are described by:
0
P*
s
7(0+1)
i f  0  <  i <  m in jz, 1 j 
1 i f  min jz , 1 1  <  i <  1
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Al: expected trade path.
i f  0 <  i < min j i ,  l j
1 1 - B ~ ' i f  min 1 j  < i < 1
( l  — (S' i f  0 < 2 < mi n | « ,  l |
(1 -  i5) S  +  i6S B  A  -  2isj B ^  -  F  i f  m i n { ? , l } < « < l
where B  =  7^ 1) and i =
For a full proof of the above see Appendix C.
If S = a  > 1 and S  > 7  (/3 +  1), then the unit measure of market size poses 
a binding constraint. The constrained optimum network size is thus P* =  1, 
provided £7(11/) > 0. The equilibrium is analogous to that of proposition (5), 
with cost given by c(i, 1).
Whether constrained or unconstrained, the equilibrium network size is con­
stant over the range of values of i where £7(11/) >  0. It follows that the
54
E(W )
2.5 "
E(W)
2 "
1.5"
0.5"
0 0.2 0.6 0.8 11(a)
Figure 10: Equilibrium Al: expected welfare path.
measure of intermediated trade is also constant. Where P* < 1, Equations 
(24) and (25) simplify to:
It follows immediately from (28) and (29) that indirect trade is constant and 
direct trade decreases with i as the probability of successful matching declines. 
Hence, < 0 and > 0. At the limit where P* = 1, all trade is interme­
diated, so E*d (T) = sd = 0 and EJ(T) =  8j  — 1.
Furthermore, since 8 = a > 1, it follows that 8 > Hence, from
proposition (9), .E*(n/) is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium, so the
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contribution of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing 
in the level of information costs, where the intermediary is active.
The constrained profit path, where P* = 1 is lower than if the intermediary 
could expand the trade network further, but increasing in i nonetheless, since
£(n/)|/>=1 =  ii ( S - 27 ) - F .  ■
Illustrative Exam ple Figures (11) and (12) illustrate10 the equilibrium 
network size where 5 — a  > 1. Figure (11) shows that optimal network size 
is unaffected by the level of information cost i. The intermediary’s optimal 
investment is again increasing in S  relative to cost parameters /3 and 7 . Figure
(12) shows that expected trade volume decreases monotonically with i, but lies 
above the expected trade path that prevails with access to direct matching 
only.
1.2.3 Equilibrium Pattern o f Interm ediation (C l)
Proposition 12 I f- ^ j-a < 8  < a, then the interior equilibrium is charac­
terised by the following:
(a) Network size is decreasing in the level of information costs i and cost pa­
rameters /3 and 7  and increasing in trade surplus S.
(b) Indirect trade is decreasing and direct trade increasing in information costs 
i. Total expected trade is unambiguously decreasing in information costs i.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive and increas-
10Figures (11) and (12) are illustrated for /3 — 2, 7 =  1, a  = 5 =  3, F  =  0.001 and 
S = {  2 ,3}.
p 1 r
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0.75'
S/3
0.5"
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Figure 11: Equilibrium Bl: path of network size with information costs. 
ing in the level o f information costs i.
P ro o f . If 7^ -j-a < 6 < a,  then equilibrium network size, P* , expected trade
volume, E*(T) ,  and expected welfare, E* (W ),  are described by:
0 i f  0 < i  < min j t ,  1 j
1 i f  min jz, l j  < i < min | 7, l jP* =
S
7 (y S + l )ia~6
1 - i *
1 i f  min jz, 1 j  <  i <  1
i f  0 < z < m in jz ,  l |
E*(T) = <
E*(W ) =
1
1 - i 6 +
( l  — is ) S  
S  -  27zQ -  F
•p—J S(P+l)~2a
i * '
i f  min jz, l |  < i < min 1 j
 -
i f  min <z, l z < z < l
i f  0 < i < min 1 j  
i f  min jz, l j  < i  < min j i ,  l j
(1 - i 6) S  + i6S G ^  - 2 - / G ^ i a - F  i f  m i n j ? , l j < z < l
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Figure 12: Equilibrium Bl: expected trade path.
where G = y0 +\yia-& and i is the11 smaller positive root of
£(II/),p=1 =  Sis — 27ia — F — 0 and i = 
The proof of the above is in Appendix D.
It follows from the interior equilibrium that:
S
tP+T)
1
ot — l > 0.
dP*
di
(a — 6 ) S
7 ( 0 - l ) ( 0 + l )  \7 (^  +  l)
ff+l+(g a)
i P~l < 0 when a > S
dP* n dP* n dP* n> 0 ; - r — < 0 ; ^ 7^  < 0ds dp (30)
11 This is the threshold above which the intermediary can attain a positive profit. It is 
computed based on the constrained profit equation, where P  =  1. If F  is sufficiently high, 
however, market size is not a binding constraint in the region where 1?(II/) =  0. so the
threshold which applies is: iip- p  = > 0.
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Hence, optimal network size is decreasing in i and cost parameters, but in­
creasing in S. Moreover, E*D(T), and EJ(T ),are given by:
The decline in network size with information cost i is mirrored by E} (T ) when 
a > 5. The decline in intermediated matches with i increases the measure of 
traders seeking a direct match in stage 4. At the same time, a higher i implies 
a lower probability of successful direct matching.
Furthermore, since 6  > it follows from proposition (9) that E*(Hj)
is increasing in information cost i in the interior equilibrium. Hence, the 
contribution of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing 
in the level of information costs, where the intermediary is active.
■
1.2.4 E quilib rium  P a tte rn  o f In te rm ed ia tio n  (D l)
P ro p o sitio n  13 I f  5 < then the interior equilibrium is characterised
by the following:
(a) Network size is decreasing in the level of information costs i and cost pa­
rameters /3 and 7  and increasing in trade surplus S.
(b) Indirect trade is decreasing and direct trade increasing in information costs
2
(31)
(32)
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i. Total expected trade is unambiguously decreasing in information costs i.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive but decreas­
ing in information costs i.
P roof. If 5 < then equilibrium network size, P*, expected trade vol­
ume, E*(T), and expected welfare, E*(W), are described by:
0 i f  0 < i<  m in |i |F=1, l |
1 i f  min | 2|p=1, l |  < i <  min |T, l |  
i f  min j?, l j  <  i < min j«|P=p, l}  
i f  min | i |p =p, l |  < i < 1
P* = I
7(/S+l )ic
E*(T) - <
i f  0 < i < min |i jp =1, 1 j 
i f  min | i |p =1, l |  < i < min l |
1 £ 3 1  * ( f l + l ) - 2 «  rZ. > 'I
I e- 1 i f  m m |2, l j  <  * < n n n |« (p=p , l |
E*(W) = <
1 - i 5 
1
l - i 5 +
1 — i6 i f  min | 2|p=p, 1 j  < i < 1
( l — is) S  i f  0 <  i < min | 2|p=1, l |
S  — 2r)ia — F  i f  min | 2|p=i, l |  <  2 <  min |7 , l |
(l — is) S  +  isS A ^  — 2/yA'0-i ia — F  i f  min |7 , l j  < i < min | i |p =p, 1 j
(l — 25) S  i f  min | 2|P=p, 1 j  < i < 1
where A  — Tp+i) 2 =
s
7(^+1)
1
a —<5 > 0,
2|p_i is the smaller positive root of E(U])\p=i = S i6 — 272“ — F  =  0
andy = p -  [(^ )<’1 (V) (m)8']P+1 I  2 a -< 5 ( /3 + l) > 0.
For a proof of the above see Appendix E. The trade effects follow from the
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proof of Proposition (13). Expected profit is unconstrained in the interior 
equilibrium. Since 5 then it follows from proposition (9) that ex­
pected profit and thus the contribution of intermediation to social welfare is
decreasing in the level of information costs i. ■
Illu stra tiv e  E xam ple Figure (13) illustrates12 the pattern of network in­
vestment where 5 < For this range of elasticities, the commission rate
is less responsive to information cost i than is networking cost giv­
ing rise to a negative relationship between network size and information costs 
along the interior path. Moreover, as illustrated in figure (14), unconstrained 
expected profit, denoted by E u (Hi) rises without limit as i —> 0, which im­
plies that in the absence of a binding market size constraint, the intermediary 
finds it profitable to invest in an an ever-increasing network size as informa­
tion costs tend to zero. Thus below threshold i , equilibrium network size is 
constrained by the size of the market. For interval i G J^0 ,TJ the intermediary’s 
expected profits follow the constrained path, denoted by E c (U.j)^p^i in figure 
(14). While unconstrained expected profit is increasing , constrained expected 
profit is declining as information costs tend to zero, rendering the network 
unviable below some threshold level i.
12 Illustrated for parameter values a: =  6, 5 =  3, — 2, 7 =  1, F  =  0.1, and S  =  2.
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Figure 13: Equilibrium Dl: path of network size with information costs.
1.3 Conclusion
This chapter presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information 
asymmetry between trade partners, where an intermediary has the opportunity 
to invest in a network of contacts and facilitate trade matching for a success 
fee. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on 
incentives for trade intermediation, thereby endogenising the pattern of direct 
and indirect trade.
The framework delivers four key results. First, intermediation unambigu­
ously raises expected trade volume and social welfare by expanding the set 
of matching technologies available to traders. Second, convexity in network- 
building costs is necessary for both direct and indirect trade to arise in equi­
librium; otherwise, the level of information costs determines whether all trade
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Figure 14: Equilibrium D l: constrained and unconstrained profits.
is routed through the intermediary or takes place directly.
Third, under assumptions of convexity in the intermediary’s technology, 
optimal network size and hence the equilibrium pattern of trade is shown to 
depend on the level of information costs as well as the relative effectiveness of 
direct and indirect matching technologies with changing information costs. In 
particular, if the probability of direct matching is more responsive to changing 
information costs than is the cost of network expansion, then indirect trade 
offers a relatively more attractive matching technology than direct trade as 
information costs rise. Hence, the proportion of indirect trade to total trade 
is increasing in the level of information frictions. Conversely, if networking 
costs are more responsive than the probability of a direct match, then the 
intermediary has an incentive to contract network size with the opposite trade
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implications. The model thus suggests that we can learn about the relative 
elasticities of direct and indirect matching technologies from an empirical ex­
amination of the impact of changing information costs on intermediation.
Finally, the model sheds light on the relationship between information fric­
tions and aggregate trade volume, which may be non-monotonic as a result of 
conflicting effects of information costs on the incentives for direct and indirect 
trade. Higher information costs worsen direct matching prospects but can, 
at the same time, provide an incentive for network-building and thus indirect 
trade through a trade network.
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A p p en d ix  A . P r o o f  o f  P ro p o sitio n  9.
Differentiating (21) partially with respect to i yields:
=  - p  [2a  (», P) + P S ,i  (i)] (33)
It follows directly that expected profits are increasing with i, if:
P C
Ci(i,P) < — — 4  (j) (34)
Substituting for Ci (i , P ) and (( (i) simplifies the condition to:
p e +1 <
2«7 (35)
q jS —ot
7(/3+l)Substituting the expression for (interior) equilibrium network size, P* = 
and rearranging, yields the necessary and sufficient condition for unconstrained 
equilibrium profits, I?* (II/), to be increasing in i:
p-i
(/3 +  1)5 > 2a (36)
A p p en d ix  B . P r o o f  o f  P ro p o sitio n  10.
Maximising (21) with respect to P  yields the first order condition:
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-  2P  S i6 - 7 (/? +  1) -  0 (37)
Solving yields the interior profit-maximising network size, P , where:
P  = ' S i5~a ' 
_l(P +  1).
> 0 (38)
The second order condition is found to be:
d2E(Ui) _  0 
dP 2
The second order condition is negative provided p  > Since
~  r -  i  1(3 > 2 , P  > /?_1 and so corresponds to an interior maximum.
The intermediary sets P  = P  provided E(Ui) > 0 and P  < 1. Let i de­
note the threshold level of information costs at which E(Ili)^p_p = 0. Since 
<5 >  a > 1, it follows that (f3 +  1)5 > 2a, so, from proposition (9), -E(II/) 
is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium. Hence, -E'(nj) >  0 when i > i. 
Solving E(J\.i)^p=p = 0 for i yields:
0 ,min | i ,  1 j j .Equilibrium network size is thus P* =  0 for i G 
Furthermore, P  is increasing in i since 5 > a > 1, but network size is con­
strained by market size.
Let i denote the threshold level of information costs, at which P  = 1. Solving 
P  = 1 for i yields:
~ r ^ + i ) - ] ^  (4i)
i =
Hence, equilibrium network size is P* — 1 for i G Jmin l | , l j .
For values i G min l |  ,min 1 j j , where E(Uj) > 0 and P  < 1, network
size follows the interior path P* = P  =
i/3-1 . These results are sum­
marised by:
0 i f  0 < i < m i n | i ,  l |
P *= t  ^  min { 2, 1} < i <  m in { ? ,l j
1 i f  min |  z, 1 j < 2 < 1
where i = 1
9 / \ / \ P+1 ~l S(0+l)-2a
^ ( A )  ( ^ )  1 >  0 and i = 7(^+1)s > 0.
If 0 < 2 < min I?, 1 j, then the intermediary does not invest in a trade net­
work and all trade takes place directly. The expected trade volume is thus 
9(2) =  1 — i5. If min j?, l j  < 2 < 1, then the intermediary’s network spans 
the entire market so all transactions are intermediated and trade volume is 1. 
For values of 2 , min j i ,  l j  < 2 < min j?, l j ,  both direct and indirect trade 
are observed in equilibrium. Substituting P* into equation (13) yields the 
equilibrium expected (total) trade path over this range of information costs.
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These results axe summarised by:
1 — is i f  0 < i < m i n | i ,  l j
la zr  S ( 0 + i ) - 2 c  'lq_y i 0-1 i f  mjn 1 i  j. < i < min < *, 1 1 
i f  min |7 , l |  <  i < 1
E*(T) =  < 1 - i 5 + 
1
where i —
9 /  \  /  „ \  ^+1 1 6 ( 0 + l ) - 2 a
7 ^  ( / l )  1 >  0 and ii=
1
S—c > 0 .
Finally, the piece-wise function E*(W) follows directly from substitution
of P* = 0, qi&—ot7(^+1) and 1, respectively, into equation (17). This yields:
(l — is) S  i f  0 < i < m i n | i ,  l |
E*(W ) — < _  it'j c> _|_ _  2')A^z:iiCL — F  i f  min | i ,  1 j- < i <  min |7 , l j
S  — 272° — F  i f  min j?, 1 j  < i < 1
where i =  
A -  s ^ ~ a.
( * )  m
|± * 1  6 ( 0 +  l ) -2 a
> 0 and i = 4~“ > 0 and
A p p en d ix  C . P r o o f  o f  P ro p o sitio n  11.
The equihbrium path if <5 =  a > 1 follows directly from equation (22). If 
5 — a — 0, then P  simplifies to:
P\5=a 7(/? +  l) .
1
3 -1
> 0 (42)
P\$=a is a positive constant, that represents the profit maximising network 
size. From (42) it follows that equilibrium network size, trade and welfare 
depend on whether (i) S  < 7 (/? -1-1) or (ii) S  > 7 ((3 -f 1):
(i) If S  < 7 (/? +  1), then P\s=a < 1- i > 0 denote the threshold level
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of i at which E*(Ui) = 0. Since 6 — a, it follows from proposition (9) that 
(j3 +  1)<5 > 2a, so E(Hi) is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium. Hence, 
E( n / )  < 0 when i < i. Solving E(Hi)^p_p — 0 for i and simplifying yields:
i = > 0 (43)
0 ,min j i ,  1 j jEquilibrium network size is thus P* =  0 for i G 
For all values of i > i, expected profits are positive, so the intermediary 
invests in contact-building to P\s=a < 1- Equilibrium network size is thus 
P* -  P\5=a for i e mm
and S7(/3+1)
l
l |  , l j .  Furthermore, substituting both P* = 0 
into equations (13) and (17), respectively, yields the piece- 
wise functions E*(T) and E*(W).
(ii) If S  > 7 (/?+ 1), then P\s=a >  1, so the constraint imposed by market size 
is binding. The constrained optimum is thus P* =  1, provided E(H i) > 0. 
The equilibrium is analogous to that described in proposition (5). P* =  0 
below a threshold value i, that solves E (n /) |p =1 =  is (S — 27) — F  — 0, and 
P* = 1 otherwise.
A p p en d ix  D . P r o o f o f  P rop o sitio n  12.
The equilibrium path if a < S < a  follows directly from equation (22). 
Since 6 < a, then P  can be rearranged to give:
-^ l 5<oc
_7(/? +  l ) ia—5
l
> 0 (44)
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From (44) it follows that ^  < 0, so the interior equilibrium path of network 
size is declining with information cost i. Moreover, the second order condition 
in equation (39) is negative provided P  . Since /? > 2 it
i
must be true that P\$<a > ^  • Hence (44) corresponds to an
interior maximum.
Let i denote the threshold level of information costs, at which P\$<a = 1. 
Solving for i yields:
S  1 ^ (45)
.7 (0 + 1).
Let i denote the threshold level of information costs at which ^ (n / )  =  0. Since 
the interior equilibrium path of network size is declining with information cost 
i, then for sufficiently low F, the threshold i corresponds to a range where 
P  =  1. If so, then i solves £ '(n /) |p =1 =  S is—2'yia —F  = 0 and i < i , where i is 
described by equation (45). If (for sufficiently high F) threshold i corresponds 
to a range where P  = P\$<a, however, then i solves E(Ilj)^p=p  = 0. This yields 
the threshold level in equation (40) and must exceed i, where i is described 
by equation (45). If the value of Pj(5<a at E(Hi)^p=p — 0 exceeds 1, then this 
indicates that the constrained optimisation applies and the relevant threshold 
is i solves i? (n j) |p =1 =  S is — 2'yia — F  =  0.
These results are summarised by:
0 i f  0 < i < min I?, 11
1 i f  min |z , l j  < i < min l |P*=<
s
7(/?+l ) i a ~ s ' 1 i f  min 1 j < i < 1
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where i is as above and i = s7(0+1)
l
a —<5
> 0.
The piece-wise functions E*(T) and E*(W) follow directly from P* and 
equations (13) and (17), respectively.
A p p en d ix  E. P r o o f  o f  P ro p o sitio n  13.
If 8 — 0Ti a ’ then from proposition (9) it follows that 7?(IIj) is decreasing 
in information cost i in the interior equilibrium. Moreover, since 8 < a , the 
interior path is described by P^<a , where Pj<$<Q is given by equation (44). 
The declining profits along the equilibrium path imply that as i —► 0, P  —> oo, 
hence the constraint that P  = min | p ,  1 jis  binding. Let i denote the thresh­
old level of information costs, at which P\s<a =  1- This corresponds to the 
threshold given by equation (45).
Further, let i denote the threshold level of information costs at which P (II/) =
0. While unconstrained profit is decreasing with i , constrained profit P (II/) |p =1 
is increasing for low values of i (hence, expected profit is non-monotonic with 
information cost i. Case D under convex network-building costs is analogous 
to Equilibrium B described in proposition (6) under the linear cost specifica­
tion).
Let i\p=i solve P (II/)|p=1 =  0 and i\p=p solve E(Hj)^p=;p = 0. It follows 
from <5 < ^ - a  and the definition of i that i\p=\ < i < P=p- Thus, E(Hj) 
is non-negative between these thresholds. Hence, the intermediary is inactive
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p*=
for low levels of information cost i < ijp-^and also for i > i^ p=p.
0 i f  0 < i <  min |f |p =1, l |
1 i f  min |z |p =i, l |  <  f < min |7 , l |
1
1 i f  min |7 , 1 j < i < min ^ p==p, 1 j
i f  min | i |p =p, 1 j < i < 1 
The piece-wise functions E*(T) and E*(W) follow directly from P* and equa­
tions (13) and (17), respectively.
0
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2 C om peting for C ontacts: N etw ork C om petition , 
Trade Interm ediation  and Fragm ented D uopoly
This chapter extends the two-sided, pairwise matching model with a single 
intermediary, developed in Chapter 1, to analyse the effects of competition 
between intermediaries on endogenous network-building. The simplest frame­
work within which to undertake such an analysis is the case of two trade 
intermediaries competing in network size and commission rates.
The model analyses the strategic interaction between two information in­
termediaries with symmetric access to an information technology that allows 
them to develop contacts with importers and exporters seeking to form unique 
trade matches. The intermediation analysed takes the form of information in­
termediation, where the role of intermediaries is to facilitate matching in a 
market with information frictions. Intermediaries thus seek to match mem­
bers of their network of contacts for a success fee.
The related literature on competition between information intermediaries 
is limited to relatively few contributions, where these focus on competing 
‘cybermediaries’ who seek to match two sides of a market on the Internet 
(Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, 2003). The main role of intermediaries in this 
literature is to gather and process information on users that visit their website 
so as to assist buyers and sellers in matching through their web service. This 
literature focuses on the effects of competition between online intermediaries 
in the presence of asymmetric network externalities where the value of an in­
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termediary to a buyer depends on the number of sellers or goods that can be 
accessed through the intermediary (e.g. access to books through Amazon ver­
sus a smaller online seller). The literature discusses different pricing rules and 
contractual arrangements between users and intermediaries and contrasts the 
effects with the findings of the traditional literature on network competition 
(for example, Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
This chapter examines a framework of competition in information inter­
mediation that differs from this literature. The focus of the model is the 
endogenous network investment decision of competing intermediaries, which 
in turn affects the nature of competition between them. While the importance 
of network size for competition is addressed in the literature, this is explored in 
the context of network externalities, whereby an intermediary that offers wider 
access to trading partners is considered more valuable to traders. The analysis 
in this chapter does not consider network externalities of this kind. Moreover, 
there are no asymmetries built into the model (although asymmetries between 
intermediaries may arise in equilibrium). In fact, the model assumes that 
traders receive intermediation offers by intermediaries after uncertainty about 
matching possibilities is resolved. That is, traders who find themselves in a 
position to choose between the two competing intermediaries, do so in the 
knowledge that a match with their unique trading partner is possible.
The model focuses on the competition between intermediaries in commis­
sion rates and the coordination game played by trading partners who must
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select between intermediaries. Moreover, in contrast to the analysis of Chap­
ter 1, where the intermediary has exclusive access to traders in his network, the 
competition between intermediaries gives rise to a distinctive market structure 
as a result of network overlap and the inability to price discriminate between 
groups of network members. In particular, intermediaries are monopolist ser­
vice providers to some contacts but duopolists over contacts they share in 
their network overlap. The chapter thus models competition between infor­
mation intermediaries as a fragmented duopoly with a competitive and a non­
competitive segment, which gives rise to an undercutting game in commission 
rates with no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
To the best of my knowledge there is no literature that examines compe­
tition in endogenous network formation in this way.
A few references in the Industrial Organisation literature consider markets 
with similar characteristics. Baye and De Vries (1992) develop a model with 
brand loyal consumers and price-sensitive consumers, in a market where price 
discrimination is not possible. They too find no pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
in prices.
Beard, Ford, Hill and Saba (2005) build a model directly applicable to ca­
ble television service competition, in which cable networks overlap, but price 
discrimination across users is not possible. They do find a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in prices, despite the fragmented nature of the market, as a result 
of smoothness conditions that ensure demand is decreasing in price in both
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market segments. The network overlap itself is exogenous in Beard, Ford, 
Hill and Saba (2005), while the distribution of brand loyal versus price sen­
sitive consumers is also arbitrary in Baye and De Vries (1992). In contrast, 
intermediaries’ network sizes are endogenous in the model developed in this 
chapter.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the eco­
nomic environment and describes the timing of the game between traders and 
intermediaries. The subgame perfect equilibrium is characterised in Section 2. 
Section 3 provides two illustrative examples. Section 4 concludes.
2.1  E con om ic E nvironm ent
Consider the two-sided market of Chapter 1, where a continuum of risk-neutral 
importers (M) and a continuum of exporters (X), each distributed uniformly 
and with unit density over [0 , 1], match uniquely to exchange a single unit of 
output generating joint surplus S  > 0. There is two-sided information asym­
metry as traders regarding the location of trading partner on the continuum. 
Due to the infinite number of importers (and exporters) along the continuum, 
the probability of any trader j  locating her partner through random selection 
is 0 .
Each pair (Xj , Mj )  may match through a direct matching technology, 
which achieves successful matching with probability q(i), where i reflects the 
level of information costs or barriers to information flow between the two sides 
of the market and i 6  [0,1]. Let qf(i) < 0, q( 1) =  0 and q{0) =  1. This direct
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matching technology could reflect a search process whose success hinges on 
the state of information technology.
Alternatively, traders may match through a trade intermediary. Suppose 
there are two intermediaries, A  and B , with access to the same technology for 
developing a network of contacts. The network of intermediary I  is denoted 
by a measure of importer contacts, Pm i , and exporter contacts, P xi, where 
Pm  I € [0,1] and P x i € [0,1], respectively, for I  — {A ,B }. Given network 
size, the measure of feasible trade matches depends on the degree of overlap 
between importer and exporter contacts and is a random variable. For any 
given network investment, expected matches are maximised through symmet­
ric contact-building13 in the two sides of the market. Hence intermediaries 
ensure Pm i = P x i = Pi V/, where Pj G [0,1].
Network set-up costs are assumed to be zero, for simplicity. Let C (Pi) 
denote the total investment cost for a symmetric network of size Pi on either 
side of the market. The network investment decisions of intermediaries are 
analysed under two cost specifications:
(a) Linear costs: C (Pi) = 2P/c, where c > 0.
(b) Convex costs: C (Pi) =  2Pic(i,P i), where c(i,Pi) = 7 iaP f and a > 1,
7  > 0 .
For simplicity, it is assumed costless to match trade pairs from within the 
network of contacts. Hence, each intermediary has a marginal cost of interme-
13 This is proposition 1 of Chapter 1.
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diation equal to zero. Intermediaries receive a success fee or commission for 
each intermediated trade match. Let a  a and a s  denote the commission rates 
of intermediaries A  and B, respectively, where a  a  £ [0,1] and a s  £ [0,1].
The marginal revenue from intermediation is thus 0 ^ 5  and a s S  for A  and B, 
respectively. Residual trade surplus is assumed to be shared equally between 
the importer and exporter.
The demand for each intermediary’s services depends on two factors. First, 
the network size decisions of the two intermediaries. A larger network size 
gives rise to a larger measure of expected matches through the network, but 
also increases the expected overlap between networks. Expected overlap gives 
rise to an expected measure of common matches that can be intermediated 
through either network and for which intermediaries compete. Second, traders 
with access to both trade networks must choose between the intermediaries ex 
post and play a coordination game.
2.1.1 T im ing o f th e  G am e
Intermediaries and traders interact strategically in a multi-stage game. The 
timing of the game is as follows.
S tage 1 - N etw ork  investm ent: Intermediaries A  and B  simultaneously 
and non-cooperatively choose network sizes Pa and Pb - Network in­
vestment costs are sunk.
S tage 2 - C om m ission se tting : Intermediaries simultaneously and non-cooperatively
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commit to commission rates a  a and a# , respectively.
S tage 3 - In te rm ed ia tio n  offers: Uncertainty over which trade matches are 
feasible through each network is resolved. Each intermediary makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it intermediation offer to traders that can be matched, 
specifying his commission rate. Successful matching is conditional on 
both trade partners accepting an offer by the same intermediary. Traders 
accept at most one offer.
S tage 4 - In d irec t trad e : Indirect trade takes place through A  and/or B.
Stage 5 - D irec t trad e : Any unmatched traders trade directly with proba­
bility q { i ) .
2.1.2 E qu ilib rium  C oncept
The solution concept used is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and the 
method used is backward induction. A strategy for intermediary I  is described 
by a pair { P j , c x j } .  An offer acceptance strategy for trader j  is described by a 
pair {Ra,R s}, where R a is a rule for determining whether an intermediation 
offer is acceptable and R s is a rule for selecting between acceptable offers. A 
set of strategy pairs, for intermediaries and traders, respectively, can be said 
to form an equilibrium of the game if these maximise the expected profit of 
each intermediary and the expected surplus from trade of each trader, given 
the strategies of all other players.
The subgame perfect equilibria of the game are characterised over the next
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sections.
2 .2  T raders’ In cen tives
Traders select their offer acceptance strategy to maximise their expected pay­
off taking intermediaries strategies as given. Each trader in receipt of one 
or more offers must decide whether to accept one (or none) of the offers of 
intermediation. If all offers are rejected in stage 3 then trade can only take 
place directly in stage 5 of the game with probability q(i). The expected pay­
off from the direct trade route represents the outside option available to all 
traders and forms the benchmark against which all intermediation offers axe 
assessed. Equilibrium rule Ra summarises this assessment through a partici­
pation constraint.
Although uncertainty about available matching opportunities is resolved at 
the time of traders’ decision-making, indirect trade between matching trade 
partners is not guaranteed. The uncertainty in the outcome of the model 
arises, in part, from the coordination game played by traders in receipt of two 
offers of intermediation. Equilibrium rule R s summarises the incentives for 
selecting between available offers of intermediation, when both of these are 
acceptable. Since traders cannot communicate their intentions, there is a non­
zero probability of coordination failure as a result of mismatch in coordination 
decisions.
The incentives of traders at each decision node of the game are examined 
in turn.
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2.2.1 Stage 5 - D irect Trade
The pool of traders who attempt to match directly in stage 5 are those who 
either (a) receive no offers of intermediation , (b) accept no offers of interme­
diation, and (c) accept one offer but fail to match as a result of coordination 
failure. Since importers and exporters are assumed to match uniquely, any 
unmatched trader j  can be assured that her trading partner is also a member 
of the pool of unmatched traders. The probability of a direct match, q(i),
depends on the prevailing, level of information costs, reflected in parameter
i. Assuming trade surplus is shared equally between trading partners, the 
expected payoff from direct trade of any trader j  is given by:
=  \q ( i)S  (46)
Recall from Chapter 1, that a monopolist intermediary sets his commission 
rate at 1 — q(i), thereby leaving traders indifferent between direct and indirect 
trade. Let a M denote the monopoly commission rate, where a M — 1 — q(i). 
Expressing (46) in terms of a M gives:
S DT(nj ) =  i ( l - a M) S  (47)
The expected payoff from direct trade reflects traders’ outside option. All 
offers of intermediation must generate an expected payoff at least as good 
as in order to be acceptable. Interpreting equation (47), duopolist
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intermediaries must offer traders an expected payoff from indirect trade at 
least as good as that which would have been received under a monopolistic 
market structure.
2.2.2 Stage 3 - Interm ediation Offers
In stage 3, traders X j  and Mj  find themselves in one of four positions:
(1) Pair (X j , M j ) cannot match through either intermediary.
(2) Pair (Xj,  Mj)  can match through A,  but not B; traders receive one offer 
from A .
(3) Pair (Xj,  Mj)  can match through B,  but not A; traders receive one offer 
from B.
(4) Pair (Xj ,Mj)  can match through either A  or B] traders receive two 
intermediation offers.
If in (1), then Xj  and Mj  have no option but direct trade in stage 5. If in 
position (2)-(4), then X j  and Mj  contrast the expected payoff from each offer 
received against the expected payoff from direct trade.
Let U f denote the payoff of trader j  from indirect matching through A  and 
n f  the payoff through B,  where these are given by (48) and (49), respectively:
U f =  i ( l - a A) S
nf = i ( i  —«B)S
(48)
(49)
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It follows directly from (47), (48) and (49), that if a a < o M, then interme­
diation through A  is acceptable and if olb < o M, then intermediation through 
B  is acceptable. In general, all offers must satisfy the participation constraint 
otj <  c*M in order to be acceptable.
In the case where X j  and Mj  receive only one offer, the optimal selection 
rule is thus to accept the unique acceptable offer. The optimal acceptance 
strategy conditional on one offer being received is thus ‘accept offer I  if a j < 
a M; reject otherwise’. The next section examines the selection decision of 
traders in receipt of two offers.
T he  T rad e r C oord ina tion  Subgam e Consider a trade pair (Xj,  Mj)  that 
can match through either A  or B.  In stage 3, X j  and Mj  each receive two 
offers of intermediation. They apply optimal rule R a to assess the acceptability 
of each offer. Since expected payoffs are symmetric for both traders, their 
assessment of offers is identical.
If both offers are deemed unacceptable, Xj  and Mj  reject both offers and 
can expect to receive E DT(Jlj) in stage 5. If one offer is acceptable and the 
other unacceptable, then the optimal decision is for X j  and Mj  to reject the 
unacceptable offer and trade indirectly in stage 4. Hence, in the case of one 
acceptable offer, there is no possibility of coordination failure.
If both received offers prove to be acceptable for Xj  and Mj,  then each 
trader j  must choose between them. This gives rise to a coordination game 
between X j  and Mj.  As with all games of this class, there are three equilibria,
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two symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria (both choose A  or both choose 
B)  and one symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where both traders 
choose A  (or B)  with the same probability.
If both Xj  and Mj  accept A  in stage 3, then each receives 11^. If they 
both accept B,  then each receives IIj*. If one accepts B  and the other A,  then 
indirect trade cannot take place due to coordination failure. Thus mismatch 
can arise in the model even though both traders are members of both networks 
and both offers are acceptable. If coordination failure takes place, traders can 
expect to receive expected payoff E DT(Hj). Table (1) describes the payoff 
structure of the coordination game:
M j
A  B
A
Xj
B
For both offers to be acceptable, it must be the case that ola < <*M and 
a s  <  o lm  are satisfied. This allows the payoffs in table (1) to be ranked, 
confirming (A, A)  and (B,B)  as the two pure strategy Nash equilibria of the 
coordination game. Either both traders accept A , or both accept B.
Allowing traders to randomise over A  and B , such that Xj  accepts A  with 
probability A (and B  with 1 — A) and Mj  accepts A  with probability p. (and
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f  (1 -  a A), f  (1 -  a A )
| ( l - a M), f ( l - 0 f ( l -  a B), f  (1 -  <*b)
Table 1: Traders’ Coordination Game
B  with 1 — fi), it is straightforward to show14 the coordination game has one 
symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (A*,/t*) where:
(X ^  —  Ct ft\*  =z H* = “ ------ ^ ----  (50)
2 a M — a B — oca
Combining (50) and the pure strategy payoffs allows the expected payoff 
for each trader j  in the the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to be computed:
a M -  olb ( . a M -  aA ( M\
2aM - a B - a A ^  2aM -  a B -  a A  ^ Q
(51)
We can now distinguish between three cases: (a) a  a < &B, (b) a B < a a 
or (c) aA =  a B. If either (a) or (b) holds, then the game between X j  and Mj  
becomes a Ranked Coordination game, which has the additional feature that 
the equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
Consider case (a) where a a < ctB. If intermediary A  offers to match 
pair j  for a lower commission than B, then the payoffs received from pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium (^4,^4) dominate those from (B, B). By inspection 
of (51) it can also be observed that E(Jlj)\\*^* < 11^. Hence pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium (v4, A) is Pareto superior to the other Nash equilibria of the 
coordination game. It can thus be said that although there are three equilibria,
14 A derivation of the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and associated expected  
payoff, of the coordination game is included in Appendix A.
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the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (A, A) offers a compelling focal point15 of 
the Ranked Coordination game when a a < cub-
Similar arguments apply in case (b), which lead to the result that {B ,B ) 
is Pareto superior to the other two Nash equilibria providing a focal point of 
the coordination game when < ctA-
In case (c), where a a  = olb, both pure strategy Nash equilibria yield 
symmetric payoffs and A * = fi* — Since the two intermediaries are indis­
tinguishable and there is no way for trade partners to indicate their action to 
each other, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium provides a compelling focal 
point of the game when a a  =  Qg.
The multiplicity of equilibria implies there is a multiplicity of selection 
rules R s that are optimal for each trader in pair j,  given the strategies of 
the other players. For example, if all traders follow the selection rule ‘always 
accept A  when two acceptable offers are received’, then the outcome of their 
actions is (A, A) and no trader j  ever finds it optimal to deviate from the rule.
Let the ‘focal strategy’ refer to the selection rule R s, which specifies an 
action for each trader j  to follow in each of the three cases (a) to (c), that 
leads to the focal point in each case. This rule gives rise to the most intu­
itive and likely outcome of the stage 3 coordination game. Specifically, that
15 The game theory literature points to a number of mechanisms for resolving the multiplic­
ity of equilibria in the Ranked Coordination game so that focal pure Nash equilibria emerge 
as the unique solution. These include communication or signalling between coordinating 
parties to indicate the action to be taken. In light of the information barriers that underpin 
the model, such communication is prohibited by assumption. If unique pairs of traders could 
communicate their actions to each other then there would be no need for an intermediary. 
Other mechanisms include mediation where an outside party imposes a solution.
each trader in pair j  simultaneously and non-cooperatively accepts the most 
inexpensive of two acceptable indirect trade routes when commissions differ 
across intermediaries, and flips a coin when commission rates are the same 
across intermediaries. Its conceptual appeal aside, the focal rule gives rise to 
strategic interactions between intermediaries that do not arise if one of the two 
intermediaries is always selected in stage 3, irrespective of commission rates. 
To explore the effects of competition in overlapping matches, we examine the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game that includes the focal strategy R s 
as part of the equilibrium strategy of traders.
The focal selection strategy R s can thus be summarised as follows for trader 
j: If two acceptable offers are received and a a 7^  £*b, then accept the offer
with the lower commission rate with probability 1; if a a  =  &b , then accept 
offer A  with probability
To confirm that randomisation when a  a  =  & b  does not give rise to an 
unacceptable expected payoff, consider that coordination is at A with prob­
ability and at B  with probability Mismatch occurs with probability 
Moreover, a a  — &b  implies that 11  ^ =  IT® =  Ilj. Hence the expected payoff 
when commissions are equal, which follows directly from (51), is given by (52):
£ (n ita = « fl<a* = £(n iV =„*=i = + \EDT^ i) (52)
> •EDT(nJ)
Hence the selection rule Rs in the case of two acceptable offers is consistent
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with the participation constraints of both traders.
2.2.3 T rad e rs’ Offer A cceptance S tra teg y
The analysis of traders’ optimal incentives is summarised by proposition (14).
P ro p o sitio n  14 The following pair {R a,R s} forms an optimal acceptance 
strategy for each trader j:
R a : Any offer k is acceptable i f  a /  <  a M and unacceptable otherwise.
R s : I f  one acceptable offer is received, accept it; i f  two acceptable offers are 
received and a a  ^  o c b ,  then accept the offer with the lower commission rate 
with probability 1; if  two acceptable offers are received and a a = &b , then 
accept offer A with probability \ .
P roof. The optimality of Ra follows directly from equations (47), (48) and 
(49). The optimality of R s in the case of one acceptable offer also follows 
directly from these. The optimality of R s given two acceptable offers and 
a  a  7^  & b  follows from the payoffs in table (1). The optimality of R s when 
a a — &b  follows from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the coordination 
game, described by (50) and from the expected payoff under randomisation 
given by (52). ■
2 .3  S tage  2 - N ash  E quilibrium  in  C om m ission  R a tes
In stage 2, intermediaries simultaneously and non-cooperatively select com­
mission rates, a  a  and c*#, respectively, to maximise their expected profit,
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taking each others’ commission rate, network sizes Pa € [0 , 1] and Pb  € [0 , 1] 
and as given.
The strategic interaction between intermediaries in the commission-setting 
game hinges on two conflicting effects. On the one hand, a lower commission 
rate makes it more likely that the intermediary’s offer is selected by traders in 
receipt of two acceptable offers. At the same time, a lower commission implies 
lower profit per successful match.
The measure of trade matches possible through a network of a given size 
is a random variable that depends on the degree of overlap between importer 
and exporter contacts. A crucial feature of the game is that intermediaries 
set commission rates prior to the realisation of this random variable and thus 
without knowing the identity of their future customers. This prevents inter­
mediaries from price discriminating between trade pairs16 that are exclusive 
to their own network and those common to both networks.
To assess intermediaries’ incentives in the commission-setting game the 
structure of traders’ demand for intermediation services needs to be charac­
terised.
16 All decisions of intermediaries are thus made on the basis of expectations. The ex post 
realisation of trade matches can differ markedly from the ex ante expectation. For example, 
if P a  =  P b  =  5, the measure of expected common matches is P a P b  =  JE- The realised 
overlap between the two networks can range from 0 to  however, depending on which 
specific importers and exporters are contacted in stage 1. The obvious exception is where 
P a  =  P b  =  1 for which expected and realised trade matches coincide.
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2.3.1 Dem and for Interm ediation Services
For an intermediary to be able to match pair (X j , M j ), both partners must be 
members of the intermediary’s network. The matching probabilities for any 
pair (Xj,  Mj)  are therefore given by (53) to (56):
Pr [Pair j  can match via A  and B] — P \P q (53)
Pr [Pair j  can match via A, but not B] = P \  ( l — Pq) (54)
Pr [Pair j  can match via B , but not A] =  P^ ( l — P |)  (55)
Pr [Pair j  cannot match via A  or B] = ( l — P |)  (l — Pj|) (56)
Suppose both intermediaries choose network sizes between 0 and 1. The 
market structure that results is one of fragmented duopoly. Each intermediary 
has a set of exclusive matches, over which there is monopoly power. At the 
same time, the non-zero probability of network overlap gives rise to a set of 
expected common matches, over which intermediaries compete.
The success of each intermediary in gaining trade matches from the com­
petitive network overlap depends on relative commission rates. From Rs in­
termediaries anticipate that all common matches are won by the intermediary 
with the lower of the two commission rates when a a  ^  o^ B^  while each expects 
to win |  of common matches when a a  =  Qg.
Let E  (Ta ) denote expected indirect trade through A  or, equivalently, ex­
pected demand for A’s intermediation services. Similarly, E  (Tb ) denotes ex­
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pected indirect trade through B  or expected demand for B '’s intermediation 
services. Combining the matching probabilities in (53) to (56) with {Ra,R s} 
yields E  (TA) and E  (Tb ), conditional on aA and as-
Consider the expected demand for A ’s services. Intermediary A  expects 
a measure P \  ( l — Pq) of exclusive matches while common matches between 
A  and B  are given by measure If &A < &B < then A  provides
the most inexpensive trade route, so all matching traders in the competitive 
segment coordinate at A . This yields a total expected demand for A  of P \.  
Conversely, if a s  < a a < all common matching traders coordinate at B
giving intermediary A  an expected demand of P \  ( l — P ^j only. If Qg =  a a <
a M, then intermediaries’ offers are acceptable but indistinguishable, so traders 
randomise over A  and B  in the coordination stage. \P \P b  are expected to 
trade through A,  another \P \P b  through B , while the remaining \P\P%  fail 
to coordinate.
Similar arguments can be applied to B . The structure of E  (T4) and 
E  (Tb ) summarised below gives rise to the strategic incentives discussed in 
the rest of the section.
P \ i f  o ia<<x b < olM
P \  (1 -  P%) i f  a B < a A < olm
P \  (1 -  | P | )  i f  a B = aA < a M
0 i f  a A > ocM
E (T a )= <
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E {T b ) = {
P i i f OLB < OtA <  OtM
Pl  (! -  p a ) i f OtA < & B  5:
Pb (1 -  \ P a ) i f OLB =  O-A < OLM
0 i f a B  > a M
Recall that network investment costs are sunk in stage 1. Moreover* the 
marginal cost of matching is assumed to be zero for simplicity. If follows that 
the expected operating profit of A  and B, respectively, are given by (57) and 
(58):
B (n ^ )  =  aAS E (T A) (57)
•E(IIb) =  otBS E (T B) (58)
Intermediaries thus choose a a and a #  to maximise E  (IX4) and E  (IIb), 
respectively, given E  (T a ) and E  (T b )-
2.3.2 Polar Cases o f Market Structure
The discussion above assumes network sizes between 0 and 1. In general, the 
commission-setting game can be analysed for three polar cases:
1. Monopoly in intermediation services, where {Pb — O', Pa £ [0,1]}
or {Pa =  0 ;Pb G [0,1]}. Inspection of E (T a ) confirms that expected 
indirect trade collapses to P \  when a.a <  a M and 0 otherwise when 
Pb  — 0, and vice versa if B  is a monopolist. This corresponds to the
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analysis in Chapter 1, where a monopolist intermediary chooses a M in 
equilibrium.
2. Bertrand duopoly in intermediation services, where {Pa =  1; Pb  — 1}- 
If both intermediaries’ networks span the entire market, then networks 
overlap entirely giving rise to the most competitive market outcome. 
Intermediaries are in direct competition for all trade pairs.
3. Fragmented duopoly in intermediation services, where {Pa  6  (0,1); Pb  E (0,1)}. 
Each intermediary’s demand is partitioned between a competitive and 
non-competitive segment.
The two competitive cases are analysed in turn.
2.3.3 Com peting in Commission Rates: Bertrand D uopoly
Let Pa  — Pb  — 1. All trade pairs are common to A  and B  giving rise to the
following demand structure:
1 i f  OtA <  o lb  <  olm
E ( T a ) = <
E(Tb ) = <
0 i f  OLB <  OLA <  OtM
\  i f  OLB =  OLA <  OLM
0  i f  ola >  a M
1 i f  OLB <  OLA <  OlM
0 i f  OLA <  OLB 5: OLM
\  i f  OLB =  OLA <  olm
0  i f  a s  >  olm
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Expected operating profits for A  and B  when aB = ex a are thus:
£ (IU ) |« b=<m =  (59)
E ( n B \ a e = a A  =  (60)
Expected operating profits for A  and B  when a s  < a  a  are thus:
E(nA)|QB<£M = o (6i)
£ ( n  s ) l a B < a A  =  < * b S  (62)
Conversely, when a a < oib-
E  ( n A ) |a J4 < a B =  0 a S  ( 6 3 )
£ ( n B )|QX<(tfl =  0 (64)
Intermediaries provide a homogeneous service in a price-setting Bertrand 
duopoly. The pattern of E  (II4) and E  (IIb ) provides an incentive for interme­
diaries to undercut each other in order to win the entire market. In contrast 
to the classical Bertrand duopoly, coordination failure in traders’ decisions 
implies that intermediaries share half the market when a s  = a a , instead of 
sharing the entire market.
Let oP denote the ‘competitive’ commission rate where E  (II^) =  E  (Iljg) =
0. In the absence of a marginal cost of matching, oP =  0 , giving rise to a
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unique Nash equilibrium in commission rates at a s  = a  a = oP = 0. The 
Bertrand duopoly outcome is summarised by proposition (15).
Proposition 15 I f  P a  =  P b  =  then the commission-setting subgame has 
a unique, pure strategy Nash equilibrium where a s  =  « a = °P  = 0 .
P roof. To prove that a s  = c*a = oP =  0 is the unique, pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium of the game we show that olb — a A = &o > oP can 
never be an equilibrium. The proof is by contradiction. Let (oca, olb) = 
(a0,ao), where o 0 > oP. If A  deviates from (e*o, <*o) by undercutting B , then 
E  (IlA)|a/l=ao_e = S ( a 0 - e ) ,  where E  (n A),Qx=ao_£ -> S a 0, as £ -> 0. Since 
^ ( n ^)|a^=ao =  iS (ao ), it follows that ^ (n> i)|Qyl=ao_£ > E (U A)lQA=ao. It 
is thus profitable for intermediary A  to undercut from ao > oP . Likewise, 
^ ( n s ) |a B=ao-e < E  (n ^)|aJ4=aA-e- Hence, olB  =  <*a = <*o > oP cannot be 
an equilibrium. ■
2.3.4 Com peting in Commission Rates: Fragmented Duopoly
Let Pa  € (0,1) and Pb  £ (0,1). This gives rise to a distinctive market 
structure comprised by a competitive and a non-competitive market segment 
between which price discrimination is not possible. Hence intermediaries are 
neither pure monopolists, nor pure duopolists and as a result face conflicting 
incentives compared to both the monopoly case of Chapter 1 and the Bertrand 
duopoly case.
Consider the incentives of intermediary A  when setting a a - In the frag-
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merited duopoly, in contrast to the Bertrand duopoly case, A  never finds it 
optimal to set a a  =  cP  =  0, given a B < a M. This is due to the fact that A  
can always relinquish the common trade matches to B  and set the monopoly 
commission rate. The only traders that accept A 's offers at aA = a M, given 
a s  < a M, are traders in receipt of an A  offer only. Let E M (IT4) denote the 
expected profit from 4^’s monopolistic market segment corresponding to this 
strategy. It follows directly from E  (T a ) that:
E M  ( T l A )  =  a M S P l ( l - P l )  (65)
Profit level E M (IT4) is always an option for A, introducing a positive lower 
bound to the profits A  receives in the commission-setting game.
If A  sets a  a  = c*o then the most profit A  can ever expect to earn is 
E  (rU )|ao<aB =  a 0S P \,  in the event that a 0 < aB. Contrasting E  (rU )|Qo<aB 
with E m  (IX4) reveals that ao >  (l — P^) a M must be satisfied in order for 
A  to find it optimal to charge ao, given a B. If conversely, ao < a M,
then the maximum expected profit that A  can receive by setting ao is lower 
than the profit from A 's outside option, and hence ao is never optimal.
Let ola denote the threshold level of a a  at which max E  ( n ^ ) ^  =  E M (IX4). 
Hence:
aA =  (1 -  P i)  a M (66)
It follows that if a a  < &a , then the maximum profit that A  can ever
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expect to generate from intermediation service provision overall is less than 
that under monopolistic commission setting that yields E M (IX4). Hence, A  
never charges a commission below ola-
Furthermore, given Ra, A  never finds it optimal to set a  a > otM since all 
its offers are subsequently rejected. The elimination of dominated strategies 
of A, conditional on Pa , yields a a E [a a , aM] •
Similar arguments for B  yield the following outside option for B:
BM(nB) = aM5P |(l-P l) (67)
Let a B denote the threshold level o fa B at which max E  (I1B), =  E M (nB).
Hence:
aB =  (1 -  P%) aM (68)
Symmetric arguments for B  allow the elimination of dominated strategies, 
thereby yielding a g  6 [as,ctM]. Note that, in general, the threshold levels 
are not symmetric since network sizes can be asymmetric in stage 1.
Consider how the threshold level of B  is affected by the network size of A. 
The lower is Pa  then the smaller the measure of common matches between 
A  and B  and thus the smaller the loss of trade matches from a deviation to 
the monopolistic strategy. Thus the attractiveness of B ’s outside option is 
increasing as Pa  —■► 0 making B  less inclined to undercut A, thereby raising 
the deviation threshold level a# . At the limit, when Pa — 0, it follows directly
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from equation (68) that a s  = otM. In other words, the smaller is Pa , ceteris 
paribus, then the weaker are competitive forces between A  and B , inducing B  
to set a s  more monopolistically. At the one extreme, where Pa  = 0, there 
is no competition, so B  sets the monopoly commission (as in Chapter 1). At 
the other extreme, where Pa  =  1, there is no monopolistic segment, yielding 
the Bertrand pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which B  sets the competitive 
commission rate.
The partitioned market structure is thus a hybrid of the two extremes of 
monopoly and Bertrand duopoly that gives rise to conflicting monopolistic and 
competitive forces. The combined effect of these forces is to make any fixed 
pair of commission rates ( a ^ a # )  unstable. There is thus no pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium in commission rates when Pa G (0,1) and Pb G (0,1).
The conflicting incentives are illustrated in figure (15). The figure illus­
trates the case where Pa > Pb and thus a a > olb- Consider the incentives 
of A. The optimal response to aB > otM is to set a  a =  but if a a = otM, 
then B  has an incentive to undercut A  for a a G (<5b, a M]. A  also has an in­
centive to undercut B  for aB G (S^, a M], driving down commission rates. A’s 
incentive to undercut is restrained, however, by the existence of A’s outside 
option. Hence, once a s  reaches a a > a s ,  A  finds it optimal to deviate to 
a  a — otM\ but if a  a = otM, then B  has an incentive to undercut A... and so 
on.
The analysis is summarised by proposition (16).
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Figure 15: Strategic commission-setting in the fragmented duopoly.
P roposition  16 I f  Pa E (0 , 1) and Pb €  (0,1), then the commission-setting 
subgame has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in commission rates.
Proof. Proof is by contradiction. Let (a A ,a*B ) reflect a pair of commission 
rates th a t constitu te a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where a*A E [a,4 , ctM] 
and a*B €  [ a ^ , a M]. Consider the optim al response of A to  a*B , where a B 
takes the following values: (a) 0 ,4  <  a B <  a M and (b) a*B — a  a  <  •
(a) If a  a  < a B < a M, then the optim al response of A  is to  undercut B  
by e, where e —* 0. The expected profit from ^4’s undercutting strategy is 
E W A)\aA=a.B_e = (c% -  e)SPl-  a 'BSP\w h e r e >  (l -  f F%)
a*B E  (n ^ ) |aA=a^. Hence, A receives a higher expected profit from undercut­
ting B  by e, than  from m atching a*B . It follows th a t T ’s optimal response to
ol*b is always a A =  a*B — e if aA < ctB < a M.
Given a A, consider the incentives of B. Using an identical argument, it is 
optimal for B  to deviate from a B by undercutting a A by e, if a #  < aA < otM. 
Hence, R ’s optimal response to a*A is a s  = ctA — e < a B and not a*B. Thus 
aB is not an optimal response to a A, where aA is an optimal response to a B . 
(b) If a B =  a a < a M, then the optimal response of A  is to deviate to a M, 
since E  (n j4)|a^<s^ < E M (n^); but then it follows that intermediary B  finds 
it optimal to deviate to a s  =  a M — e > aB . Hence, the optimal reply to a B 
is a A = a M, but the optimal reply of B  to a A not a*B.
Similar arguments apply for H ’s optimal response to a*A. It follows from the 
above that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in commission rates. ■
2.3.5 Randomising Commission Rates
This section characterises the unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in in­
termediaries’ commission rates. Intuitively, randomisation of commission rates 
prevents rival intermediaries from systematically undercutting each other.
Let H (aA) and F  (a s )  denote the cumulative distribution functions used 
to randomise commission rates a A and a s ,  respectively, where F  (•) and H  (-)
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axe continuous and have the following features:
H (aA) = F (a B) = 0
H (aM) -  F  (aM) =  1 (69)
dH /daA > 0; dFf da B > 0
Since the distributions are continuous, the probability of A  and B  setting 
identical commission17 rates is 0. Let aA be a random draw from H  (•). It 
follows from F  (•) that:
P r(aB < a A) =  F (aA)
P r(aB > a A) =  1 -  F (aA) (70)
P r(a ,4 =  a B) =  0
Given the probabilities described in (70), we seek to find the optimal distri­
bution H  (•) for intermediary A, that keeps expected profits constant over the 
distribution, and similarly, the optimal F  (•) that keeps IPs expected profits 
constant.
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium depends on the relative values of a A 
and aB, which reflect the relative values of PA and PB. There are three cases:
(i) a A > a B, where PA > PB (ii) a A < aB, where PA < PB and (iii) a A = a B,
17This implies that while coordination failure with probability  ^ is expected in stage 3 in 
the event where traders receive two offers and commission rates are equal, the randomisation 
of commission rates in stage 2 ensures that this event occurs with zero probability. Thus 
coordination failure does not arise in equilibrium.
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where Pa  = Pb -
In (i) and (ii) intermediaries A  and B  are shown to randomise18 over 
different distributions, while in case (iii) the symmetry in network sizes implies 
H  (•) =  F  (•) =  G (•). Following the methodology used in Baye and De Vries 
(1992), but allowing for asymmetric network sizes19, yields the unique, mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium summarised in proposition (17).
P ro p o sitio n  17 (a) I f  Pa = Pb  = P  £ (0,1), then there exists a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, in which intermediaries choose their commission 
rate randomly from the same distribution:
a — (1 — P 2) a M
G{a) = -------—  9 ----- , where a  G \a ,a M] (71)a P z L
where a = ( l — P 2) a M.
(b) I f  Pa  £ (0 , 1), Pb  € (0 , 1) and Pa ^  Pb , then there is a unique, mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium, in which intermediaries A  and B  choose their com­
mission rate randomly from distributions H (cxa) and F{chb), respectively, 
where:
18Note that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does not imply randomisation of com­
mission rates across offers made to traders. Each intermediary sets a unique commission 
rate that is common to all offers made, where this unique commission rate is a random draw 
from the relevant distribution in proposition (17) in equilibrium.
19 Since intermediaries’ network investment decisions in stage 1 are not necessarily sym­
metric, we solve for the unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for general P a and P b 
without imposing a restriction of symmetry.
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H {aA) =  — — where aA e [aA,a M] (72)
olaPb
a B  ~  ( l  ~  P a )  Fa  m iF (a B) = -----— £2-^ ----- , where a B G [qb ,q  ] (73)
ocbPa
where aA =  ( l — PB) a M and a B =  ( l — P 4) a M.
P roof. The cases of symmetric and asymmetric network sizes are examined 
in turn:
(a) The optimality of G (•) for both intermediaries when Pa = Pb  =  P-> such
that H  (•) =  G (•) and F  (•) =  G (•) in equilibrium, can be shown by examining
expected operating profit of intermediaries in the ranges [0 ,cE], [ a ,a M], and 
greater than a M. From demand E(Ta ) and probabilities (70), it follows that:
M
E{ Ua ) =
c i a S P 2  i f  a A  < 3 <  a
F ( c a )  ( a A S P 2 (  1 -  P 2 ) )  +  (1 -  F ( a A ) )  ( a A S P 2) i f  a A  6  [3, a M ] 
0 i f  a A >  c x M
Since it is never optimal for A  to  set a  a below 3, the probability that a  a < 3 
is zero. Hence, randomisation over range a  a  € [3, a M ]  need only be consid­
ered. E  ( n j4 ) |a ^ € |3 qm] can be simplified to aA SP 2 [l — P 2F(q!^)]. Hence, A  
chooses H  (•) to maximise E  ( n ^ )  over [3 ,a M]:
max
dH
naM
E  (IU) =  [a A S P 2  (1 -  P 2 F ( a A ) ) }  d H  (74)
Jot
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Recalling that H (a ) — F  (a) = 0 and H (a M) =  F  (aM) = 1, the solution 
to (74) yields constant expected profit for A  over [S, a M] equal to E M (n^). 
The analysis is symmetric for B  so:
m axE(IX4) =  m a x E (n s ) =  a MS P 2 (l -  P 2) (75)
dH dF
A ’s expected payoff under any random draw ot a £ [S, o:M] must be equal to 
(75). Similarly for random draw a B £ [3, a M] by B. Solving from (74) and 
(75) yields optimal distributions H  (•) =  G (-) and F  (•) = G (•), where distri­
bution G (•) is described by equation (71).
(b) The optimality of H  (•) and F  (•) in (72) and (73), respectively, follows 
similarly for the case where Pa  7^  Pb • Let Pa  < Pb  and hence a a  < &b - 
From demand E(Ta ) and probabilities (70), it follows that:
<*ASP \ i f  OLA <  & A
OLAS P \ " i f  Qa e  [aA,a B\
F(aA) (aAS P \(l  -  P%)) +  (1 -  F(cm )) (aASP%) i f  aA e  [SB , « M]
0 i f  ola>  otM
E (U A) =
The probability that a.a < &A is zero, but there now exists a range of com­
mission rates [aa , o b \, where A  finds it optimal to follow an undercutting 
strategy but B  finds the monopolistic strategy optimal. This gives rise to a 
positive probability that a a  < &b  < °lM • Hence A  chooses H  (•) to maximise
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the following:
ra M ra B
m ^ E ( H A) = [aAS P l { l - P l F ( a A))]d H +  (aAS P % )d H (  76)
J C*b J&A
Solving (76) yields constant expected profit for A:
max E (IU) = E m (IU) =  aMSP\  (1 -  F%) (77)
dH
B  chooses F  (•) to maximise:
raM
m ax£(nB) =  /  [aBS P l ( l - P l H ( a Bj) \dF  (78)
dF JctB
Solving (78) yields constant expected profit for B:
max E (nB) = Em (Hb) = aMSP2B (l -  P\)  (79)
dF
From (76), (77), (78) and (79) it follows that the optimal strategy of A  and
B  is to randomise commission rates according to distributions (72) and (73),
respectively. ■
Intuitively, randomisation of commission rates prevents intermediaries from 
systematically undercutting each other, thereby allowing the expected oper­
ating profits E m  (IF4) and E M (lie) to be attained in equilibrium. That is, 
randomisation allows each intermediary to attain expected operating profit 
equal to that which would arise from the monopolistic segment of their net­
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work under the monopoly commission rate.
This is summarised by Corollary (1).
C orollary  1 In the unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in commission 
rates:
(a) I f  Pa  = Pb  = P, then each intermediary expects to receive constant oper­
ating profit equal to aMS P 2 ( l — P 2) .
(b) I f  Pa  -f~ Pb , then intermediaries A  and B  expect to receive constant operat­
ing profit equal to E M (II^) =  a MS P \  ( l -  P%) andE M (n B) =  <*MSP% ( l -  P \) ,  
respectively.
Proof. This follows directly from the proof of proposition (17). ■
An implication of randomised commission rates is that traders’ payoffs 
from indirect trade through A  and B, respectively, are random variables that 
mirror H{ola) and F  (ocb) when Pa ^  Pb  and G(a), when Pa  =  Pb - The 
conflicting monopolistic and competitive forces for commission-setting in the 
fragmented duopoly give rise to a unique, non-cooperative mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium where intermediaries randomise their commission rates. The range 
of commission rates over which randomisation takes place has an upper bound 
of a M, imposed by R a, and a positive lower bound due to intermediaries’ mo­
nopolistic outside option. While the upper bound for both commission rates 
is exogenously determined by traders’ direct trade option, that in turn hinges 
on the level of information costs in the market, the lower bounds hinge on 
network sizes. In particular, an intermediary with a larger network, enjoys a
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relatively larger set of exclusive trade matches, and thus behaves more monop- 
olistically when randomising commission rates than does an intermediary with 
a smaller network. Each intermediary’s expected operating profit is constant 
and corresponds to expected monopoly profit from the monopolistic market 
segment. Intermediaries invest in network development in stage 1, anticipat­
ing the implications of their decisions. It is the Nash equilibrium in network 
sizes to which we now turn.
2 .4  S ta g e  1 - N a sh  E q u ilib r iu m  in  N e tw o rk  S izes
In this section we seek a Nash equilibrium, or Nash equilibria, in network sizes, 
where these are set simultaneously and non-cooperatively by competing inter­
mediaries, each taking the network size of his rival, and the offer acceptance 
strategy of traders, as given.
2.4.1 N etw ork  Investm en t C ost
Intermediaries are assumed to have access to the same technology for develop­
ing a network of contacts, where the total investment cost for a network of size 
Pi is denoted by C {Pi). The network investment decisions of intermediaries 
are analysed under two cost specifications:
(a) Linear cost: C (Pi) — 2P/c, where c > 0. Hence:
dCi
dPi
= 2c > 0 (80)
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The marginal cost of network expansion is constant.
(b) Convex cost: C (Pi) — 2Pjc(i,P i), where c(z, Pj) =  7 iaPj and a  > 1, 
7  > 0. Hence:
C (p I ) = 21iaP j (81)
=  6r i “P? > 0 , =  127 i“P , > 0 (82)
^  -  2a/yia~1P f > 0 (83)
01
The marginal cost of network expansion is thus increasing monotonically in 
the level of information costs and network size, while convexity in network size 
is assumed. Cost parameter 7  is a scale factor. In addition, let the probability 
of direct matching q(i) take the functional form q(i) = 1—i5 , where 5 > a  > 1.
2.4.2 Stage 1 Expected Profit
In stage 1, intermediary A  chooses Pa to maximise stage 1 expected profit, 
denoted by E 1(Ha ), taking Pb  and {R a,R s} as given. Similarly, intermediary
B  chooses Pb  to maximise E 1(JIb ), taking Pa and {f^a, R s} as given. Inter­
mediaries anticipate expected operating profit levels E M (n^) and E M (n#), 
respectively, to arise from the stage 2 commission-setting subgame. Hence,
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E1^ )  and El (J\B) are given by:
^ ( I U )  =  B m (Ua ) - C ( P a ) (84)
aMSP2A { l - P l ) - C ( P A)
and:
= Em (TIb ) - C ( P b) (85)
a:MS P % ( l - P l ) - C ( P B)
where a M = 1 — q(i).
Equations (84) and (85) offer a general description of expected stage 1 
profit, where the three polar market structures correspond to different config­
urations of P a  and P b ’-
1. Monopoly: if Pb  = 0 and Pa £ [0,1] then (84) and (85) yield £ ’1(IIJ4) — 
olm S P \  — C (Pa ) and £'1(IIs) =  0. Thus B  is inactive and A  is a 
monopolist and vice versa if Pa = 0 and Pb  £ [0 , 1].
2. Bertrand duopoly: if Pa — Pb — 1 then (84) and (85) yield E 1 (II^) =  
^ ( n * )  -  - c ( i) < 0 . Hence, P a  =  P b  — 1 can never constitute a 
Nash equilibrium in network sizes.
3. Fragmented duopoly in intermediation services, where Pa £ (0,1) and 
P b  £ (0,1). Equations (84) and (85) allow for both symmetric and
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asymmetric network size selection.
It follows that Bertrand duopoly can never arise in a subgame perfect 
equilibrium (SPE) of the game, since it does not constitute a Nash equilibrium 
in stage 1. Only monopoly and fragmented duopoly are thus consistent with 
SPE.
2.4.3 Linear Network-Building Costs
Substituting C (Pi) = 2P/c into (84) and (85) yields:
E1 (H 4) =  aMS P l ( l - P l ) - 2 c P A (86)
E^IIb ) =  aMSP% (l — Fa) — 2cPB (87)
Equations (86) and (87) show that the expected profit of an intermediary 
is decreasing in the network size of the rival intermediary and increasing in 
his own network size. Intuitively, the larger the network size of the rival, the 
greater the measure of common matches as a result of network overlap; and 
hence the lower the expected operating profit arising from the mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium in commission rates.
Examination of (86) and (87) shows there is no pair of network sizes 
(P%,Pb ) that are best responses to each other and simultaneously satisfy 
P 4 £ (0 , 1] and Pg £ (0 , 1] when network-building costs are linear.
The results are summarised by propositions (18) and (19).
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Proposition 18 I f  network-building cost is linear, then there is no pure strat­
egy Nash equilibrium in which both intermediaries are active.
Proof. Let Pb {Pa) and Pa {Pb ) describe the locus of network size pairs along 
which E 1(JIa) — 0 and E ^ l j l p )  =  0 , respectively. Hence, for a given network 
size Pa, P b  {Pa) gives the threshold level of Pb above which E 1{I1a)\pa < 0 . 
Similarly, for given network size Pb, Pa {Pb) gives the threshold level of Pa 
above which E 1{Ub)\pb < 0. Rearranging P ^ n ^ )  =  0 and P ^ n # )  =  0 from 
equations (86) and (87) yields:
=  y - s M ^ y  <«»
Proof by contradiction. Let (Pj[,Pp) reflect a pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
in network sizes where P \  6  (0,1) and Pp € (0,1).
Consider the incentives of intermediary A. If P b  {Pa ) < Pp, then it follows 
that £J1(n>i)|p* < 0; but if A  is making losses, P \  cannot be an optimal reply 
to Pp. Recall that E 1 (n^) is increasing in Pa-  It follows that the maximum 
expected profit that A  can attain, given Pp, is that which corresponds to 
Pa = 1* If P 1( ^ a ) \p * ,p a =i > 0 , then A’s optimal reply to Pp is P a  (Pp) =  1.
If E 1(Ua)\p*,pa =i < 0, then A’s optimal reply is P a  (Pp) =  0 .
Suppose Pa (Pp) =  1. Then B  is making losses under Pp > 0. Thus P ’s
optimal reply to Pa {Pp) =  1 is Pp (1) =  0 .
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Suppose instead that Pa (P%) =  0. Then P q  G  (0,1) is not an optimal reply 
to Pa {Pb) — 0 since B  can raise £ ’1(IIb) by increasing P% to 1. Thus P ’s 
optimal reply to Pa (Pb) — 0 is Pq (0) =  1.
If instead Pg < P b (Pa )-, then it follows that E 1(TIa )\p * > 0 ; but then 
interior network size P \  G (0, 1) is not an optimal reply to P%. A’s optimal 
reply is thus Pa  (Pb ) = 1 an(i arguments apply as above.
We can thus conclude that neither is P^ G  (0,1) an optimal reply to 
Pjb £ (0,1), nor is Pq G  (0,1) an optimal reply to P \  G  (0,1). Moreover, since 
Pq (1) =  Pj£ (1) =  0, (P \ iP b ) ~  (1» 1) cajmot be a Nash equilibrium either. 
T h u s ( ^ ,P g )  cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium where both network sizes 
axe non-zero. It follows that there is no Nash equilibrium in which both 
intermediaries are active. ■
P ropo sitio n  19 I f  network-building cost is linear and provided c < \ S a M, 
then there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria where (Pa i Pb ) ~  (1)0) and 
(P4,PS) =  (0 , 1).
P roof. It follows from proposition (18) that (P£, P'b ) cannot constitute a 
Nash equilibrium where both network sizes are non-zero. The only remain­
ing candidate Nash equilibria are (P\->Pb) =  (1,0) and (P ^,P ^) =  (0,1). If 
P \  — 1, then there is no scope for B  to gain exclusive trade matches from 
investment in Pp. All resulting trade matches are common and thus no profit 
can be attained. The optimal reply of B  is thus Pq (1) =  0. A symmetric ar­
gument applies where P^ =  1. Hence, (P^, P^) =  (1,0) and (P^, P^) =  (0,1)
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constitute the two pure strategy Nash equilibria in network sizes. Moreover, it 
follows directly from equations (86) and (87) that c < ^S a M must be satisfied 
for expected profit to be positive in equilibrium for the monopolist intermedi­
ary. ■
The analysis has shown that under linear costs of network expansion the 
equilibrium outcome of the game is monopolisation of the market by either A 
or B. The non-convexity in network-building costs provides incentives for in­
termediaries to increase network size without bound, other than the constraint 
imposed by market size. Each intermediary provides complete coverage of the 
market, when active, thereby preventing the rival intermediary from gaining 
any exclusive trade matches.
Substituting Pa =  1 and Pb  — 1 into (88) and (89), respectively, yields:
P  =  P b  (1) =  P a  (1) =  ( l  “  s j ^ ) 2 (*>)
P  denotes the threshold level of Pa below which it is optimal for B  to 
invest in a network size that covers the whole market and above which B  is 
inactive. By symmetry, P  is also the threshold for Pb . Figure (16) illustrates 
the reaction functions20 of A  and B. The E 1(I1a ) — 0 and E 1(Ub ) = 0 
loci pin down threshold level P  for the two intermediaries and confirm the 
monopolisation of the market by either A  or B  (at NE2 and N Ei, respectively) 
is the only market outcome consistent with profit maximisation under linear
20The figure is drawn for parameter values S  =  10, c =  1 and a M — 0.7.
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costs of network expansion.
A B 1
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Figure 16: Monopoly Nash equilibria in network sizes.
2.4.4 Convex N etw ork-B uilding Costs
This section shows how convexity in the costs of developing a network provides 
sufficient incentives for ‘restraint’ in network investment, so as to allow both 
intermediaries to survive in a fragmented duopoly with incomplete network 
overlap.
Note that in the analysis that follows we assume 7  is sufficiently low relative 
to S  so that E l {UA) and £ ’1(IlJg) are positive in equilibrium. The results are 
summarised by proposition (20).
P roposition  20 If  network-building cost is convex, then there exists a unique,
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pure strategy Nash equilibrium in network sizes where:
PI = Pn =
37
A B 2 S i5~a 6 (0,1)
P roof. Substituting C (P j) =  2Pjc(i, Pj) = 27iaP f  and q(i) — 1 — is into 
(84) and (85), where 5 > a > 1 and 7  > 0, yields:
B 1^ )  =  isS P l ( l - P l ) - 2 1iaP sA
B ^ n s)  =  issp% (1 -  P \)  -  21ep%
(91)
(92)
The network size reaction functions of A  and B , denoted by Pa (Pb ) and 
Pb  (Pa ), respectively, are derived from the first order conditions:
-^ p P - -  =  2isSPA (1 -  P%) -  67iaP \  =  0
d P A  | P B
aEl f B)- = 2isSPB (1 -  P \)  -  6n iaP% =  0
dPB \ p A
(93)
(94)
The first order conditions (93) and (94) simplify to give:
CjS-a
Pa (Pb ) =  (1 - H )
Cj5—a
Pb  (Pa ) = —  ( l - P | )
(95)
(96)
Solving the reaction functions simultaneously, and confirming that we have 
a maximum21, yields Nash equilibrium network sizes (P ^ P g )  in terms of
1 The second derivatives and confirmation that PJJ and Pg correspond to a maximum can
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information costs 2, and parameters 7 , S , 5 and cn:
Discarding complex and negative solutions to (93) and (94) confirms that (97) 
describes the unique Nash equilibrium in network sizes. ■
It follows directly from the reaction functions, (95) and (96), that network 
sizes axe strategic substitutes. An increase in the network size of A  gives rise 
to a strategic contraction in the network investment of B y and vice versa. 
Intuitively, when intermediary A  invests in a larger network, the expected 
overlap between the two networks is larger, thereby lowering E M (II#). Hence, 
for given investment cost C(Pb ), B  can expect a lower revenue than before, 
thereby inducing a network contraction.
Moreover, network sizes are increasing in trade surplus S, declining in cost 
parameter 7 , and increasing in information cost i (since 5 > a  > 1).
Figure (17) illustrates22 Pa  (Pb ) and Pb  (Pa ) and depicts a unique, pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in network sizes, in which both intermediaries invest 
symmetrically in network development. This arises from the symmetry in the 
costs incurred by A  and B. It is straightforward to show that when cost 
parameter 7  varies across intermediaries, the intermediary with the lower cost 
has a larger network size in equilibrium.
be found in Appendix B.
22 The figure is drawn for parameter values 7  =  1, <5 =  4, a  =  2, £  =  4 and i =  0.8.
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Figure 17: Fragmented duopoly Nash equilibrium in network sizes.
Nash equilibrium network sizes (P^, Pb ) in terms of information costs i , 
and parameters 7 , S, S and a  are:
P* =  p* =  p* = 37
2 Sis~c
Si6—a
37 +  1 - 1 (98)
Let P M denote the monopoly network size that prevails under the same 
cost specification. It follows directly from proposition (10) in Chapter 1 that:
pM _ S is~a > p * (99)
Equations (98) and (99) describe the equilibrium monopoly and duopoly 
network sizes for network cost specification (81). Figure (18) illustrates the
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path of network size with information costs in the two cases for parameter 
values 7  =  1, 5 =  4, a = 2 , S — 4.
1 f
0 . 25 "
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 18: Network size and information cost.
To summarise, the analysis shows that either a monopoly or a fragmented 
duopoly can prevail in equilibrium, depending on the network-building tech­
nology. Under convexity assumptions, both intermediaries invest in a network 
and compete over common matches, while randomising commission rates. In 
contrast, linear network development costs can only give rise to a monopoly 
outcome.
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2 .5  C onclusion
This chapter presents a new theoretical framework to analyse the strategic in­
teraction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission 
rates and network size. The intermediaries are assumed to have symmetric 
access to an information technology that allows them to develop contacts with 
importers and exporters who match uniquely in pairs. Intermediaries have the 
opportunity to invest in a network of contacts and subsequently compete in 
commission rates before making offers of intermediation to members in their 
network. Traders select between intermediaries ex post, when uncertainty in 
the realisation of a match is resolved.
The analysis delivers the following results. First, the model suggests that 
network competition between information intermediaries has a distinctive mar­
ket structure, where intermediaries are monopolist service providers to some 
contacts but duopolists over contacts they share in their network overlap. 
Traders in the network overlap receive two intermediation offers, while other 
members are exclusive to one intermediary and thus receive only one offer of 
intermediation. Traders in receipt of two intermediation offers play a coordi­
nation game when deciding which offer to select. The information frictions in 
the model make it impossible for traders to signal their decisions to each other, 
so there are multiple equilibria to the game. The model thus emphasises the 
role of ‘beliefs’ in determining market outcomes when there are information 
frictions and traders gain from making coordinated decisions.
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Second, the coordination game of traders presents the possibility of coor­
dination failure between trade pairs, even though both traders are members 
of both networks and this is known to both.
Third, we show that if traders choose to accept the offer from the inter­
mediary with the lower commission and randomise when commissions are the 
same, then intermediaries have an incentive to undercut each other. More­
over, intermediaries’ inability to price discriminate between the competitive 
and non-competitive market segments, gives rise to an undercutting game, 
which has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium due to the option to charge 
the monopoly commission to exclusive contacts, and relinquish the overlap to 
the rival. Randomising over the strategy space of commission rates results 
in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium yielding expected profit equal to that 
which would have been earned in the monopolistic outside option. In this 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, an intermediary with a larger network sets 
a higher commission rate, on average, than an intermediary with a smaller net­
work. Moreover, average commission rates lie below the monopoly commission 
rate. Hence, compared to the monopoly case in Chapter 1, traders who match 
indirectly enjoy a trade surplus over and above their outside option.
The multiplicity of equilibria of the coordination game and the randomi­
sation of commission rates that results shows how information problems can 
give rise to endogenous uncertainty in market outcomes.
Finally, competition is affected by the technology of network development.
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The analysis shows that either a monopoly or a fragmented duopoly can prevail 
in equilibrium, depending on the network-building technology. Under convex­
ity assumptions, both intermediaries invest in a network and compete over 
common matches, while randomising commission rates. In contrast, linear 
network development costs can only give rise to a monopoly outcome.
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A p p en d ix  A . T h e  C oord in ation  G am e
Recall the payoff matrix summarising the payoff structure of traders’ simulta­
neous and non-cooperative coordination game in stage 3:
M j
A B
f  (1 -  o a )  , f  (1 -  a A ) f  (1-0*0, #(1-0*0
# (1 -0 * 0 ,f ( l - a * ) 1(1- «b) , f  (1 -  «b)
There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibria, {A, A) and (B,B),  and one 
symmetric, mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Suppose Xj  selects A  with prob­
ability A (and B  with 1 — A) and Mj  selects A  with probability fi (and B  with 
1 — fi). For probabilities ( A t o  form a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
the expected payoffs from mixing between A  and B  must be equalised for each 
trader.
Equalising the expected payoff from the mixed strategy of X j  yields:
A (1 -  oca)  +  (1 -  A) (1 -  a M )  = (1 -  A) (1 -  otB) +  A ( l  -  a M )  (100) 
Rearranging (100) yields:
*  = 2a f S a aB 1 aA
Equalising the expected payoff from the mixed strategy of Mj  yields:
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fi (1 -  a a ) +  (1 -  n) (1 -  olM) =  (1 -  /x) (1 -  a B) +  /x ( l  -  a M) (102)
Rearranging (102) yields:
a M — a ftft* =   (103)
2 otM — a B — ola
Since A* = fi*, the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is symmetric. 
The expected payoffs of X j  and Mj  in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
are found by substituting A* and /x* into each side of (100) and (102) yields:
S
2
S
2
a M - a B a M -  a A H M\
( !  -  <*a )  +   1 -  i 1 ~  a  )2 a M — a B  — o la  
a M — a  a
2aM — olB  — ola (1 - a B ) +
2 olM  — OLB  — OLA
OLM  — OLB
2aM — a B — aA ( i - O
A p p e n d ix  B . S eco n d  D e riv a tiv e s
The second derivatives that follow from (93) and (94) are:
9 P A  \Pb  
^ E ^ U b )
d P B  | PA
= 2i°s ( i -  pI) -  n^ePA
= 2isS  (1 -  P \)  -  U '{iaPB
(104)
(105)
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To have a maximum, (104) and (105) must be negative. Hence, the fol­
lowing must hold in equilibrium:
Pa > ^ ( 1  ~ P i )  (106)
pB > ^ p ( l - - P S )  (107)
Comparing (106) and (107) with (95) and (96) confirms the constraints are
satisfied in equilibrium and thus that P \  and Pg correspond to a maximum.
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3 International Trade, M inim um  Q uality Standards 
and th e Prisoners’ D ilem m a
This chapter extends a well-established vertical product differentiation model 
to a two-country framework in which international duopolists compete in qual­
ity and price in each market. Unilateral minimum quality standards are en­
dogenously determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative standard-setting 
game between the governments of the two countries. The international context 
highlights the effects of cross-country externalities from the implementation 
of minimum quality standards that can be both positive, both negative, or 
asymmetric, depending on the quality of traded goods. These externalities 
are shown to give rise to a Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in the incentives of 
the two policy-makers that leads to inefficient policy outcomes. The role of 
minimum quality standards as non-tariff barriers is examined and the incen­
tives and scope for international cooperation analysed.
The chapter contributes to both the international trade and industrial 
organisation literature in a number of ways.
First, the chapter extends the literature that examines the effects of min­
imum quality standards in markets where firms offer vertically differentiated 
products by analysing national incentives to regulate quality in an open- 
economy setting. The cross-country externalities generated when countries 
are finked through international trade are not present in the literature that 
studies quality standards in the context of a single economy.
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Second, the chapter endogenously determines national minimum quality 
standards through the strategic interaction between policy-makers. To the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first analysis that endogenises national de­
cisions to regulate quality in an international context. The industrial organ­
isation literature has widely analysed the effects of minimum standards in a 
single country, but has done so by introducing minimum standards as exoge­
nous constraints. Only recently has the issue of endogenous determination 
of quality standards begun to be addressed. Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) 
endogenously determine the minimum quality standard in the context of one 
country where a social planner sets the standard to maximise national welfare. 
This chapter extends to two policy-makers, each of which unilaterally selects 
their national minimum quality standard to maximise national welfare. The 
individually optimal standard are shown to be jointly suboptimal as a result 
of the cross-country externalities.
Third, the analysis contributes to the literature on international coopera­
tion by examining whether bargaining from a non-cooperative Nash equilib­
rium in minimum quality standards can lead to an efficient outcome. The 
analysis follows the approach of the literature on cooperation in tariffs (e.g. 
Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002; Staiger and Tabellini, 1987) but shows that 
endogenous country asymmetries arising from specialisation in goods of dif­
ferent quality levels introduce constraints to cooperation that do not arise in 
the literature on cooperation in tariffs.
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The related literature on minimum quality standards originates in the 
industrial organisation literature, with the development of vertical quality 
differentiation models (e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sut­
ton, 1982). In his renowned paper, Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked and Sutton’s 
framework to demonstrate that mild minimum quality standards are welfare 
improving in a duopoly where firms compete in prices and incur fixed quality- 
development costs. Similar results are obtained by Crampes and Hollander 
(1995) assuming that quality improvements increase variable rather than fixed 
costs.
The literature has more recently turned to open economy versions of the 
vertically differentiated duopoly framework. Motta and Thisse (1993) analyses 
the effects of environmental quality standards in autarky and free trade, while 
Boom (1995) analyses the effects of differing national standards for firms who 
cannot tailor quality to different markets. She finds that exit from the market 
with the more stringent standard may occur if the difference in national mini­
mum standards is beyond a certain threshold, but does not determine national 
standards endogenously through a standard-setting game.
The model in this chapter differs from Boom (1995) and other works as­
suming up-front quality development costs (Ronnen 1991, Zhou et aL, 2000, 
Herguera et aL, 2002, among others), by assuming firms incur quality depen­
dent variable costs (as in Motta, 1993, Crampes and Hollander, 1994, and 
Lutz, 2005). Hence the model applies more closely to industries where quality
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improvements stem from higher quality of materials or ingredients or other 
factors embedded in the production process (e.g. textiles) rather than from 
innovative characteristics or design that arise from up-front investment in re­
search and development (e.g. pharmaceuticals). The advantage of this cost 
specification is it gives firms the flexibility to tailor quality levels to different 
markets and to thus respond endogenously and asymmetrically to different 
quality standards.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the model 
and characterises the unregulated equilibria. Section 2 examines national in­
centives for standard-setting and solves for the non-cooperative Nash equilibria 
in minimum quality standards. The properties of these are examined and con­
trasted to world welfare-maximising international standards. International 
cooperation in setting quality standards is analysed in Section 3. Section 4 
concludes.
3.1 T h e M od el
This section describes the economic environment of the two-country model 
of vertical product differentiation and characterises the unregulated equilib­
ria. This lays the groundwork for the rest of the chapter that analyses the 
non-cooperative standard-setting game between policy-makers and examines 
the scope and effects of international cooperation in standard-setting. The 
underlying quality differentiation model is closest to Motta (1993), Crampes 
and Hollander (1995) and Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) for a single economy.
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3.1.1 Economic Environment
Consider two segmented markets, A and B,  with a single firm located in each 
(firms A  and B). The firms compete in quality and prices in each market, 
producing a vertically differentiated good. The firms can supply goods of a 
single quality level in each market but are able to differentiate the quality of 
their exports from the quality of their domestic sales. Let qij be the quality 
level of the good produced in country i (by firm i) and consumed in country j ,  
where i , j  6  {A , B}. We assume no upper bound to quality level so qij € [0, oo). 
There is no potential entry of additional firms, but the duopolists may choose 
not to supply goods to either or both markets. Finally, we assume no transport 
costs.
The firms interact in a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms non- 
cooperatively select quality levels qAA, QAB and q s B i  Qb a , respectively. Perfect 
and costless commitment to these quality levels is assumed. Firms compete in 
prices in the second stage, given first stage quality levels. Firms have access to 
the same production technology, which involves variable costs that are convex 
in quality and linear in quantity. No sunk costs of quality development are 
assumed23. Let V(Sij,qij) denote variable costs of production as a function of 
quality, q^, and sales, Sij, of firm i in market j ,  where these are as in (108):
23Note that the absence of fixed sunk costs of quality development implies the equilibrium 
choice of qualities and prices would not change if firms chose these simultaneously and non- 
cooperatively, rather than sequentially and non-cooperatively. The sequential structure is 
preserved for purposes of comparability with the related literature.
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V{Sij,Qij) =  bqfjSij, where b >  0 (108)
Convexity in quality is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of an 
interior solution24 for quality choice in stage 1, and can thus be accompanied 
by an unlimited range for quality level qij.
The demand side is assumed to consist of a continuum of consumers in 
each market with a varying taste parameter25, 0. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed, with unit density, over the interval [0 , 0] and derive utility from 
the first unit of purchase only. The indirect utility function of a consumer 
with taste parameter 0 , purchasing a unit of a good with quality q and price 
p  is described by (109):
U = 9 q - p  (109)
Given firms’ decisions (qijjpij), consumers in each market choose between (i) 
purchasing one unit of the good from firm A, (ii) pm-chasing one unit of the 
good from firm B, or (iii) making no purchase. Consumers receive zero utility
24There is no interior solution for firm quality levels if the variable cost function is non- 
convex. For example, if variable costs are linear in quality, e.g. V (g ) =  eg, the low quality 
firm’s best response is a quality level j  that of the high quality firm, while the high quality 
firm adds to profit by raising quality without limit (e.g. Choi and Shin, 1992). A solution 
can only be pinned down by assuming quality has a finite upper limit, g, where the high 
quality firm locates.
25 Parameter 9 may also be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and quality such that a consumer with a higher 6 has a lower marginal rate of substitution  
between income and quality and thus a higher income. With this interpretation the frame­
work presented is analogous to models where consumers vary in their income level rather 
than preference over quality e.g Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982).
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if they do not buy the good. Note that since the minimum value for 9 is 
zero, there is always a measure of consumers who prefer not to buy the good 
when prices are positive, implying incomplete market coverage. Parameter 9 
measures market size, which is symmetric in both countries.
Further suppose the governments of countries A  and B  have the oppor­
tunity to regulate quality in their market by unilaterally setting minimum 
quality standards in a stage 0, prior to the strategic interaction of firms. Gov­
ernments choose standards to maximise national welfare, anticipating firms’ 
optimal price and quality responses.
The solution concept employed to solve the multi-stage game is subgame 
perfect equilibrium (SPE), found by backward induction. First, the unique 
second-stage equilibrium in prices is analysed and firms’ payoffs described in 
terms of first-stage qualities. Second, optimal first stage quality decisions of 
firms are examined. This allows the unregulated equilibria to be characterised. 
Then, the effects of minimum quality standards are examined, yielding the 
regulated optimal quality responses of firms. Finally, the incentives for stan­
dard setting are analysed and the non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum 
standards characterised. The issue of international cooperation in standard 
setting is analysed in the next section of the chapter.
3.1.2 The Price-Setting Subgame
Firms A  and B  compete in prices in each market in the final stage of the game, 
given stage 1 quality levels. It is common practice in the industrial organisation
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literature with one market to arbitrarily assign one firm as high quality, solving 
for equilibrium prices and qualities assuming an exogenous quality ranking 
between firms. Rather than assigning a particular quality ordering between 
firms in each market, we suppose that in each market j ,  there is a ‘high’ quality 
supplier (H), with quality level qnj, and a ‘low’ quality supplier (L), with 
quality level qij, where qnj >  qLj- This allows for the possibility that firms 
choose identical quality levels in stage 1. The associated prices levels of these 
goods are denoted by puj  and pLj, respectively. We proceed to characterise 
equilibrium prices and qualities for the H  and L  quality goods supplied in each 
market and then examine the multiple equilibria that correspond to different 
configurations of quality rankings of firms A  and B  in the two markets.
Hence, in the final stage of the game, firm quality levels are fixed in market 
j ,  such that qjjj > qLj- Let xjjj and XLj denote quality-deflated prices for the 
H  and L goods, respectively, and let rj denote the quality ratio, such that:
Consider the structure of demand for the two goods. Let zj denote the 
preference parameter of the marginal consumer in market j  who is indifferent 
between purchasing one unit of the good of quality qnj at price puj  and one 
unit of the good of quality qLj at price pLj- The marginal consumer Zj follows
(110)
. _  S mi ~  . c m )
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directly from (109) and is given by:
z  =  P H j ~  PLj =  r j x Hj  -  x Lj
j  QHj  ~  qLj  r j  -  1
Moreover, let k j  denote the preference level of the consumer who is in­
different between buying the differentiated good and not making a purchase. 
Consumption of one unit of the good of quality qLj at price pLj yields zero 
utility for this consumer, so from (109) it follows that k j  =  XLj — Hence, 
consumers with preference parameter Zj < 0 < 0 purchase good H  and con­
sumers for whom XLj < 0 < Zj purchase good L. Consumers with 0 < 0 < 
XLj make no purchase.
The quantity demand for H  and L  goods in market j , and thus firm sales, 
are denoted by Shj and Slji respectively, and given by:
SHj = 0 -  Zj = 0 - PHj PLj (113)
QHj ~  QLj
S Lj =  * , _ IW =  E S iz £ S £ _ E E i (H4)
qhj  -  qLj qLj
The corresponding profits, Ujjj and n ^ ,  from H  and L sales in market j , 
are thus:
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H//J =  (pHj  -  W ii j )  ( S - Z j )  
n w =  ( p i j  -  bq 'lj) ( z ,  -  x Lj )
(115)
(116)
Substituting for Zj and rearranging yields:
n qHj (xHj -  bqHj )  (0 (rj  -  1) -  r j X H j  +  x L j )  (117)
j
(118)
Maximising IIhj with respect to Xfjj, given xlj and rj, yields the quality- 
deflated price reaction function (Rh ) of firm H  in j:
xhj  (xLj )  =  2 ^ 7  P  (ro ~  !) + brjqHj  4- x Lj\ (119)
Maximising Il^j with respect to x l j  , given x Rj and r j , yields the reaction 
function (R l)  of firm L in j  :
respectively, confirm prices are strategic complements. Moreover, if qRj  > qLj 
in stage 1, then rj > 1 and Xfjj > %Lj, while if qRj = qLj in stage 1, then
x Lj  (xHj) =  g (bqLj +  x H j ) (120)
The slopes of the price reaction functions, ^ r 3- =  o a n d  — 2,
^  ’ ^ L j  \R h  2 r ,  d x L j  \R l
136
r j  =  1 and (119) and (120) imply that x j j j  — XLj-
Solving (119) and (120) simultaneously yields the unique Nash equilibrium 
in quality-deflated prices, in terms of parameters 6, 6, and firm quality levels:
XHJ =  J — ^— — ^2qH^ ~ 2qL^  +  2 b(l 2H j +  b(lLj)  (121)4 QHj QLj
XLj =   ---------   (QHjO -  qLjO +  bqfjj +  2bqH j qLj )  (122)
^QHj qLj
Substituting (121) and (122) into (112) yields the equilibrium marginal 
consumer zj:
Zj =   ------------ (2qHjO ~  qLjO +  2bq2H j +  bqH j qLj) (123)
4QHj QLj
Equilibrium prices follow directly from (121) and (122):
PHj — ~r~ (~~~~— (2^ (QHj ~  QLj) +  2bq%j +  bq \ j )  (124)
4QHj qLj
PLj =  , qLj n (6 {QHj ~  qLj) +  bq2H j +  2bqH j qL j ) (125)
4 QHj ~  QLj
Inspection of (124) and (125) reveals the quality gap, q u j  — qLji to be 
a key determinant of prices. If firms choose identical quality levels q u j  =  
qLj =  q j , then the quality gap is zero and prices collapse to marginal cost, 
PHj =  PLj — b(jj. The Bertrand outcome for homogeneous goods where price 
is equal to marginal cost and firm profits are zero results. This drives the
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quality differentiation result of the literature, confirmed in the next section.
3.1.3 N ash Equilibrium in Firm Qualities
Anticipating the price implications of their quality decisions, firms set quality 
levels non-cooperatively in stage 1. Substituting (124) and (125) into (113) 
and (114) gives demands in terms of stage 1 qualities:
S h j  =  0 — zj  =  -— ^ ---- (20 -  2bqHj  -  bqLj) (126)
Hj QLj
SLj  =  Zj -  x Lj =  -— — -----(0 +  bqHj  -  bqLj) (127)
4Qhj -  qLj
It is now straightforward to express firms’ first stage profits as a function 
of quality levels, market size and the cost parameter:
t t  / x , (23 -  2bqHj -  bqL j f
n HjiQHj,QLj) =  { Q H j - Q L j ) -------{4qH ' - q L )~2--------  (128)
. 2
tt  f \ / x QHjqLj (0 +  bqHj  -  bqLj)
n  Lj {qHj, qLj) =  { Q H j - Q L j ) -------(4q# - -  qL )2---------
The profit equations confirm that firms can only earn positive profits when 
a quality gap is established in stage 1. Profits are affected by quality choice 
in two ways. Firms trade off the cost of producing a higher quality good with 
the higher price made possible by the higher quality level, but also consider 
the disparity in quality levels, which affects the intensity of price competition. 
The quality levels in the unregulated equilibrium are found by solving the
138
following system of first-order conditions, that captures these two effects: 
dHHj(QHjiQLj) QHj i^bqHj +  bqLj—20) ,  3 OOI_ 2  „ , „2
— —  =  — ( 4 t o ~ Y , j f — (2ibqHi -  m ,H ’ qL i+ 5bqm L i
(130)
+2bqlj -  4q%j0 +  QqHjqLjO ~  Sqlj0) =  0 
dULj(qHj, qLj)  qnj (0 +  bquj -  bqLj) , 3 2 , 17» 2
— -----------------(4««  -  «*)» (46,«  -  19 ite ' a w +  7
(131)
-2bq\j + Q^HjQ ~ 7qHjQLjQ) =  0
The first order conditions simplify to (132) and (133), implicitly define the 
quality reaction functions of the two firms, qnj {qLj) and qLj {qHj)-
24 bqjjj — 22bq%jqLj +  5 bqnjq\j +  2 bq^  — ^qjjj0 +  6qHjQLj& — &QLj0 = 0
(132)
4bq^j -  19bq2HjqLj +  17bqHjq lj ~  2bq\j +  Aq2Hj0 -  7qHjqLjO =  0 (133)
Confirming a maximum, the analytical expressions for qnj {qLj) and qLj {qHj) 
can be found. These are not included in the main text due to their length, but 
can be found in Appendix A. The reaction functions are illustrated for param­
eter values 0 = 5 and b =  \  in figure (19), and shown to be positively sloped,
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indicating that firm quality levels are strategic complements. The intuition 
behind the upward sloping qnj {qLj) reaction function is straightforward. A 
rise in qLj narrows the quality gap, thereby intensifying stage 2 price compe­
tition. The high quality firm thus has an incentive to increase its quality in 
order to widen the quality gap and alleviate competition. The convexity of 
costs with respect to quality ensures it is not optimal for the high quality firm 
to fully offset the impact of higher qij and thus quj {qLj) has a slope less than 
1.
^Hj
UR
0 4 6UR
Figure 19: Nash equilibrium in qualities.
The upward sloping reaction function of the low quality firm, qLj {qHj), is 
less straightforward, since an increase in qjjj widens the quality gap, relaxing 
price competition. The intuition behind the relationship is that the low quality
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firm’s revenue is increasing in its own quality level, but its ability to raise qLj 
is constrained by the stronger price competition that ensues. The alleviation 
of price competition through a higher qnj thus permits an increase in qLj, that 
would otherwise not be optimal.
Since product differentiation relaxes ex post price competition26, firms 
find it optimal to offer distinct quality levels in equilibrium. Solving (132) 
and (133) simultaneously yields the unregulated equilibrium quality levels 
q = 0.40976| and q^p  =  0.19936|. They are increasing in market size, 
but decreasing in the cost parameter of the model.
In the context of the two-country model, either high or low quality goods 
are imported by j .  The larger the market size of country j ,  or the higher is the 
highest income level (depending on the interpretation of 0), then the higher 
the quality of traded goods of a given type. The results of the model are 
thus consistent with recent empirical studies that find a positive relationship 
between the quality of traded goods and country size and income (Hallak, 
2006; Hummels and Klenow, 2005).
Substituting equilibrium qualities q ^  = 0.40976| and q^P = 0.19936| 
into the prices, sales, and profit equations fully characterises the unregulated 
equilibrium. The results axe reported in table (1).
26This result is reminiscent of the well-known result of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), 
where duopolists choose capacity constraints and then compete in prices. The incentive to 
constrain output in order to alleviate price competition gives rise to  the Cournot outcome. 
Commitment to quality differentiation serves a similar purpose in the vertical product dif­
ferentiation literature, but there are key differences; quality-differentiated goods command 
different prices, so firms are asymmetric in equilibrium. In contrast, capacity constraints 
serve to uniformly raise price above marginal cost preserving the symmetry between firms.
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The consumer surplus in j , C j, is comprised by the surplus of consumers of 
high quality goods H , denoted by Cnj, and of consumers of low quality goods 
L, denoted by Clj- Integrating utility over the relevant range of consumers 
gives the expressions (134), (135) and (136), expressed in terms of firm quality 
levels and model parameters 9 and b. Substituting for equilibrium quality 
levels yields consumer surplus in the unregulated equilibrium, reported in table 
(2).
d9 (134)C h j  =  f  (9qHj ~ P H j )
J Z j
( 2 9  — 2b q n j  — b q L j )  . _  _  0 0 .
=  . ------------------- 72---------{ b Q H j 9  +  b q Lj 9  -  2 b q L j  -  2 b q H j  +  b q L j q H j )
2 (4q H j  ~ q L j )
CLj — f ( 9 q L j  -  pLj) d 9  (135)
J x r . i’ * L j
QHjQLj , » \ 2
   ~2 ( °  +  b(lH j  ~  bQLj)
2 (4qH j -  q L jY  
Cj =  Cnj +  CLj
q2 ■
i S & q l j  ~  2bQLjQHj9 + 4b2q j j j  -f h2qLj QHj
2 (4qHj ~  QLj)2
+ b2Q2Lj<lHj + 5qLj 9 2 -  8b q l j9  + 4qH j92 -  8bq2H j9) (136)
3.1.4 Firm Quality Rankings and M ultiple Equilibria
Sections 1.2 and 1.3. solve for unregulated equilibrium prices and qualities 
in each market, without specifying which of the two firms, A  or B, is the 
high or low quality supplier in each market. The assumption that firms can 
freely choose quality levels for domestic and export sales and the absence of
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T h e  U nreg u la ted  M arket j
Quality levels 
Quality ratio 
Quality gap 
Prices
Quality-deflated prices 
Marginal consumer 
Sales
Profits
Consumer surplus
qUR = 0.40976f
rj =  2.0554
QHj — QLj — 0.2104|
P H j — 0.22666^- 
xHj -  0.533140 
Zj = 0.720750 
SHj. =f 0.279250
n ^ -  -  0.016407^
Cj = 0.046985^
q l f  =  0.19936f
pLj -  0.075010^ 
xLj = 0.376250
SLj =  0.34450 
n  Lj =  0.012149^
Table 2: The Unregulated Market
transport costs gives rise to four possible equilibria:
1. Each firm supplies its home market with low quality goods and exports 
high quality goods, so qAA < Qb a  and qAB > Qb b - Countries trade in 
high quality goods.
2. Each firm supplies its home market with high quality goods and exports 
low quality goods, so qAA > QBA and q^B < Qb b - Countries trade in low 
quality goods.
3. Firm A  is the world high quality supplier, so qAA > Qb a  and qAB > Qb b - 
Country B  imports high quality goods from A  while A  imports low 
quality goods from B.
4. Firm B  is the world high quality supplier, so qAA < Qb a  and qAB < Qb b  - 
Country A imports high quality goods from B  while B  imports low 
quality goods from A.
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Hence the model gives rise to three possible trade patterns. Countries may 
trade in high quality goods, low quality goods, or bilateral trade may be in 
goods of different quality levels (equilibria 3 and 4 are symmetric).
The welfare of a country is measured as the sum of consumer surplus and 
profits of the domestic firm from domestic sales and exports. The welfare of 
each country thus depends on the quality rankings of firms in each market, and 
thus the pattern of trade in equilibrium. While world welfare, denoted by W , 
is unchanged between equilibria, the distribution of welfare between countries
n3varies. Consumer surplus is symmetric between countries at Cj =  0.046985^- 
but the higher profits earned from H  sales in the unregulated equilibrium 
imply higher welfare from a higher quality ranking of firm j  relative to the 
foreign firm.
Equations (137) to (140) give the welfare equations for country A  under 
the four equilibrium configurations:
wA1 QAA < Q B A  i<1AB > Q B B = C a  + n tA + n  h b (137)
w,A
\<1AA><1B A 1<IAB<<IBB = C a  + n  h a  + n  l b (138)
W tA
\<1AA><1BAi<1AB><1BB = C a  + K H a  + n  h b (139)
WtA
\ QAA <<1BA iQAB « 1 B B = C a  + II l a  +  II lb (140)
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Correspondingly, equations (141) to (144) describe welfare for country B  under 
the four equilibrium configurations:
wP
\<1AA < Q B A  ,Q A B > Q B B = C b  + n  h a  + n  l b (141)
wP
\(1a a > Q b a ,Qa b < Q b b =  C b  +  n  l a  +  n  h b (142)
wP
\ <1a a ><]b a ,9 a b > Q b b —  C b  + B l l a  + n  l b (143)
wP
\q a a < q b a  ,Qa b  < q b b — C b  +  n  h a  +  n h b (144)
Combining the unregulated market outcome reported in table (2) with welfare 
equations (137) to (140) and (141) to (144) yields the unregulated welfare levels 
in table (3) for the four equilibrium configurations.
U n regu la ted  E qu ilib rium  W elfare D is trib u tio n
F irm  R ankings w A W B W
( 1 )  Qa a  <  Qb a , Qa b  >  Qb b
(2) q a a  >  Qb a , Qa b  <  Qb b
(3) q a a  >  Qb a , Qa b  >  Qb b
(4) q a a  <  Qb a , Qa b  <  Qb b
0.075541$
J0.075541$
330.079799$
a30.071283$
0.075541$
0.075541$
0.071283$
0.079799$
0.151082$
I30.151082$
0.151082$
0.151082$
Table 3: Welfare distribution in the unregulated equilibria.
Table (3) shows the asymmetric distribution of welfare in equilibria (3) 
and (4) where national firms are either world quality leaders or world low 
quality suppliers. Equilibria (1) and (2) give rise to symmetric welfare effects 
in the unregulated equilibrium. This symmetry is not preserved, however,
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in the regulated equilibrium where governments set minimum standards non- 
cooperatively, as is made clear in the next section.
3 .2  N o n -C o o p era tiv e  M in im um  Q u ality  S tandards
This section endogenises the choice of minimum quality standards in the two 
countries, where these are the result of a non-cooperative standard-setting 
game between the governments of A  and B. The objective function of each 
policy-maker is to maximise national welfare, taking as given the minimum 
standard of the other country, while anticipating the optimal quality response 
of the high quality firm and ensuing duopolistic price competition.
The industrial organisation literature on minimum quality standards has 
only recently endogenised the choice of national minimum quality standard 
(Ecchia and Lambertini,1997), prior to which standards were modelled as ex­
ogenous constraints. This chapter extends the analysis to examine the in­
centives for standard-setting in an international context, thereby showing the 
effects of cross-country externalities and the role of trade patterns in shaping 
national incentives. Section 1.4 establishes the three possible trade patterns 
that arise as equilibria of the two-country model. These in turn correspond to 
three non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum standards.
The section first examines the effects of minimum quality standards on key 
market variables that influence national decisions. The government reaction 
functions in minimum standards are then examined and the Nash equilibria in 
minimum quality standards characterised. These are contrasted to the world
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optimum pair of quality standards and the role of unilateral standards as 
non-tariff barriers to trade is analysed.
3.2.1 The Effects o f M inimum Quality Standards
The welfare improving effects of minimum quality standards in a single mar­
ket with two price-competing duopolists was first found in Ronnen (1991) 
and is a feature of the subsequent literature, such as Crampes and Hollander 
(1995) and more recently Ecchia and Lambertini (1997). It is common to the 
literature that the intensity of price competition induces a greater degree of 
quality differentiation than is optimal from a social welfare perspective, which 
a minimum standard can correct by narrowing the quality gap between the 
two goods and raising both quality levels.
As the next few sections show, the incentive to regulate is also a feature 
of the two-country model, but the open economy characteristics of the frame­
work distort policy-makers’ incentives to correct the inefficiency in quality- 
differentiation. This section analyses the effects of a minimum quality stan­
dard, sJ , in country j , such that s-7 > q^j1- The related industrial organisation 
literature usually examines the effects of ‘mild’ minimum standards as ex­
ogenous constraints, defined as a standard in between the two unregulated 
qualities, > s-7 > q^lf- Since s-7 is determined endogenously in this model 
as a result of a strategic game between policy-makers, we prefer not to restrict 
policy-makers’ strategy space through a priori assumptions about whether 
unilaterally selected standard are ‘mild’ or ‘severe’, i.e. s* > q^jf > q The
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effects of s-7 on key market variables, for the range of values consistent with 
both firms remaining in market j ,  are summarised by the following:
(i) The quality levels of both firms increase and the degree of quality dif­
ferentiation decreases, qij > as a result of the binding standard, 
and qnj {si) > q ^  as a result of the strategic complementarity between 
quality levels. The standard has the effect of raising the quality of the 
low quality firm closer to that of its rival. As discussed in section 1.3, 
the optimal response for the high quality firm to raise its own quality 
level to alleviate the price competition induced by the implementation 
of a minimum quality standard. The convexity of costs ensures that the 
high quality firm’s quality rises less than proportionally, as a result of the 
trade-off between the intensified price competition that a smaller qual­
ity gap implies and the convex costs of quality improvement. The high 
quality firm’s quality response to minimum standard standard sJ found 
by substituting q^j = s-7 into the high quality firm’s reaction function, 
implicitly defined by (132), which yields qHj{s3), the optimal response 
of the high quality firm27 to standard sJ . Figure (20) illustrates the 
path of quality levels and the quality ratio r 7 with minimum standard 
s-7 for 0 — 5 and b — As the severity of the minimum standard in­
creases, the quality ratio converges to 1, while the quality gap converges 
to zero. Let spi  denote the ‘prohibitive’ minimum standard in country
27The analytical expression for qHj(sJ) can be found in Appendix A.
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j , at which quahty levels are equal. The ensuing price competition is 
at its strongest and both firms earn zero profit. sP3 is thus the high­
est standard consistent with the survival of both firms in market j .  For 
standards s > sP3, firms would make losses28 giving rise to exit. Solving 
QHj{sPj) = qLj = spi  yields the general expression for sP3:
^ = S  <i45>
The larger the market, or the lower is firm cost, then the higher the 
maximum standard consistent with a duopolistic outcome. For 9 = 5 
and & =  5 , sP3 = as illustrated in figure (20).
(ii) Prices are increasing and converging over s3 G Ql P, §f J . There are two 
conflicting effects on price levels. First, a higher s3 implies higher quality 
levels for both firms and thus higher variable costs, that are increasing 
at an increasing rate due to the convexity assumption. Second, the 
convergence of quality levels intensifies price competition, moderating 
the impact of costs of price levels. The cost effects dominate under 
the assumptions of the model, in contrast to other contributions, where 
prices fall with standards (e.g. Ronnen, 1991, Boom, 1995). Substi­
tuting qi,j =  s3 and quj{s3) into price equations (124) and (125) yields 
PHj(s^\ b, 6) and pLj{s3,b, 9), which are confirmed to be increasing in s3,
28 Note that if firms incur a fixed costs of production in addition to the variable cost 
specification assumed, the threshold standard above which exit occurs is lower than sP3. 
For simplicity, fixed costs are set at zero.
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while the price gap is declining in s3. Figure (21) illustrates PHj{sJ,b , 0) 
and PLj{&* > frj 0) for 0 = 5 and b = \ ,
(iii) Profits of the high quality supplier decrease with standard s3 and profits 
of the low quality increase with standards up to a certain threshold level, 
s, above which they also decline. Substituting q^j =  s3 and qnj(s3) into 
the profit equations (128) and (129) yield H jjjis3 ,b,0) and IILj{s-*,b,0), 
from which - Uh^ ,b^  < 0 is confirmed. Solving dTlL^ j = 0 and 
confirming the maximum yields threshold level:
s = 0.27763? (146)b
Hence, ,b— > 0 for s3 G sj and dnL3J*j,b^  < 0 for s3 G
[s, sP j] . The path of firm profits earned from high and low quality sales 
in j  is illustrated for 9 =  5 and b — ^ in figure (22). The economic 
mechanism for these contrasting effects operates through the narrowing 
quality gap and price implications of s3. As the quality gap narrows 
consumers switch from consuming the high quality good to consuming 
the low quality good. At the same time, the increasing prices imply some 
consumers switch from consuming low quality goods to not making any 
purchase. From (123), (122) and (132), ^  > 0 and > 0. The 
implications of the increase in the preference parameter of the marginal 
consumers, is an unambiguous decline in demand for high quality goods 
with s3, lowering Hfjj- This negative relationship is common feature
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Figure 20: Regulated equilibrium qualities.
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Figure 21: Regulated equilibrium prices.
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of the related literature. The low quality firm enjoys a larger overall 
market share for sufficiently low s-7 but beyond a threshold s, the stronger 
price competition dominates the market share effect and profits decline. 
Expressing low quality sales in terms of s-7, b and 9 by substituting 
qLj =  sJ and qnj{sJ) into (127) allows threshold level s to be computed 
from g g j =  0 in terms of model parameters:
5 =  0.34104? (147)b
It thus follows that dSLJg fj,b'9^  > 0 for s-7 E  and dSLJ^ ' b?e) < Q
for s-7 E Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander (1995) 
find a similar pattern for profits, while Boom (1995) finds losses for both 
firms as a result of assumptions that keep market shares constant. The 
effects of s-7 on firm profits and sales are illustrated in figures (22)-(24) 
for 9 =  5 and b =
(iv) There are two conflicting effects of minimum quality standards on con­
sumer surplus under variable quality costs. First, the convexity of unit 
costs implies higher prices as a result of higher quality levels, an effect 
which is exacerbated by firms’ strategic responses to each others’ price 
increases. Second, stronger price competition associated with dimin­
ished quality disparity has a positive effect on total consumer surplus. 
The pro-competitive effect of s-7 dominates the cost effect for standards 
up to a threshold level s, above which the converse is true. Equation
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Figure 22: Regulated equilibrium profit levels.
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Figure 23: Regulated equilibrium high quality sales. 
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(136) describes total consumer surplus as a function of quality levels and 
parameters b and 0. Substituting qLj =  s3 and qHj(s^) into Cj yields 
Cj(s3,b,0). Solving dCA ^jb^ ) =  q an(j confirming the maximum yields 
threshold level:
s =  3.668? (148)b
It follows that dCi ^ j b^  > 0 for s3 £ Ql^ i an^ dCl^ j b^  < 0 for 
s3 £ [s, sFj] . The path of consumer surplus is illustrated for 6 = 5 and 
b = t; in figure (25). Note the effect of s3 on consumers is not uniform. 
Crampes and Hollander (1995) obtain the result that all consumers gain 
for sufficiently low minimum quality standards, under similar assump­
tions. For a higher standard, however, the higher costs and prices induces 
losses in high quality consumers, relative to low quality consumers, who 
increase in number as an increasing measure switches to purchasing the 
low quality good. Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) show that all consumers 
lose for a sufficiently high standard. Hence, as s3 rises over s3 £ 
welfare is being redistributed from the supplier of high quality goods to 
the supplier of low quality goods and to consumers in aggregate, but 
also between consumers of high quality goods to consumers of low qual­
ity goods.
The effects of s3 on Cj and IlHj and Ulj described in this section shape the 
incentives of policy-makers in the standard-setting game. Section 2.2 examines 
these incentives more closely.
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Figure 24: Regulated equilibrium low quality sales.
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Figure 25: Regulated equilibrium consumer surplus.
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3.2.2 N ational Incentives
In stage 0, the governments of A  and B  are assumed to set minimum quality 
standards s'4 and sB simultaneously and non-cooperatively, under the assump­
tion that both firms remain in the market, taking the strategic interaction of 
the firms and the resulting effects on market variables as given. In section
2.1 the ‘prohibitive’ standard, sP3, which defines the highest minimum quality 
standard consistent with the survival of both firms in market j ,  is found to 
be sP3 =  | | .  Hence, the strategy space of each policy-maker of country j  is 
s3 E Qlj1, spi . The policy-maker of each country j  chooses s3 from within 
this strategy space to maximise its national welfare, W 3, taking the standard 
of the other country as given.
Recall that policy decision s3, gives rise to a strategic response of the high 
quality firm in market j ,  qHj(s3)- Substituting the reaction function qHj(s3) 
implicit29 in (132) and qij =  s3 into equations (136), (128) and (129), yields 
consumer surplus and profits from the sale of high and low quality goods in 
market j , as functions of policy variable s3 and market parameters 0 and b. 
These are defined generally as Cj(s3,0,b), IlHj(s3,0,b) and IlLj(s3,9,b).
Consider welfare equations (149) and (150) that describe the objective 
functions of governments A  and B  in terms of s'4, sB and parameters 9 and b:
}The analytical expression for qHj{sP) can be found in Appendix A.
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w A (sA,sB,e,b)  =  c A(sA,e,b) +  n AA(sA,e,t>) + ^AB(sB,o ,b ) ( m )  
W B (sA,sB,e,b)  =  C'B(sA, I )6) +  n BB(sB,516) +  n BA(s'4,I,6)(150)
Suppressing market and cost parameters b and 0 for convenience, the gov­
ernments’ reaction functions are implicitly defined by (151) and (152):
dWA(sA,sB) dCA(sA) , d l W * - 4) „
— a? * — |S* =  ~ d ^ - + dsA = °  (151)
d w B(sA,sB) ocb (sb ) a i w * 8 ) , .
— w ^  =  a*5  =  (152)
For a pair of standards (s'4*, sB*) to constitute a Nash equilibrium in min­
imum standards, the pair must solve both (151) and (152). Since the dis­
tribution of consumers is symmetric in the two markets, the choice of the 
minimum standard is influenced symmetrically by its effect Cj(sJ) in the two 
countries. Recall from section 2.1 that ^ (f ) > 0 holds for a range of values 
a> E [QlR»f], where s =  3.668^, providing incentives to regulate. Asymme­
tries in incentives for setting minimum quality standards hinge on the quality 
of its domestic sales. If firm A  supplies its home market with high quality 
goods, then domestic profit is unambiguously lowered by the implementation 
of sA > qBR, since dl[j^ A   ^ < 0. In contrast, if firm A is a sup­
plier of low quality goods then profit from domestic sales is increasing with sA 
for sufficiently low minimum standards, sA E [qBR,s], where s — 0.27763^.
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Similar arguments apply for country B.
Moreover, inspection of the implicit reaction functions of A  and B, given 
by (151) and (152), respectively, reveals that while the level of W A and W B 
depend on both sA and sB, the optimal responses of the two policy-makers 
depend only on the quality ranking of the national firm in the domestic mar­
ket and parameters b and 6. The policy-makers’ optimal choice of minimum 
standard thus involves a trade-off between the gains to domestic consumers 
and the effects on domestic profit, which is unaffected by the foreign standard 
but depends on the quality of domestically produced goods. The discussion is 
summarised by proposition (21).
P ro p o sitio n  21 A country’s optimal unilateral minimum quality standard is 
higher when the domestic firm is the low quality supplier in the domestic mar­
ket, than if  the domestic firm is the high quality supplier.
Proof. Let W JH denote the welfare of a country j  when the domestic firm is 
the high quality supplier in j  and W 3L denote welfare when the domestic firm 
is the low quality supplier in j .  Further, let IIji denote the profit of firm j  
from exports (of unspecified quality) to i, where i j .  Hence (suppressing 
market and cost parameters b and 6):
wjH(si,si) = +  +  (153)
w[{sV )  =  (^ (sO  +  I I i^ s O  +  n * ^ )  (154)
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Let s?H and denote the optimal unilateral standard when W 3 =  W JH and 
when W 3 =  W^, respectively, given s \  Since IIji (sl) is not a function of 
the domestic standard s-7, optimal standard = argmaxsJ W 3H (s*, s7) =  
arg maxsj W 3H (s7) and =  argmaxsJ W 3L (s7, s7) — argmax^ W 3L (s3), where 
W jH (sj ) = Cj (sj ) + h Hj (sj ) and W JL (s7) =  Cj (s7) +  ULj (s7). Recall that 
<  0 for all *# and > 0 for 0  e  [«£R,s], while > 0
for s7 6 [<#*,*]. It follows that arg maxsJ s7) < arg maxsj W JL (s7) and
hence sJH < s>L. •
In general, the policy-maker finds it optimal to set that solves (155), 
or that solves (156), depending on whether the domestic firm is a high or 
low quality supplier in j:
dC j(si,o,b) d n Hj(si,e,b) 
dsi dsi
dC j(s7, 9, b) dULj{si,0,b)
dsi +  dsi
Solving (155) and (156) yields non-cooperative standards30 s-]H — 0.23995^ 
and =  0.346911, respectively. In the former case, the policy-maker sets a 
relatively ‘soft’ unilateral standard, while in the latter case a relatively ‘tough’ 
standard is set. Symmetry across countries implies that = ss  =
0.23995| and s f  — s£ =  sT = 0.3469l|, where ss  denotes the ‘soft’ unilat­
eral quality standard and sT ‘tough’ unilateral standard. Both ss  and sT lie
30Tables (3) and (4) in Appendix B report the solutions to all market variables under the 
two unilateral optimal minimum standards.
=  0 
=  0
(155)
(156)
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between the unregulated high and low quality levels, so unilaterally selected 
minimum standards are, indeed, mild.
P ropo sitio n  22 Unilateral minimum quality standards are always mild.
P roof. Since ^ ( f  ) =  0 at s =  3.668| and =  0 at s =  0.27763|,
then s)L that solves a convex combination of these in (156) must satisfy s < 
s^ < s. Moreover, since s > q^R a n d 's <  q^R it is also true q^R < < q^R.
Hence, sJL is mild. Following a similar line of argument for sJH and noting that 
Sjj > 0, it is straightforward to show that s?H is also mild. ■
Tables (4) and (5) report the regulated market outcome under ss  and sT , 
respectively. They show that consumer surplus is higher and profit from high 
quality sales lower under sT than under ss . Furthermore, the tougher standard 
corresponds to a smaller quality gap, indicating the lower degree of product 
differentiation. Prices for both high and low quality goods are higher with the 
tougher standard, as the convex variable costs effect from the higher quality 
levels outweighs the pro-competitive effect of stronger price competition.
3.3  N ash  E quilibria in  M in im um  Q uality  S tandards
Section 2.2 establishes minimum quality standards ss  — 0.23995| and sT =
0.346911 as the optimal unilateral policy decisions of national welfare-maximising 
policy-makers in countries whose national firm supplies the domestic market
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Regulated Equilibrium w ith High Quality D om estic Sales
Quality levels 
Quality ratio 
Quality gap 
Prices
Quality-deflated prices 
Marginal consumer 
Sales
Profits
Consumer surplus
qHj = 0.42856f
rj =  1.8318
QHj -  QLj =  0.188615
P H j  =  0.23487^ 
xHj = 0.548050 
Zj =  0.736850 
S Hj  =  0.263150
n  Hi =  0.013476^
C j  =  0.050122^
qLj — s-*H — ss  =  0.23995|
pLj = 0.091475^ 
xlj = 0.3910
Slj — 0.345850 (imports) 
ULj =  0.012702^
Table 4: Regulated Equilibrium with High Quality Domestic Sales.
Regulated Equilibrimn with Low Quality D om estic Sales
Quality levels 
Quality ratio 
Quality gap 
Prices
Quality-deflated prices 
Marginal consumer 
Sales
Profits
Consumer surplus
qHj = 0.49272f 
rj =  1.4203
QHj ~  qLj =  0.145811
pHj = 0.27231^
xHj -  0.552670
Zj = 0.797430
SHj =  0.202570 (imports)
n  Hj = 0.0059831^
Cj  =  0.055502^
qLj =  s jL =  sT =  0.34691 f
pLj = 0.15604^
XLj =  0.449790
SLj =  0.347640 
U Lj =  0.012407^
Table 5: Regulated Equilibrium with Low Quality Domestic Sales.
with high or low quality goods, respectively. Examination of the four config­
urations of firm quality rankings show that there exist four non-cooperative 
Nash equilibria in minimum standards: two symmetric Nash equilibria, where 
national minimum standards are either both tough (sA =  sB =  sT) or both 
‘soft’ (s"4 — sB = s5), and two asymmetric Nash equilibria where one coun­
try sets the soft standard and the other the ‘tough’ standard (sA — ss  and 
sB — sT, or s"4 =  sT and sB = ss ).
The multiplicity of non-cooperative Nash equilibria in minimum standards
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arises from the multiplicity of equilibria of the firms’ strategic interaction in 
prices and quality levels. It is interesting to note that asymmetric national 
standards can arise endogenously even though markets are symmetric and the 
duopolists have access to the same technology.
Consider the four configurations of firm quality rankings in A  and B:
1. If q a a  <  Qb a  and qAB > Qb b , then each firm supplies its home market 
with low quality goods and trade is in high quality goods. Policy-makers’ 
incentives are symmetric and give rise to a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
pair of standards (s'4*, s5*) =  (sT,s T).
2. If qAA > Qb a  and qAB < Qb b , then each firm supplies its home market 
with high quality goods and trade is in low quality goods. Policy-makers’ 
incentives are again symmetric, but standards are less stringent due 
to the negative effect on the profits of the domestic firm. The Nash 
equilibrium pair of standards is thus (sA*,sB*) =  (s5 , s5).
3. If qAA > Qb a  and qAB > Qb b , then firm A  is the world high quality sup­
plier. Country B  imports high quality goods from A  while A  imports 
low quality goods from B. Policy-makers’ incentives are asymmetric 
such that the policy maker in A  has an incentives to set the ‘soft’ stan­
dard to protect the interests of the high quality producing A  firm, while 
policy-maker B  sets the ‘tough’ standard. The Nash equilibrium pair of 
standards is thus (s"4* ^ 5 *) =  (ss ,sT).
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4. If qAA < Qb a  and qAB <  Qb b , then firm B  is the world high qual­
ity supplier and A  exports low quality goods to country B. The Nash 
equilibrium is again asymmetric, where (s^*,ss *) =  (sT, s5).
These results are summarised in proposition (23).
P ro p o sitio n  23 Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium minimum quality standards 
are higher when countries trade in high quality goods than if  they trade in low 
quality goods. I f  trade flows vary in quality, then a higher minimum standard 
is set by the country importing high quality goods than by the country importing 
low quality goods.
Proof. If countries trade in high quality goods then national firms are low 
quality suppliers in their home markets. Conversely, if trade is in low quality 
goods, then national firms are high quality suppliers in their home market. 
Moreover, if one country imports high quality goods and the other low quality 
goods, then the national firm of the high quality importing country is the world 
low quality supplier, while the other firm is the world high quality supplier. 
The proposition then follows directly from proposition (21). ■
The key difference between the international duopoly and having both 
duopolists in a single country is that only the profits of the national firm are 
incorporated into each policy-maker’s objective function. At the same time, 
the trade links between countries give rise to cross-country externalities from 
standard-setting as each standard affects the profits of the foreign firm.
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In contrast to the widely explored negative terms-of-trade externalities of 
the strategic tariff-formation literature (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2002; 
Staiger and Tabellini, 1987), the cross-country externalities arising from mild 
quality standards can be either positive or negative, depending on the quality 
of traded goods. Profits from low quality exports are increasing in foreign 
minimum standards, provided these are not too severe, yielding a positive 
cross-country externality. Profits from high quality exports unambiguously 
decrease with foreign minimum standards, giving rise to a negative cross­
country externality. The four Nash equilibria thus correspond to the four 
different combinations of externalities that may arise between the two coun­
tries: symmetric positive externalities, symmetric negative externalities, or 
asymmetric positive and negative externalities.
More formally, the externalities between countries A and B  are reflected 
in (157) and (158), which describe the impact that sB and sA have on W A 
and W B, respectively, through their effect on profit flowing abroad.
dsB dsB <
d W B =  d a  BA  >  0
d w A =  a a A B  > Q (157)
dsA dsA < (158)
The sign of and — respectively, depends on the quality of traded 
goods, and thus on the pattern of trade. For example, if A exports high 
quality goods to B, then even a very mild minimum standard sB imposes
a negative externality on A. Conversely, if low quality goods are exported,
making, the Nash equilibrium standards are inefficiently high or inefficiently 
low relative to the world optimum pair of standards that internalises these 
effects.
To examine the efficiency characteristics of the Nash equilibria, we de­
rive the efficiency condition for pairs of minimum quality standards. Then 
the world-welfare maximising pair of standards is calculated and contrasted 
with the non-cooperative policy outcome. This paves the way for the analysis 
of international cooperation in quality standards that forms the rest of the 
chapter.
3.3.1 Efficiency
Consider the welfare level of A  from a given pair (sA, sB).
Consider an iso-welfare contour for A , that describes all the combinations
then for sufficiently low sB , the externality on country A  is positive. Since
these positive or negative external effects do not factor into unilateral decision-
WA = WA(sA,sB) (159)
of national standards that yield the welfare level described in (159). Along
the iso-welfare contour, it must hold that:
(160)
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Hence, the slope of the iso-welfare contour of A  is given by:
dsA
dsB
dW A/ d s B
(161)d W A/ d s A
Similarly along an iso-welfare contour for B , for constant welfare W B = 
W B (sA, sB), it must hold that:
d W B , B dW B , A n ■ds +  ———ds =  0dsB dsA
(162)
Hence, the slope of the iso-welfare contour of B  is given by:
dsA
dsB
d W B/ d s B 
idWB=0~  d W B /d s A
(163)
Substituting (151) and (152) into (161) and (163) allows the slopes of the 
country A  and B  iso-welfare contours to be expressed in terms marginal effects 
of national standards on consumer surplus and profit flows:
dsA
dsB
dsA
dUAB/ d s l
dsB
\dwA=o dCA/ d s A +  dUAA/ d s A
d C s /d s 3  +  dTlBB/ d s B
(164)
(165)
\dwB=o dUBA/ d s A
For a pair of minimum quality standards (sA, sB) to be efficient, there must 
be no possibility Pareto improvement from (sA,s B), so the iso-welfare contours 
must be tangential to each other at (sA,sB). The efficiency requirement is
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thus:
dsA dsA
dsB \dWA=0 dsB \dWB=0
(166)
Results from the examination of the Nash equilibria against efficiency con­
dition (166) are summarised in Proposition (24).
P ro p o sitio n  24 The Nash equilibria in minimum quality standards are inef­
ficient.
that’ dsA' dsAdsB \d\VA=0 dsB \dWB=0P roof. Recall the condition for efficiency 
implies (164) and (165) must be equal for Nash equilibrium pair (sA*, sB*) to 
be efficient. Moreover, in order for the pair to constitute a Nash equilibrium, it 
must be true that it solves the government reaction functions, (151) and (152).
However, if (s"4*, sB*) satisfies both (151) and (152), then
\dwA=o
— oo >
dsA
dsB = 0, thus violating the condition for efficiency.\d\VB=0
3.3.2 W orld O ptim um  M inim um  S tandards
Let pair (sA,s B) =  (s^a°  ■> SE}°) denote the pair of minimum standards that 
maximise world welfare W  (s'*, sB), given by (167), where:
W  (sA , s B) =  W a ( s a , s b ) +  W b ( s a , s b ) (167)
= cA (s'4) +  nAA (s'4) +  nBA (s'4) +  cB (sb ) +  nBB ( sB) +  n AB (sB)
Since each market has a low and high quality supplier with symmetric 
costs and consumer preferences are identical across markets of equal size 0,
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then by symmetry s ^ °  = s ^ °  =  sw o , where sw o  =  arg maxs W  (s) =  
2 [Cj (s) 4- IIHj (s) +  IILj (s)]. Thus sw o  solves:
d w  =  dCj (s) a n Hj (s) a n Lj (s)
ds ds ds ds
Rearranging (168) yields the efficiency condition:
_______ d n Hj (s) / d s  =  dCj (s) / d s  +  dULj (s) / d s  =
dCj (s) / d s  -f dULj (s) / d s  dUnj (s) / d s
It follows directly from (169) that efficiency is satisfied at the world op­
timum. Hence, the world welfaxe-maximising pair of minimum standards is 
shown to be both symmetric and efficient. The implication is that world wel­
fare is maximised at a unique point, where both countries harmonise their stan­
dards at sw o. Since the world optimum does not constitute a non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium, it may only be reached through cooperative agreement. The 
feasibility of international cooperation at (sA,s B) =  (sw o ,s w o ) is analysed 
in the section 3.
Solving (168) yields the world optimum common standard sw o = 0.25241 
It is observed to lie between the two optimal unilateral minimum standards 
ss  = 0.23995| and sT — 0.346911. This leads to Proposition (25).
Intuitively, the cross-country externalities imply that when a government of 
a country imposes a minimum quality standard, part of the costs (or benefits) 
of the standard are borne by the trading partners of that country. As a result,
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each government faces less than the full costs (or benefits) of the standard 
and hence over (or under) provides regulation of quality relative to the world 
optimum minimum standard that internalises the cross-country effects.
Proposition 25 The world optimum standard (sw o ) lies between the unilat­
eral ‘soft’ standard (ss ) and ‘tough9 standard (sT).
Proof. Since sw o  =  argmaxs W'(s), — argmaxs W 3H and sJL — argmaxs W ^ ,
where W(s) =  Cj(s) +  n //j(s) +  Hij(s),  W 3H =  Cj (s-7) -t- Hijj {&) and 
W 3l  — Cj (sJ) +  W.Lj (s-7), then from the properties of IILj, n Hj and Cj it 
follows that sJfj < sw o < s?L. m
Table (6) reports the solutions to all market variables under sw o , the
world welfare maximising (common) minimum quality standard.
W orld W elfare M axim ising M ark e t O utcom e
Quality levels 
Quality ratio 
Quality gap 
Prices
Quality-deflated prices 
Marginal consumer 
Sales
Profits
Consumer surplus
qHj = 0.43885f 
r5 = 1.7386
QHj ~ QLj — 0.18644 
a2
P H j  =  T  
xHj = 0.546760 
Zj  = 0.746010 
SHj = 0.253990
n Hj =  0.012028?
Cj = 0.051511?
qLj = gj = swo =  0.25241 f 
H2
PLj  — T
=  0.399580
SLj = 0.346420 
n  Lj  = 0.012869?
Table 6: Market Outcomes Under the World Optimum Standard.
3.3.3 Non-Cooperative Standard-Setting and Trade
Consider the implications of the over- or under-regulation of quality on the 
trade flows between A  and B. When countries trade in high quality goods,
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the Nash equilibrium is symmetric and characterised by ‘tough’ standards in 
both countries. These are more stringent than is optimal from a world-welfare 
perspective, however, as a result of the bilateral negative externalities. Since 
demand for high quality goods is decreasing in the minimum quality standard, 
over-regulation implies lower demand for high quality goods in each country 
and thus lower bilateral trade in these goods than is efficient. The tougher 
standards also imply the quality of traded goods is higher than is efficient.
Conversely, trade in low quality goods gives rise to a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in which both countries set ‘soft’ standards, which are laxer than 
is optimal from a world-welfare maximising perspective. For low quality goods, 
however, laxer standards imply less demand in each country, and thus lower 
bilateral trade in low quality goods than is efficient. Moreover, the quality of 
traded goods is lower than is efficient.
Similar arguments apply for the asymmetric Nash equilibria for the flows 
of high and low quality exports, respectively. It follows that irrespective of 
the quality level of traded goods, and thus for all patterns of trade, the inef­
ficiency in unilateral decision-making in quality standards operates as a non­
tariff barrier to trade. Moreover, the result follows without any of the usual 
assumptions that generate non-tariff barrier effects of minimum standards, 
such as certification or labelling costs for firms to meet different national stan­
dards or quality modification costs that prohibit the customisation of quality 
to different markets.
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The discussion is summarised by proposition (26).
Proposition 26 Trade flows are lower under Nash equilibrium quality stan­
dards than under world optimum standards.
P roof. Recall that < 0 and > 0 for s  G (qYR,s^  where s =  
3.4104|. If both countries export high quality goods, then Nash equilibrium 
standards are sA* — sfl* =  sT. From Proposition (25) it follows that sT > 
sw o , so exports must be lower than under world optimum standards. If 
countries trade in low quality goods, then Nash equilibrium standards are 
sA* =  s B* =  s s . Proposition (25) implies s s  < sw o  . Moreover, since 
sw o  j- then dR^ jj > 0 holds in the region of the Nash equilibrium and world 
optimum. Hence low quality exports are lower in the Nash equilibrium than 
under world optimum standards. Finally, if A  exports high quality goods and 
B  exports low quality goods, then s"4* = s s  <  sw o  and sB* =  sT >  s w o . 
Thus high quality exports of country A  are lower under sB* =  sT than under 
sB* = s w o . Furthermore, country IPs low quality exports are lower under 
s^ 4* — ss  than under sA* = s w o . ■
3 .4  In tern ation a l C oop era tion  in  Q uality  S tandards
Section 2 establishes the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibria in 
minimum quality standards, as well as the efficiency of harmonisation of qual­
ity standards at the world optimum. This section analyses the potential gains 
from international cooperation between governments under the three distinct
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trade patterns: trade in high quality goods, trade in low quality goods, and 
bilateral trade in goods of different qualities. A common feature of all three 
cases is the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in the incentives of the two policy­
makers. While countries stand to gain through a cooperative agreement, this 
does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Taking as given the minimum quality 
standard of the other country, each policy-maker has an incentive to defect 
from the cooperative agreement. The analysis follows the general approach 
used in the analysis of cooperative agreements in tariffs (Bagwell and Staiger, 
1999, 2002) by examining Pareto-improving reciprocal adjustment of mini­
mum quality standards as a means of establishing the scope for cooperative 
agreement.
3.4.1 B argain ing  from  S ym m etric  N ash  E quilib ria
The two distinct trade patterns that give rise to a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
are analysed in turn.
T rade in  H igh Q uality  G oods
P ro p o sitio n  27 I f  countries trade in high quality goods, then a cooperative 
agreement in quality standards must involve a reciprocal lowering o f minimum  
quality standards from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If countries trade in high quality goods, then the national firms are 
low quality suppliers in their home market. It follows from propositions (21) 
and (25) that A  and B  set ‘tough’ standards unilaterally, denoted by sA* =
172
s** =  ST > s ^ ° .
For a pair of standards (sA,s B) to be welfare improving for both A  and B  
relative to the Nash standards (sT, sT), it is necessary that Sq < sT and 
Sq < sT . This is shown to be true by considering the effect of sB on W A. The 
minimum standard in B  affects the welfare of A  through its effect on profit 
from high quality exports. From the properties of II Hj it follows that W A is 
decreasing in sB. A symmetric argument applies for B , so W B is decreasing 
in sA. The cross-country negative externalities are summarised by:
dWA  <  0 (170)dsB dsB
dW B _  dUBA 
dsA dsA < 0 (171)
While each country’s welfare is decreasing in the quality standard of its trading 
partner, the implicit reaction functions (151) and (152) imply that ^ p r |sB 
and dQgE~\sA are independent of sB and s"4, respectively. The best responses 
of governments A  and B  are thus sA* (sB) = sT VsB and sB* (s'4) =  sT Vs'4, 
respectively. Hence, if sB > sT , (170) implies the best attainable welfare for 
A  given sB is:
W A (sA- (s?) ,«?) =  W A (sT, 4 )  < W A (sT , sT) (172)
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Similarly, if sA > sT , (171) implies the best attainable welfare for B  given sA 
is:
W B (sg, SB ‘  ( 4 ) )  = W B (sg, sT) < W B ( s T , sT) (173)
Inequalities (172) and (173) imply that if sA > sT or sB > sT then (sq , sB) 
cannot be Pareto improving relative to (sT, sT) for both A  and B  and thus 
cannot be the outcome of a cooperative agreement in standards. Hence for 
(so j so) to be a cooperative agreement both sA < sT and Sq < sT must hold. 
■
Figure (26) illustrates the incentives of the two policy-makers under the 
configuration of firm qualities that generates trade in high quality goods. The 
curves illustrated are plotted for parameter values b = ^ and d — 5 using 
the profit equations for high and low quality goods, consumer surplus and the 
quality reaction function of the high quality firm given in Appendix A.
The origin of the figure corresponds to no regulation, where sA = sB = 
qY,R- Iso-welfare contours W A* and W B* are drawn for the welfare level at­
tained in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by NE, where (sA*, sB*) = 
(sT,sT), while contours W A and IF5 correspond to the welfare of A  and B  
from a cooperative agreement at the world optimum (WO), where sA = sB =  
s w o  <  s t  Moreover, the dotted contour W* reflects iso-world-welfare contour 
at the Nash equilibrium level of welfare W* = W A* +  W B*.
Consider the iso-welfare contours for each country. Higher welfare levels 
correspond to contours closer to the axes, reflecting the cross-country nega­
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tive externalities that apply. For each country, the unique, optimal unilateral 
standard is sT, which reflects the optimal reply of each country to any stan­
dard set by the other. The welfare level of each is decreasing in the standard 
of the other, so the highest welfare point is (sA,sB) =  (sT,gBR) for A  and 
(s"4, sB) =  ( g i R , s t )  for B.
The efficiency locus is denoted by EE, which plots all pairs of minimum 
standards at which the iso-welfare contours of A  and B  are tangent. WO is 
the efficient, symmetric pair, which maximises world welfare. The inefficiency 
of NE is confirmed since the iso-welfare contours of the two countries are not 
tangential at NE, indicating scope for Pareto improvement. The core, enclosed 
by W A* and W B*, gives the set of all Pareto-improving points relative to 
NE, within which the darker segment reflects the contract curve of A  and B , 
along which cooperative pairs (sA, sB) are both efficient and Pareto-improving 
relative to NE.
Consider the opportunities for cooperation reflected in the figure. While 
{sT , sT) is a Nash equilibrium, mutual gains can be reaped through a recip­
rocal adjustment of minimum quality standards downwards, as follows from 
proposition (27). Each reciprocal adjustment places countries on a lower, 
symmetric contour (reflecting higher welfare), through which all gains from 
bargaining are exhausted at WO.
The analysis confirms the potential welfare gains from cooperation, but 
also highlights the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure of incentives. Points DA
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and D b  illustrated optimal defection points from cooperation for A  and B , 
respectively. If sB =  swo, then country A ’s optimal reply is to defect to 
Da , by setting sA = sT and thereby attaining a higher welfare level. While 
the scope for Pareto-improving cooperation is established, the analysis raises 
concerns over the enforceability of such cooperation.
In practice, national quality standards are developed by National Stan­
dards Bodies. 153 of these national bodies are members of the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the world’s largest developer of stan­
dards. While the ISO has greatly contributed to the development of inter­
national standards alongside national standards, it has no legal authority to 
enforce the implementation of its standards. Despite the ISO’s large mem­
bership, and the impetus it creates for the implementation of international 
standards, there are still widespread differences in national standards.
T rade in Low Q uality  G oods
P rop o sitio n  28 I f  countries trade in low quality goods, then a cooperative 
agreement in quality standards must involve a reciprocal raising of minimum  
quality standards from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
P roof. If countries trade in low quality goods, it follows from propositions
(21) and (25) that A  and B  set ‘soft’ standards unilaterally, denoted by sA* = 
sB* = ss  < sw o . Moreover, the implicit reaction functions (151) and (152) 
yield sA* (s5 ) = ss  VsB and sB* (s'4) =  ss  Vs71, respectively.
For a pair of standards (sg , sj^) to be welfare improving for both A  and B
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Figure 26: Cooperative agreement in standards under trade in high quality goods.
relative to  the Nash standards (ss , s s ), it is necessary th a t Sq > ss  and 
sB > ss . If these conditions do not bo th  hold, then  a t least on country 
has lower welfare under (sq , sB) than  under the Nash equilibrium standards. 
From the properties of YVlj and since s > ss  it follows th a t W A is increasing 
in sB and W B increasing in sA in the region of the Nash equilibrium. The 
cross-country externalities are thus positive and sum m arised by:
dwa
"O pr = r ^ 1 > 0 fors' l e («iS>s) (175)
177
Hence, if sB < ss  the best attainable welfare for A given sB is:
W A (s'4* ( s f ) , 4 )  =  W A (ss , s f ) < W A (ss , ss ) (176)
Similarly, if s$ < ss  the best attainable welfare for B  given Sq is:
W B ( s t  sB* («£)) =  W B ( s t  Ss ) < W B (ss , ss ) (177)
Prom (176) and (177) it follows that if Sq < ss  or Sq < ss , then (sq , Sq ) 
cannot be Pareto improving relative to (ss , s5) for both A  and B  and thus 
cannot be the outcome of a cooperative agreement in standards. Hence for 
(sq , Sq) to be a cooperative agreement both Sq > ss  and Sq > ss  must hold. 
■
P roposition  29 From a symmetric Nash equilibrium in minimum standards, 
mutually beneficial reciprocal adjustment of national standards increases na­
tional welfare monotonically for both countries until the world optimum is 
reached.
Proof. Consider reciprocal changes in standards dsA and dsB from an initial 
bargaining position at Nash equilibrium standards, (sA*,sB*). If trade is in 
high quality goods, then sA* = sB* = sT > sw o  and from Proposition (27) 
adjustments dsA < 0 and dsB < 0 from the Nash equilibrium are mutually 
beneficial. Similarly, if low quality goods are traded, then sA* =  sB* = ss  < 
sw o  and from Proposition (28) adjustments dsA > 0 and dsB > 0 from
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the Nash equilibrium are mutually beneficial. Since sA* = sB*, reciprocal 
adjustments give rise to symmetric Pareto improvements until sA* +  ^  ds =  
sB* + ^r,ds = sw o , where standards (sw o, sw o ) are efficient. ■
Figure (27) illustrates the strategic incentives of the two policy-makers 
where trade is in low quality goods. As before, the curves illustrated are 
plotted for parameter values b =  ^ and 9 = 5 using the profit equations for 
high and low quality goods, consumer surplus and the quality reaction function 
of the high quality firm given in Appendix A. All notation is as in figure (26).
The iso-welfare contours for countries that trade in low quality goods are 
elliptical, as illustrated in the figure. In particular, the iso-welfare contours 
for A  and B  form concentric ellipses that correspond to higher welfare as they 
converge to the unique, preferred point of each country.
Consider the welfare of country A. Welfare level W A* is attained at the 
Nash equilibrium (NE), where both countries set the ‘soft’ standard 
sw o  Welfare \yA  ffom a cooperative agreement at the world optimum (WO) 
corresponds to an elliptical iso-welfare contour that lies within the contour 
corresponding to the Nash equilibrium (sA*,sB*) =  (s5,s 5). The unique,
 A
preferred point of country A  is denoted by W  , corresponding to the pair of 
minimum standards (sA, sp ) =  (ss ,s). The intuition behind the shape of the
 A
iso-welfare contours and preferred point W  lies in the positive cross-country 
externalities between countries for minimum standards 6 (g£^,s), which 
become negative for s-7 G (s, sp ), where s — 0.27763| =  2.7763 and sp =
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Hence, at sB = s =  2.7763, the profit from firm A’s low quality exports is 
maximised, yielding the highest attainable welfare for A  at (s"4, sB) — (ss , s). 
Similar arguments apply for country B.
The dotted contour reflects the iso-world-welfare contour through the Nash 
equilibrium point, corresponding to welfare level W* = W A* +  W B*, and 
centred around the world welfare maximising WO point. The core, enclosed 
by the intersection contours W A* and W B*, gives the set of Pareto-improving 
cooperative agreements, the efficient of which lie on the contract curve, that 
forms a subset of the efficiency locus EE.
Propositions (28) and (29) are reflected by reciprocal increases in stan­
dards sA and sB, which increase welfare by ‘internalising’ the positive ex­
ternalities drive firms to under-regulate at the NE, relative to WO. These 
Pareto-improving adjustments shift countries onto smaller and smaller concen­
tric circles from NE, which correspond to higher welfare levels, until efficiency 
is achieved at WO where both iso-welfare contours are tangent. As with trade 
in high quality goods, the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure exists, since coun­
tries A  and B  have an incentive to defect to DA and DB, respectively, from a 
cooperative agreement at WO.
3.4.2 Bargaining from Asym m etric Nash Equilibria
This section examines the incentives and scope for cooperative agreement be­
tween the two countries from an initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium in min­
imum quality standards. This corresponds to the trade pattern where one
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Figure 27: Cooperative agreement in standards under trade in low quality goods.
firm ranks as the high quality leader in both markets, and the other firm 
is the world low quality supplier. The resulting trade pattern is where one 
country exports high quality goods, and finds it optimal to set minimum qual­
ity standard ss < sw o , while the other exports low quality goods, and sets 
> s w o .
The results point to scope for mutual gains from reciprocal adjustment 
in minimum standards, but show that the asymmetric welfare measures and 
externalities (positive for one country and negative for the other) make a 
cooperative agreement at the world optimum infeasible. The asymmetries
between A  and B  are such that the world optimum does not offer a Pareto gain 
to both countries and hence does not He on the contract curve. In the absence 
of lump-sum transfers that can correct for the asymmetries, the models shows 
that harmonisation of minimum quality standards cannot form a cooperative 
agreement. This result is similar to Mayer (1981) and Kennan and Riezman 
(1988), who show in the context of tariff negotiations that free trade may be 
unattainable if countries are sufficiently asymmetric31 in size.
The results are summarised by general propositions (30) to (34) and then 
illustrated for particular parameter values.
P ro p o sitio n  30 I f  trade flows vary in quality, then a cooperative agreement 
reached from the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium must involve a higher stan­
dard in the high quality exporting country and a lower standard in the low 
quality exporting country .
P roof. Suppose A  exports high quality goods and B  exports low quality 
goods (or vice versa). It follows from propositions (21) and (25) that A  sets a 
‘soft’ standard and B  a ‘tough’ standard unilaterally, where sA* — ss  < sw o  
and sB* = sT > sw o . The implicit reaction functions (151) and (152) yield 
sA* (sB) = ss  \/sB and sB* (sA) = sT VsA, respectively. Equations (170) 
and (175) imply a negative externality on A  from sB* — sT and a positive 
externality on B  from sA* = ss . Hence for standards (sA,sB) to be welfare
31 An importaint difference is that asymmetric Nash equilibria arise endogenously as a 
feature of the vertical product differentiation in this chapter, and not as a result of assymetric 
assumptions in country or firm characteristics.
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improving for both A  and B  relative to the Nash standards it is necessary 
that so >  *S and *g < 5T. If these conditions are not both satisfied, then 
at least one country has lower welfare under (sA,s B) than under (s5,s T), as 
shown by (176) and (173), and (sA,s B) cannot be the result of a cooperative 
agreement. ■
Lemma 31 The world optimum does not lie on the contract curve of govern­
ments whose initial bargaining position is an asymmetric Nash equilibrium in 
minimum standards.
Proof. Consider the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where A  exports high qual­
ity goods and B  exports low quality goods, where Nash equilibrium standards 
are s^* =  s s  < s w o  and sB * =  sT > s w o . For the world optimum to lie 
on the contract curve it must be both (i) efficient and (ii) Pareto improving. 
The world optimum is shown to be efficient in section 2.3.2. Agreement at the 
world optimum is shown not to be Pareto improving, however, by examination 
of country welfare levels at the Nash equilibrium and at the world optimum: 
Substituting s s  = 0.23395| and sT — 0.346911 into equation (132) yields 
Nash equilibrium high qualities qHA{sS) = 0.42856| and qHB{sT) = 0.49272|. 
Firm quality rankings imply q*AA =  qHA(sS ) =  0.42856^, qAB = qHB{sT ) = 
0.49272f, q*BB = sT = 0.34691 f  and q*BA = ss  = 0.23395f. Substitu­
tion of the equilibrium values in (149) and (150) yields Nash welfare levels 
W A* = (6.9585 x 10-2 ) \  and W B* = (8.0616 x 10-2 ) respectively.
At the world optimum low qualities are qiA =  qLB = sw o -  0 . 2 5 2 4 1 From
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(132) the high quality best responses are qHA(sWO) =  Qh b (sWO) =  0.43885|. 
It follows that qj[° = = 0.43885| and q^g  -- q^® — 0.252411.
Substituting into (??) and (??) yields welfare levels at the world optimum 
W A =  (7.5567 x 10-2) \  and W B =■ (7.7249 x 10-2 ) respectively.
W A > W A* and W B < W B* imply the world optimum is not Pareto improv­
ing relative to the asymmetric Nash equilibrium and thus cannot lie on the 
contract curve. ■
Proposition 32 From an initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium in minimum  
standards, an agreement at the world optimum cannot be reached through 
Pareto improving reciprocal adjustment of national standards.
Proof. This follows directly from lemma (31). ■
Lemma 33 From initial asymmetric Nash equilibrium minimum standards a 
lump-sum transfer from the high quality to the low quality exporting country 
can ensure mutual gains from a cooperative agreement at the world optimum.
Proof. Consider the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where A  exports high 
quality goods and B  exports low quality goods. The proof of lemma (31) 
confirms that W A — W A* > W B* — W B. Thus any lump-sum transfer LAB 
from A  to B  where LAB € (wB* — W B, W A — W A*^ ensures mutual gains 
from an agreement at the world optimum. ■
Proposition 34 I f  lump sum transfers between countries are possible, then 
the world optimum can be reached through international cooperation for all
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configurations of firm quality rankings.
P roof. This follows directly from propositions (29) and (33). ■
Figure (28) illustrates the strategic incentives and opportunities for coop­
erative bargaining from the asymmetric Nash equilibrium where sA — ss  and 
sB = sT , corresponding to a quality ordering in each market where firm A  
is the high quality supplier. As before, the curves illustrated are plotted for 
parameter values b = \  and 0 = 5 using the profit equations for high and low 
quality goods, consumer surplus and the quality reaction function of the high 
quality firm given in Appendix A.
The asymmetric Nash equilibrium depicted contains elements of figures 
(26) and (27) of the previous sections. Country A  exports high quality goods, 
and thus always loses welfare from the implementation of a binding standard 
in country B, through the negative effect on export profit. The iso-welfare 
contours for A  are thus increasing in welfare for lower sB, and centred around 
sA = ss , the optimal minimum standard for A. Welfare level W A* is attained 
at the asymmetric Nash equilibrium.
Country B  is an exporter of low quality goods to country A  and thus 
experiences a positive welfare effect from the implementation of sA G (qBR,n), 
and a negative welfare effect for sp G (s, sp ) , giving rise to elliptical iso­
welfare contours. Welfare W B* corresponds to the welfare level at the Nash 
equilibrium.
The concentric dotted iso-world-welfare contours are centred around WO
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and the efficiency locus EE passes through WO and into the core formed 
by the two (reservation) iso-welfare contours at NE. The main observation is 
that WO is not on the countries’ contract curve, so in the absence of lump 
sum transfers, this point cannot be reached through reciprocal adjustment of 
sA and sB. While country A  gains from WO (relative to NE), country B  expe­
riences a loss in welfare, since W B < W B*. Mutual gains from a cooperative 
agreement are possible, for example at C, but the resulting agreement does 
not entail harmonisation of standards and corresponds to a world welfare level 
lower than at WO. Note that the Prisoners’ Dilemma structure in incentives 
continues to apply, with DA and DB reflecting the defection points of A  and 
jB, respectively.
If lump-sum transfers are possible between countries, then a lump sum 
transfer L ^  — W B* — W B is the smallest transfer consistent with cooperation 
of B  at WO. Under LAB, country B  is indifferent between NE and WO, while 
A  gains welfare relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Meza and Tombak (2007) introduce asymmetries in marginal costs and 
Jinji and Toshimitsu (2004) assume asymmetric fixed quality-development 
costs to obtain an endogenously determined quality ranking. For sufficiently 
small cost differentials, they each find a unique duopoly equilibrium in which 
the low cost firm offers high quality. Their results suggest that even small cost 
asymmetries can eliminate symmetric Nash equilibria. If the quality ranking 
of firms is preserved across markets through a cost advantage of one firm over
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Figure 28: Cooperative agreement in standards when countries trade high for low quality 
goods.
another, then only the asymmetric equilibria discussed survive.
3.4.3 C ooperative S tandard -S etting  and Trade
P roposition  35 International cooperation in standard-setting raises trade vol­
ume relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for all configurations of 
firm quality rankings.
Proof. Proposition (26) establishes th a t trade flows are lower under the Nash 
equilibrium than  under world optimum  standards. Under sym m etric initial
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conditions, Proposition (29) establishes that reciprocal mutual adjustments in 
standards allow the world optimum to be reached. Hence international coop­
eration from a symmetric Nash equilibrium raises or lowers standards towards 
the world optimum, thereby raising trade flows. Moreover, if lump sum trans­
fers can be made between countries, then Proposition (34) establishes that the 
world optimum can be reached even under asymmetric initial conditions. 
Pareto improving cooperation is possible even in the absence of lump-sum 
transfers, however. Proposition (30) establishes that such cooperation must 
raise the standard of the high quality exporting country and lower the standard
of the low quality exporting country, albeit not to the world optimum level.
dS dS  /Since < 0 and > 0 for s 6 lq ^Rt 's), any cooperative agreement
from an asymmetric Nash equilibrium is trade enhancing. ■
3 .5  C onclusion
This chapter extends a well-established vertical product differentiation model 
to an international setting where international duopolists compete in two seg­
mented markets. The framework is used to analyse governments’ incentives 
for the unilateral setting of minimum quality standards, as well as the scope 
and effects of international cooperation on welfare and international trade. 
Firms compete in qualities and prices internationally and incur variable costs 
of quality improvement, allowing quality of domestic sales and exports to be 
differentiated. National standards are endogenous and result from a standard- 
setting game between governments whose objective function is to maximise
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national welfare.
Multiple equilibria arise as a feature of the underlying vertical product 
differentiation model. Four unregulated Nash equilibria in minimum stan­
dards are shown to exist, two symmetric and two asymmetric, depending on 
the quality ranking of firms in each market. The framework delivers sev­
eral new propositions. First, the analysis establishes that in all four cases, 
unilaterally selected minimum quality standards are inefficient as a result of 
cross-country externalities. Second, trade flows are shown to be lower under 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium standards than under a mutually beneficial 
cooperative agreement, suggesting higher trade flows between countries that 
cooperate in standard-setting than between countries that set minimum stan­
dards unilaterally. Unilateral minimum standards are thus shown to operate 
as non-tariff barriers to trade.
In contrast to the widely explored negative terms-of-trade externalities 
of the strategic tariff-setting literature, the cross-country externalities arising 
from mild quality standards can be are either positive or negative, depending 
on the quality of traded goods. Profits from low quality exports are increasing 
in foreign minimum standards, provided these are not too severe, yielding a 
positive cross-country externality. Profits from high quality exports unam­
biguously decrease with foreign minimum standards, giving rise to a negative 
cross-country externality. The four Nash equilibria thus correspond to the 
four different combinations of externalities that may arise between the two
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countries: symmetric positive externalities, symmetric negative externalities, 
or asymmetric positive and negative externalities. Hence unilateral minimum 
standards may be inefficiently high or inefficiently low relative to the efficient 
world optimum symmetric standards.
Third, the existence of Pareto improving cooperative agreements from an 
initial bargaining position at any of the four Nash equilibria, is established. 
Moreover, the world welfare maximising symmetric standard can be reached 
through reciprocal adjustments in national minimum standards from either of 
the two symmetric Nash equilibria. These correspond to firm rankings that 
give rise to trade in high quality goods only, or trade in low quality goods 
only. While the underlying Prisoners’ Dilemma structure of the standard- 
setting game raises concerns about enforcement of cooperative agreements, the 
theoretical results show that an efficient cooperative agreement to harmonise 
minimum quality standards is feasible and mutually beneficial for countries 
that trade in goods of similar quality levels.
Finally, the potential scope for mutually beneficial cooperation is shown 
to be significantly restricted when cross-country externalities are asymmetric. 
New propositions establish that although asymmetric countries can mutually 
gain from cooperation, the resulting cooperative standards are asymmetric 
and do not maximise world welfare. Cross-country asymmetries that arise 
endogenously in equilibrium, and not by assumption, correspond to the setting 
where trade is between a country who is a high quality leader and a country
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that supplies both markets with low quality. The resulting contract curve 
does not include the symmetric world optimum. While lump-sum transfers 
can correct for this asymmetry, a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement 
at the world optimum cannot be reached in their absence. The results suggest 
that successful cooperation in the setting of minimum standards between high 
quality and low quality exporting countries is less likely, particularly if the 
agenda for cooperation is to harmonise minimum standards.
The chapter provides a motivation for international cooperation in min­
imum standards that stems from the inefficiencies of national decisions in 
an international context where countries are linked through trade, but also 
points to potential difficulties in the realisation of successful cooperation as 
international asymmetries hinder the incentives to implement jointly, but not 
individually, beneficial harmonised standards.
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A p p en d ix  A . Q uality  R eactio n  F unctions
The full expression for the high quality firm’s optimal quality response to an
unregulated low quality, q j j j  {(jLj),  or response q j j j  (sJ) to a minimum standard
sJ e q^j*, spi' j , is given below. Due to its length the country subscript j  is 
dropped and qnj (•) is given as qn (s). It is expressed in terms of the standard, 
s, and the ratio of market size to cost, | ,  denoted by m
, , 1 11 . 1 / 5  1 2 31qh  (s) — - m  +  — s + A  — -  I — ms — — m  —
36 A \  324 81 1296
where:
194
A =
3
and:
B  = 1999 6 1441 5 9803 2 4 119 3 3 23 4 ---------s ---------------ms  H m  s  m  s H ra s'
995 328 248832 2239488 279936 139968
The low quality firm’s reaction function with q^j (qnj) can be expressed 
in terms of high quality quj and the ratio of market size to cost denoted m. 
For expositional convenience the country subscript j  is dropped.
The unregulated Nash equilibrium quality levels reported in the text can be 
found by solving qnj (qLj) and qi,j (qnj) simultaneously. The polynomial ex­
pressions yield a number of solutions. All negative and complex solutions are 
discarded, as well as those for which qjjj < qLj• There is a unique real solution 
for which quj > qLj > 0 .
The minimum quality standards ss, sT, sw o  and threshold standards s,
where:
)')
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s and s referred to in the main text are found by substituting quj (sJ) into 
the relevant equations for welfare, profit, sales and consumer surplus, which 
are then expressed in terms of sJ and market parameters b and 9 only. Ap­
plying optimisation techniques to these expressions, with respect to , yields 
the solutions. All solutions described in the text have been computed using 
Scientific Workplace.
Furthermore, all figures in the chapter axe plotted by substituting quj (s^) 
into the relevant equations and setting parameter values 6 =  ^ and 9 = 5.
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4 A  Sw ing-State T heory o f Trade P rotection  in th e  
Electoral C ollege
In this chapter we develop a multi-jurisdictional, infinite horizon, elections 
model characterised by asymmetric information between politicians and vot­
ers and an absence of policy commitment with regards to trade policy. The 
political districts of the model, or states, form an electoral college that elects 
the president from two candidates from rival parties. The model is used to in­
vestigate how the distribution of voters with heterogeneous preferences across 
swing states gives rise to incentives for strategic trade protection by incumbent 
politicians who wish to maximise their chance of re-election.
The chapter contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the model 
presented extends the trade policy literature by using a political agency method­
ology that has never been used to address trade policy issues. The approach 
examines the electoral incentives for the strategic choice of secondary policy 
issues in a framework characterised by asymmetric information between politi­
cians and voters regarding politicians’ preferences over trade policy and lack 
of pre-commitment to a particular trade policy prior to election. Electoral 
incentives can cause political incumbents to alter their policy choice in early 
years in power in order to influence voter beliefs about the nature of future 
trade policy. By building a reputation as a protectionist or free-trader, the 
incumbent attracts swing voters to his platform.
The type of policy modelled in this type of framework is characterised by
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the inability to tailor it to satisfy the preference of voters at the state level, 
making it a national policy. Trade policy is thus an excellent candidate for a 
policy with this feature. Hence, it is the ability to garner electoral college votes 
nationally that drives results, rather than ‘pork-barrel’ state level politics. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the political incumbent has discretion over the 
selection of trade policy. While this is a reduced form of a more general notion 
of a cohesive government whose policy decisions are influenced by the desire 
to retain control of power, it is also the case that over the past few decades 
there have been periods where the US President was granted trade promotion 
authority (formerly fast-track authority) to determine trade policy. When 
granted such authority, the President is able to negotiate trade agreements 
faster, and while Congress retains power to reject proposed legislation, it has 
no power of amendment and limited room for debate. While discretion of 
certain policy instruments is constrained by multilateral agreements, there 
is still considerable scope for erecting Non-Tariff Barriers, or implementing 
safeguards, granting relevance to the assumptions of our framework.
Second, we contribute to the political agency literature by developing a 
tractable multi-jurisdictional framework that extends the single-district polit­
ical agency framework of recent contributions to the literature by List and 
Sturm (2006) and Besley and Burgess (2002). We model the electoral system 
as an electoral college, where electoral votes are attached to political states. 
This innovation adds a spatial dimension that delivers additional results on
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how the distribution of single-issue voters across swing states can influence 
trade policy decisions. The framework delivers three new propositions that 
relate the location of swing voters across swing states to the likelihood that 
incumbents engage in strategic trade protection.
The third contribution of the chapter is that we provide empirical evidence 
using data for the United States that lends support for the type of mechanisms 
present in the theoretical model. By augmenting the benchmark empirical 
specification used by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) we find evidence 
in the data to support the theoretical hypothesis that the concentration of 
a sector across states that are both swing and decisive for election outcomes 
is a significant determinant of the level of trade protection of that sector. 
This provides formal support for the claims made in the popular press about 
the politics behind the recent United States - European Union steel tariffs 
dispute, “that steel tariffs were introduced for short-term political advantage 
... in order to gain votes in key states like West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania 
and Michigan where the steel industry is a major employer” (The Guardian, 
November 17th, 2003).
The literature with regards to the role of concentration on endogenous pro­
tection is, in general, very different to the framework employed in this chapter. 
The first strand of the literature is the long-standing tradition that addresses 
the role of concentration for collective action. The effect of geographical con­
centration on facilitating lobby formation and therefore positively affecting
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trade policy, was first put forward in Olson (1971). The relationship between 
the location of industry and import barriers has been debated at length in 
this literature. The "close group" hypothesis that the concentration of firms 
allows them to overcome free-rider problems and organise lobbying efficiently 
is widely accepted and Hansen (1990), among others, provides supporting em­
pirical evidence. This contrasts with the "dispersed group" argument which 
posits that geographically dispersed industries enjoy broader political repre­
sentation (depending on the electoral rules) as empirically supported by Pin- 
cus (1975), for instance. Busch and Reinhart (1999) explicitly distinguishing 
between geographical concentration, and ‘political concentration’, defined as 
the spread of industry across political districts, in order to reconcile the two 
hypotheses. Their finding that geographically concentrated but politically dis­
persed industries in the US are more likely to be protected, suggests that the 
mechanisms linking location, concentration and protection are more complex 
than simply those that can be captured through standard measures of con­
centration. This chapter is not related to the collective action literature on 
concentration, focusing instead on the effects of concentration for electoral 
outcomes and thus electoral incentives to protect. Our framework suggests 
concentration might not always matter as such, but rather it is the presence 
of industrial concentrations in pivotal locations that has an impact on trade 
protection.
The second strand of the literature stems from the seminal contribution
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of Grossman and Helpman (1994,1996) on "Protection for Sale" that analy­
ses the effects of campaign contributions for policy decision-making. Mitra 
(1999) considers endogenous lobby formation in a theoretical extension of the 
Grossman and Helpman framework. A multitude of papers have followed in 
this strand to explain the determinants of trade policy and are surveyed in 
Helpman (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Recent contributions to 
the lobbying literature for trade include Bombardini (2005) who introduces 
the decisions of individual firms and hence the role of size distributions within 
industries in determining protection. The relevance of lobbies has been widely 
tested, for example by Goldberg and Maggi (1997), Gawande and Bandy- 
opadhyay (2000), Eicher and Osang (2002). While geographical concentration 
measures have also been included in empirical tests of the lobby model, such 
as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), they have not been linked to location 
in swing states. We augment their specification in the empirical section of this 
chapter to show that political decisions also react to electoral incentives.
The most common electoral approach to the political economy of trade and 
secondary policy issues is that of median voter models, such as Mayer (1984) 
and probabilistic voting frameworks such as Yang (1995). These have been 
used, for example, to explain differences in protectionism based on countries’ 
constitutional set-up (Roelfsema, 2004) or to consider how trade retaliation 
and liberalisation is affected by the ideological distribution of voters in trad­
ing partners (Wiberg, 2005). Our framework is distinct from these approaches
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since we examine the effects of swing voters in a model of the electoral college 
without policy commitment. We show that a redistribution of voters between 
states in the electoral college, holding the population of each voter type con­
stant, can make trade protection more or less likely. Such redistributions have 
no impact in frameworks in the spirit of Mayer (1984).
Willmann (2005) employs a median voter model to offer an explanation for 
the empirical relationship between geographical concentration and protection 
by introducing regional voters who anticipate that their representatives will 
internalise the costs of protection, once at the national level. The model cannot 
offer an explanation, however, as to why industries with the same degree of 
geographical concentration, that are located in different political states, may 
be systematically awarded different levels of protection.
Finally, a growing political agency literature has more recently addressed 
the issue of electoral incentives for policy choices in secondary policy issues, 
such as trade policy or environmental policy, about which smaller groups of 
voters have very strong views. Recent contributions to this literature include 
Coate and Morris (1998), Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Burgess (2002) 
and List and Sturm (2006). Our basic modelling approach is closest to Besley 
and Burgess (2002) and List and Sturm (2006), while extending to a multi- 
jurisdictional framework.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 develops the 
theoretical model of the electoral college and discuss the testable empirical
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implications of the model. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested 
empirically with US data in section 2. Section 3 concludes.
4.1 T h e  M odel
In this section we develop a multi-jurisdictional, infinite horizon, elections 
model characterised by asymmetric information between politicians and voters 
and an absence of policy commitment with regards to trade policy. Political 
incumbents with private preferences over trade policy may have an incentive 
to build a reputation through the strategic selection of trade policy, in order 
to swing single-issue voters to their platform in forthcoming elections.
The model contributes to the political agency literature by extending the 
single-district political agency framework of List and Sturm (2006) and Besley 
and Burgess (2002) to include a continuum of political districts that form an 
electoral college. This innovation adds a spatial dimension to the political 
agency framework that delivers results on how the distribution of single-issue 
voters across swing states can influence trade policy decisions. Moreover, 
the model extends the trade policy literature by using a methodology from 
the political agency literature that has not been used before to examine the 
strategic incentives for trade policy choice. The empirical implications that 
arise from the theoretical framework are then tested in section 2 .
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4.1.1 Economic Environment
Consider a country with a continuum of political districts32, or states, s, over 
the interval [0,1], each with a unit mass of voters. These states form an elec­
toral college, through which electoral outcomes are determined. In particular, 
let each state contribute to the electoral outcome through a single electoral 
college vote, so the aggregate measure of electoral college votes over the con­
tinuum of unit interval is also 1.
Further suppose that in any presidential election in the infinite-horizon 
game there are two candidates from rival parties, Democrat (D ) and Repub­
lican (R ), competing for votes. An election may be between two newcomers, 
or alternatively, between an incumbent politician and a challenger. If a candi­
date wins a majority of votes in a state, then the electoral college vote of that 
state is won by that candidate. The election is won by the candidate with the 
majority of electoral college votes, which corresponds to gaining a majority in 
a measure of states greater than ^ .
Politicians are assumed to face a binding term limit of two periods. After 
two terms of holding office an incumbent leaves the political arena and a new 
candidate from within the party competes with the rival candidate in the 
presidential elections.
32The assumption of a continuum of political districts allows us to appeal to the law o f large 
number in the calculation of electoral college votes won by each candidate. This facilitates 
the analysis greatly by making the framework tractable. The role of this assumption is 
discussed in more detail in section 4.1.4.
204
Incum ben ts  Policy P references During each term of office the incumbent 
politician must choose the level of public spending, or ‘ideology’, denoted by g , 
and a secondary policy, such as trade policy for a particular sector, denoted by 
r. Politicians of either party whose personal views are in favour of free trade 
are referred to as ‘free-traders’ (F), while those in favour of trade protection 
are referred to as ‘protectionists’ (P). Suppose that a randomly selected can­
didate, of either party, is a protectionist with probability 7r. While politicians’ 
preferences over public spending are assumed to be public knowledge, their 
preferences over r  are private. Moreover, electoral candidates are unable to 
commit to a particular trade policy prior to election.
The level of public spending is assumed to be continuous, or, equivalently, 
ideology is selected from a continuous spectrum. In contrast, trade policy 
takes the form of a binary choice, to be made by the incumbent politician, 
between trade protection (r — 1) and free trade (r =  0). The trade policy 
is assumed to have negligible financial impact on government revenue, and 
so the model abstracts from any possible revenue-raising incentives for trade 
protection.
Suppose politicians earn an ‘ego-rent’, £, from holding a term in office and 
receive zero payoff when out of office. In addition, a politician faces a utility 
cost c =  {clCh}  from deviating from his own preferred trade policy, where 
ch  >  CL. Let the probability of any politician having a low utility cost be 
Pr(c = cl) — p. Cost c can be interpreted as a psychological cost of setting
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a policy in conflict with personal views. Moreover, let /? denote the common 
discount factor, where /? is assumed to satisfy the following restriction:
ch >  PC >  cl >  0 (178)
Inequality (178) states that the ego-rent from holding one more term in 
office lies between the high and low utility costs.
V oter P references Voters are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences 
over the two policy issues. Suppose four types of voters comprise the measure 
of voters in each state. A voter of type k in state s, can be either a Democrat 
(D ), a Republican (P), a free-trader (F), or a protectionist (P). Let 7  ^denote 
the proportion of voter type k in the unit measure of voters in state s, such 
that:
^ 2  Ik  = !. where k e  ( A  Fi p } and 7% € [0,1] (179)
k
The D  and R  voters are indifferent about the trade policy issue and vote 
purely on the basis of their preferences over public policy. Politicians’ choice 
of g may also be interpreted as reflecting their ideological position, so D  and R  
voters cast their vote according to their ideological preferences. Even though 
trade protection, e.g. a tariff, raises the relative domestic price of the protected 
good, we assume this negative effect is negligible compared to the intensity of 
their ideological preferences. That is, although a price increase in one good 
in the consumption basket lowers consumer surplus, it is not a sufficient cost
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to cause voters to shift their support to another platform. Hence, measure 
7 of voters always vote Democrat, while 7 ^  always vote Republican, in any 
presidential election.
P  and F  voters are ‘single-issue voters’ or ‘swing voters’ with strong pref­
erences over the secondary policy issue, trade policy. Protectionists may be 
voters employed in import-competing sectors, whose jobs may be at risk from 
foreign competition under free trade e.g. Steel industry workers whose em­
ployment may be secured through a steel tariff. In contrast, free-traders reflect 
any voters with strong preferences against trade protection, such as, perhaps, 
students of economics.
The intensity of swing voters’ preferences is assumed to be such that the 
payoff received from the implementation of their preferred trade policy domi­
nates any ideological considerations. Suppose protectionists receive a payoff of 
x  > 0 if r  =  1 and 0 otherwise, while supporters of free trade receive x  if r =  0 
and 0 otherwise. Swing voters thus vote for the candidate they believe has the 
highest probability of implementing their preferred policy. Where candidates 
axe perceived to be identical in this respect, swing voters are assumed to cast 
their vote by flipping a coin.
Note that r, referred to as trade policy in this chapter, can be interpreted 
as any secondary policy about which a subset of voters have strong views 
and which has two key characteristics. The first is that r  represents a national 
policy decision that cannot be tailored to satisfy the preferences of voters at the
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state level. While some voters may have strong preferences regarding, say, the 
introduction or abolition of the death penalty, it is possible for a policy decision 
to be made at the state-level, as is observed in the US. In contrast, a tariff on 
steel imports, or any other trade policy, can only apply at the national level. 
Other national policies include immigration policy, foreign policy, participation 
in a regional trade agreement (e.g. European Union membership), membership 
in international organisation (e.g. WTO), to mention a few.
The second key characteristic of policy r  is that the political incumbent is 
assumed to have discretion over its selection. Whilst we model the decision­
maker as an incumbent politician, the model is consistent with a broader 
interpretation, where decisions are made by a group of government agents 
operating as a cohesive entity, whose decisions may be influenced by their 
desire to perpetuate their control of power.
E lecto ra l U n certa in ty  Uncertainty in the outcome of the election stems 
from uncertainty at both the state level and the national level. Each state is 
assumed to be subject to an idiosyncratic pro-D shock, z/s, that can be inter­
preted as a shock to voter turnout. Since a vote gained by the D candidate, 
is also a vote lost by the R  candidate, a positive (or negative) vs gives the D 
candidate an advantage (or disadvantage) of 2zA For convenience, we redefine 
2vs as es. Assume es is distributed identically and independently according to 
a symmetric, single-peaked probability density function h(es), with support 
[—'ipi'ip], and a continuous cumulative distribution function H(es). The value
of i/j is important to the extent that it affects the degree of uncertainty over 
the outcome of elections in each state. We assume a sufficiently wide support 
so that all states are ‘swing states’. That is, no candidate can be certain of 
winning a majority in any state, but the probability of each candidate winning 
a majority can be computed for any state with a distribution of voter types, 
7^, where k 6  {D ,R ,F ,P } ,  given the incumbent’s policy choice r and the 
cumulative distribution function H(£3).
In addition to uncertainty at the state level, we introduce aggregate uncer­
tainty33 in the form of a ‘pro-incumbent shock’, u, in electoral college votes. 
In an election between two untested politicians, the shock can be in favour of 
either. Shock u widens (or narrows) the difference in electoral college votes 
between candidates by 2u. For convenience, we redefine 2u as 77, where 77 is 
distributed according to a symmetric, single-peaked probability density func­
tion, /  (77) and a continuous cumulative distribution function F(rj). Again, we 
assume a sufficiently wide support so that no candidate can secure a majority 
of electoral college votes. In combination, the state-level and national shocks 
ensure that no candidate can guarantee to win any state s, or the electoral 
college overall.
In the US, the president is elected indirectly through the Electoral College. 
Voters vote for state electors who pledge to vote for a particular candidate.
3 3 The uncertainty reflected in the state-specific shocks is insufficient to give rise to ag­
gregate uncertainty, as a result of the infinite nature of states along the continuum. We 
thus introduce aggregate uncertainty in the form of a shock to electoral college votes at the 
national level. The importance of this assumption is made clear in section 4.1.4.
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These electors cast their electoral vote and the candidate with a majority of 
electoral votes wins the presidency. In our model, voters are assumed to vote 
for the candidates directly, while the electoral college system is embodied by 
the fact that candidates need to win a majority in a majority of states to 
win the election, rather than a direct majority. The assumptions we make 
are equivalent to assuming that state-level elections are between two honest 
electors that have pledged to vote for the D  or R  candidate, respectively, if 
elected. A state-level majority won by a D  elector corresponds to an electoral 
college vote won by the D  presidential candidate, and similarly for states 
where the R  elector wins a majority. Interpreting our model in this way allows 
shock 77 to be interpreted as mistakes made by electors when voting, or the 
presence of a random measure of ‘faithless electors’ who vote for a candidate 
other than the candidate pledged. Assuming /  (77) is symmetric around 0 and 
single-peaked implies that large measures of mistakes in electoral votes cast 
or large measures of faithless electors axe increasingly unlikely.
Timing of the Elections Game Events in the infinitely repeated elections 
model with infinitely-lived voters occur in the following order.
1. The incumbent politician draws a period one utility cost c =  {c^c#}, 
observed only by the incumbent.
2. The incumbent makes policy decisions g and r.
3. Policy choices are observed by voters and the election for the presidency
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in period two takes place.
(a) If the term limit is non-binding, then the election is between the 
incumbent and a randomly selected rival from the other party.
(b) If the term limit is binding, the election is between two randomly 
selected candidates from either party.
4. The winner of the presidential election is in office in the next period.
The game is then repeated infinitely through stages (1) to (4). In the next 
few sections we solve the game by backwards induction and characterise the 
unique equilibrium strategies of voters and politicians, for a given distribution 
of voters. The strategic incentives for trade policy choice are examined and 
the role that the distribution of swing voters plays in shaping these incentives 
is analysed.
4.1.2 Political Equilibrium
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the game between politicians and voters 
can be characterised by restricting attention to strategies that depend only 
on payoff-relevant past events, rather than the entire history of the game. 
Markov strategies for the incumbent politician, Cij, where i G {D ,R }  and 
j  G {F ,P}  and for type ks voters, where ks G {D ,R ,F ,P } ,  can be said to 
form an equilibrium if they maximise the value functions of voters and the 
incumbent politician, given the strategies of the other players.
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For the incumbent politician choosing trade policy, the payoff-relevant his­
tory of the game is fully described by (a) his utility cost draw, and (b) the 
number of terms he has already spent in office. Hence, we define a strategy 
for an incumbent politician as a rule that describes the probability with which 
he implements trade protection as a function of parameters describing the dis­
tribution of voters34 across the electoral college, his realised utility cost c and 
whether he is in his first or second term of office.
For type k3 voters, the payoff-relevant history of the game is, where ap­
plicable, the first term trade policy decision of an incumbent who is up for 
reelection against a randomly selected challenger. In elections between two 
new candidates, there is no payoff-relevant history on which voters can con­
dition their behaviour. For voter types ks = {D, R}  a strategy is a rule that 
specifies the probability with which they vote for the Democrat or Republican 
candidate. For voter types ks — {P ,F }, a strategy is a re-election rule that 
specifies the probability with which they vote for the incumbent in elections 
between an incumbent and a challenger, where this probability depends on 
the updated beliefs regarding the incumbent’s private preferences regarding 
r, conditional on the incumbent’s trade policy decision in his first term of 
office.
Let g* (D) and g* (R ) be the unique preferred levels of public spending for D 
and R  voters, respectively, where g*{D) > g*(R). It follows directly that D and
34 These are defined fully in the next sections.
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R  candidates always find it optimal to select public spending accordingly35 and 
measure 7 ^  of voters always vote Democrat, while 7SR always vote Republican, 
in any presidential election.
The game between incumbents and swing voters36 has two symmetric 
reputation-building equilibria, where incumbents choose r  strategically in or­
der to swing either P  or F  voters to their platform. Which of the two applies 
depends on the distribution of swing voters in the electoral college, as is dis­
cussed in more detail in section 4.1.5. If the incumbent stands to gain from 
choosing free trade relative to trade protection, then a protectionist incumbent 
may have an incentive to deviate from his preferred policy choice and choose 
free trade. The focus of our analysis is the converse case where the distribution 
of swing voters is such that the Free-trader incumbent may find it optimal to 
build a reputation as a protectionist. Note that the incentives for Republican 
and Democrat incumbents are symmetric, since the incentives for trade policy 
choice hinge on the extent to which free-trader incumbents of either party can 
improve their re-election probability through trade protection. Since ideology 
plays no part in the voting decisions of swing voters, the effects are symmetric 
for D  and R  incumbents.
The trade policy game is solved by backward induction, starting from the 
incentives of any politician facing a binding term limit. For any distribution
3 5 For simplicity, we abstract from strategic incentives in public spending
36The focus of the chapter is the strategic interaction between incumbents and swing vot­
ers. For completeness, a discussion of elections between two untested politicians is included 
in Appendix C.
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of ideologists and single-issue voters across the electoral college, an incumbent 
politician in his second term of office has no incentive to choose a trade policy 
that conflicts with his personal views, since he can never be re-elected. Hence, 
incumbents always find it optimal to implement their preferred trade policy 
in their final term of office.
Over the next sections we derive the conditions under which the following 
strategies constitute an equilibrium of the trade policy game in incumbents’ 
first term of office: free-trader incumbents deviate from their preferred pol­
icy and implement trade protection in the first term of office following a low 
utility cost draw; protectionist incumbents always implement their preferred 
policy in the first term of office. Furthermore, protectionist voters vote for 
the incumbent if trade protection has been implemented in the first term of 
office, and for the challenger otherwise, while free-trader voters vote for the in­
cumbent if trade protection has not been implemented, and for the challenger 
otherwise. Moreover, this ‘reputation-building’ equilibrium is unique for dis­
tributions37 of swing voters under which incumbents can expect to improve 
their re-election chances through trade protection.
The strategy of a protectionist incumbent is clearly optimal since by imple­
menting trade protection he improves his reelection probability while simul­
taneously setting his preferred policy. Moreover, if a free-trader incumbent
3 7 Appendix B shows this reputation-building equilibrium to be unique for distributions of 
swing voters where the measure of protectionists versus free-trader voters, and their distri­
bution across the electoral college is such that incumbents stand to gain from implementing 
trade protection in the first term. A symmetric unique equilibrium exists in the case where 
incumbents stand to gain through free trade.
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draws a high utility cost c = cjj, then he always follows his preferred pol­
icy choice, since ch > PC- The benefits in re-election probability can never 
outweigh the costs of a policy change.
In contrast, a draw of cl may induce a free-trader to set r  =  1 if pro­
tectionism sufficiently increases the proportion of electoral college votes won 
so as to alter the election outcome. Since the incumbent’s personal prefer­
ence over r  is hidden from voters, a free trade incumbent in his first term 
may have an incentive to build a reputation38 as a protectionist in order to 
attract protectionist voters to his platform in the next election. The lack of a 
credible commitment to a choice of r  implies that pre-election promises carry 
no weight with single-issue voters, who recognise that politicians can deviate 
ex post. The only opportunity for candidates to convey information to voters 
regarding their preferences over trade policy, is through policy decisions made 
when in power. Voters can update their beliefs on the basis of the incumbent’s 
historical trade policy decisions and thus condition their vote on the history 
of the elections game. It is this feature of the political agency model that can 
give rise to strategic behaviour by political incumbents.
Consider the incentives of swing voters in the election for the period two 
presidency, given the policy change strategy of free-trader incumbents de­
scribed above. Protectionist and free trade voters maximise their expected
38Besley and Case (1995) as well as List and Sturm (2006) examine how term limits change 
the incentives of politicians to  build a reputation, with significant effects on policy choice. In 
this chapter, the optimality of a reputation building strategy depends on both the measure 
and distribution of P  voters relative to F  voters across states in the electoral college.
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payoff by supporting the candidate with the highest probability of implement­
ing r = 1 and r = 0, respectively, in their second term. Consider a free-trader 
incumbent who can improve the probability of winning a majority of electoral 
college votes if protectionists support his platform (and free traders support 
the challenger). If nature draws cjj, the incumbent sets r  =  0, thus revealing 
himself as a free trader and gaining the support of 7 ^  voters in all states over 
the continuum. Protectionists support the challenger who is a free-trader with 
probability 1 — 7r. If cl is drawn, the D  free-trader incumbent strategically 
sets r = 1 to build a reputation as a protectionist.
The observed first-term trade policy choice provides voters with inform s 
tion with which they update their beliefs about the preferences of the incum­
bent. Let 7f denote the updated probability, derived from Bayes’ rule, where:
7f =  P r(r =  1 in 2nd term | r  =  1 in 1st term)
Pr(r =  1 in 2nd term) P r(r =  1 in 1st term | r = 1 in 2nd term)
StPr(r =  1 in 1 term)
7r
7T +  ( 1  — 7r)p
(180)
Since politicians set their preferred trade policy when the term limit is 
binding, the probability that trade protection is set in the second term is the 
probability that any randomly selected politician is a protectionist, i.e. 7r. 
Moreover, if the incumbent protects in his second term, he is revealed to be 
a protectionist and thus protects in the first term with probability 1. The
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probability that the industry in question is protected in the incumbent’s first 
term in office is the composite probability of being a protectionist, ir, or being 
a free trader who had low cost draw, (1 — tt)p.
Swing voters contrast 7r, the updated probability of the incumbent being 
a protectionist, with the probability that a randomly selected challenger sets 
r = 1 in his first term of office. For a sufficiently small value39 for p, first 
term protectionism is a sufficiently strong signal of protectionist preferences, 
so that:
7f > 7T +  (1 — 7r)p (181)
For the rest of the chapter we assume p  is sufficiently small to satisfy 
condition (181) so as to ensure that 7 sp  support the incumbent government 
if trade protection is implemented in the first term, while 7 ^  voters support 
the challenger, given politicians’ strategies in equilibrium. The optimality of 
swing voters’ re-election strategies is confirmed in Appendix A, where these 
are shown to maximise voters’ value functions, given politicians’ strategies.
The next section examines how a shift from free trade in the first term of 
office affects the incumbent’s probability of winning a majority in any state 
s, given its characteristics. State level probability changes are translated into
39List and Sturm (2006) identify two conflicting effects. Applied to our trade policy game, 
these are: first, an incentive effect that follows from the term limit assumption that lowers 
the probability of r =  1 in the second term, since a free-trader will set r  — 0 with certainty; 
and second, a selection effect that raises the likelihood of r  =  1, since re-elected politicians 
in their second term of office are more likely to be protectionist. The size of p  determines 
which of the two effects dominates.
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electoral college votes that in turn allow the change in probability of re-election 
to be derived. We examine incentives for trade protection and confirm that 
politicians’ and voters’ strategies constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of 
the game.
4.1.3 Trade Policy and State-Level M ajority
Recall that in each state s, =  L Let u sv =  (7^  — 7 ^) represent the lead
k
of the D  candidate in state s, referred to as the ‘political lead’, and u/f =  
(7 p ~  7f )  represent the excess of P  voters relative to F  voters, referred to as 
the ‘trade policy lead’. A state with a larger proportion of Republican voters 
than Democrat voters has a negative political lead, while a state with a larger 
proportion of free trade supporters relative to protectionists has a negative 
trade policy lead.
Let P\r=0 denote the probability that the incumbent wins a majority in 
state s given free trade in the first term, and p*r=1 if trade protection is 
implemented. Given voters’ strategies, protectionists vote for the incumbent if 
trade protection is implemented in the first term of office and for the challenger 
otherwise, and vice versa for free-trader voters.
Consider a Democrat incumbent in his first term of office. Consider the 
implications of switching from free-trade to trade protection in his first term 
of office on the probability of winning a majority in state s . The D  incumbent 
gains Yd +  I f  +  1,3 by setting r = 0 in his first term, while the R  challenger 
gains the remaining votes. The incumbent wins a majority of votes in state
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s, given r — 0 , if 7 ^  +  7 SF + u3 > 7 ^  +  7 p — vs, that implies es must exceed 
u 3 — Up. If the D incumbent sets r — 1, he gains 7 ^  +  7 p +  vs and the 
remaining j sR +  7 3F —i^are gained by the R  challenger. Hence, a majority in 
state s is won if e3 exceeds —oof — It follows from the distribution40 of es 
that:
Now consider the probabilities P\r=0 and pj*r=1 for a Republican incumbent. 
The R  incumbent gains 7 ^  +  l sp  — 1/5 by setting r  =  0 in his first term, while 
the D  challenger gains the remaining votes. A majority is won by R  in state s 
if 7 ^  +  7 ^  — vs > 7SD +  7 p  +  vs, that is, if es < — (oj3 +  a;*) . If the Republican 
sets r = 1 in his first term, he gains j R +  7 3p — v3 and the remaining 7 ^  +  7 ^  
+z/sare gained by the D  challenger. A majority in state s is won if e3 < ujf—Up. 
An R  incumbent’s probability of majority can thus be expressed by as:
40 Voter turnout across US states has been repeatedly found to be positively correlated 
with the closeness of electoral competition (Geys, 2006, Matsusaka, 1993, Cox and Munger, 
1989). This suggests that the state-specific turnout shock may plausibly depend on uis. For 
simplicity and so as to be able to characterise the political equilibrium, we abstract from 
this and maintain the assumption of independently and identically distributed state-specific 
shocks.
Pfr=o = Pr {e° > u ‘t - u ‘) = H (u/p -  uat ) 
p jU  =  Pr (es > - u ‘t -  w*) =  H (w*p + w°t )
(182)
(183)
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P\r=<i =  Pr {e* <  -w * -  u sp) =  1 -  H  (u ‘p +  w?) (184)
p\r=1 =  Pr (e* < u \ - 1 4 ) =  1 -  H (u‘p -  u f)  (185)
Let Aps = p\r=l — P\r=o denote the change in the probability of winning 
a majority in s  through trade protection. Combining (182) and (183), as 
well as (184) and (185), yields that Aps — H  (usp + u f ) -  H  (wj -  u f)  for 
both a Democrat incumbent and a Republican incumbent. The incentives 
for trade policy implementation are thus symmetric for incumbents of either 
party. Furthermore, symmetry of h(es) allows Aps to be summarised by:
A/»* =  f f ( |w J |+ w f ) - f f ( | ( ^ | - « { )  (186)
Equation (186) shows that the impact of the implementation of first term 
trade protection by an incumbent, of either party, on the probability of that 
incumbent winning a majority in state s  depends on two factors. First, the 
absolute value of the political lead, |u;p|, that reflects the degree of electoral 
competition in state s, and second, the trade policy lead, wf, the reflects the 
‘swingness’ of state s, as measured by the difference between protectionist 
voters and free-trader voters.
For any given level of electoral competition, the magnitude and sign of cjf 
determine the extent to which trade policy can ‘swing’ the state in the incum­
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bent’s favour. If 7 p > 7 p, then deviating from free-trade to trade protection 
improves the incumbent’s probability of a majority, so Ap8 > 0. Conversely, if 
7 p  < 7 SF then an incumbent of either party worsens the probability of winning 
a majority of votes in s, so Aps < 0. Finally, if P  and F  voters have equal 
measure in state s, then u f  = 0 and trade policy has no power in altering elec­
toral outcomes for state s. Moreover, the greater the trade policy lead (lag), 
the greater the impact on the probability of a majority in s.
For a given trade policy lead, a;*, the closer is electoral competition between 
the candidates, the larger the impact of the existing swing voters on Aps. To 
see why this is the case, consider that distribution h (es) is symmetric around 
0 and single-peaked. For a given cjf, as jwp] -4  0, the probability gain is from 
the centre of the distribution, implying a larger Aps.
The pair of leads, ( t^ w f) , therefore provides a complete description of 
state s, in terms of assessing the probability of it being won by either candidate. 
The discussion has shown that in states where 7 p > 7 p the incumbent stands 
to improve the probability of winning a majority, while chances are worsened 
in states where 7 p <  7 p. States where 7 p =  7 p are neutral to the trade policy 
decision. In a multi-jurisdictional setting, the implications of the trade policy 
decision for incumbents’ overall re-election probability depends crucially on 
the distribution of trade policy and political leads across states in the electoral 
college. If some states have more P  than F  voters, and others the converse, 
the incumbent stands to worsen his chances of winning certain electoral college
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votes and improve the probability of winning others. The next section turns 
to the question of aggregation of these effects and characterises the probability 
of the incumbent winning the election overall.
4.1.4 Trade Policy in the Electoral College
Section 4.1.3 establishes how the trade policy lead and degree of electoral 
competition in a state determine how the incumbent’s first term policy decision 
alters his subsequent probability of winning the electoral college vote of that 
state. This section examines how the distribution of state probability changes, 
Aps, arising from pairs of leads can be translated into a measure of
electoral college votes. The conditions under which reputation-building occurs 
in the political equilibrium are then characterised.
The law of large numbers implies that if each state along a continuum is 
subject to an identically distributed and independent shock es described by a 
particular distribution, h(e3), then the distribution of realised shocks over the 
infinite number of states along the continuum is exactly described by h(e3). 
This implies that if all states over a continuum have identical \ujp\ and u 3, 
then Ap3 — H  (|^p | +  wf) — H  (|ojp| — u;f) not only describes the change in 
the incumbent’s probability of winning the electoral college vote of each state 
s, but also describes the change in electoral college votes actually won over 
the continuum of unit length.
There is no aggregate uncertainty, despite the individual uncertainty re­
flected in the state-specific shocks, as a result of the infinite nature of states
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along the continuum. It follows that in the absence of an additional national 
shock, there is no aggregate uncertainty over the continuum and election out­
comes can be predicted deterministically for different policy choices. To add 
smoothness to our results, and capture the uncertainty of election outcomes, 
we introduce aggregate uncertainty in the model through the national pro­
incumbent shock 77, distributed by /  (77) . The distribution of shock 77 is as­
sumed to be symmetric around 0 and single-peaked, and distributed over a 
sufficiently wide support so that no candidate can be certain of a majority of 
electoral college votes.
To apply the law of large numbers and be able to convert changes in 
probability into changes in electoral college votes won, it must be the case 
that \ujp\ and oof are identical for all states over the continuum. Assuming 
all states are identical, however, removes all interesting effects that can arise 
from having a non-uniform distribution of | and wf. We thus choose to 
‘discretise’ the continuum into N  state ‘types’, each forming a sub-continuum 
of the overall continuum of states. States of a given type have identical [a;*] 
and ufy but states from different types may differ in their characteristics. 
Since there are infinitely many states in a continuum of small measure and 
a continuum of large measure, it follows that we can apply the law of large 
numbers on a type-by-type basis. Hence the analysis is facilitated greatly 
through the assumption of a continuum of states, while the discretization of 
the continuum into types allows us to investigate the role of voter distribution
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in a tractable way.
Let there be N  state types, denoted by n, where n =  { 1 , 2 , N}. All 
states of a given type are assumed to be identical in terms of their degree of 
electoral competition \u™\ and the trade policy lead a;™. Let (f)n > 0 denote the 
proportion of states s that are of type n, such that Yln=i <An =  1- Moreover,
Up > |w£|, wheresuppose state types are ranked in declining | s u c h  that 
k > j  and k , j  € {1,2, ...,7V}. Further assume < 1 and K l  > o-
The ranking of discrete state types over the continuum implies that the 
distribution of \up\ across the electoral college is a step function, as illustrated 
in figure (29). The distribution of states across the electoral college can be 
changed through (i) the relative weight of state types in the electoral college 
through (f)n, (ii) the finite number of types N, and (iii) the distribution of la;” I.
K
l<
0
Figure 29: Representation of N state types in the continuum.
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Let Avn denote the change in electoral college votes of type n won by 
the incumbent as a result of implementing trade protection in his first term.
votes over the whole continuum of states from a deviation from preferred 
trade policy in the first term. For any state of type n, the change in the 
incumbent’s probability of winning a majority by deviating from free trade is 
Apn, where Apn = H  | +  cv”) — H  (|wp| — cv”). It follows from the law of
large numbers that (j>nApn gives the change in electoral college votes of type 
n won by the incumbent. Aggregating over all state types yields:
It follows from (187) that A v  is a weighted sum of the state type proba­
bility changes. The incumbent may gain or lose electoral college votes from 
setting r = 1 depending on sign and magnitude of Apn for each state type, and 
the weight of that state type in the electoral college, given by (f>n. If the char­
acteristics and distribution of state types are such that Av < 0 overall, then 
the free-trader incumbent cannot improve his chances of re-election through 
the implementation of trade policy and always selects r = 0 in his first term. 
The reputation building equilibrium described in section 4.1.2 requires that 
Av > 0, so that free-trader incumbents gain from the shift from free trade. 
As discussed, there are two symmetric reputation-building equilibria, where
Moreover, let Av =  Yln=i Avn denote the total change in electoral college
N N
(187)
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A v  > 0 and where A v  < 0, respectively. We focus on the former, where free­
trader incumbents may have an incentive to implement trade protection. In 
the latter, a protectionist incumbent may choose to build a reputation as a 
free-trader by abstaining from trade protection in his first term. We return to 
this issue in the next section where we examine how a redistribution of swing 
voters gives results in a shift from one equilibrium to another.
It is appealing to interpret A v  in (187) as the change in electoral college 
votes when there are N  states (rather than N  measures of states), each with 
(f>n electoral college votes, where Apn represents the change in the probability 
of winning the electoral college votes of state n. This interpretation is intuitive 
but important conceptual differences exist between the discrete state interpre­
tation and the continuous measures of states assumed in the model. Under 
a discrete state interpretation, the electoral votes of a state n, are won or 
lost as a block 0n, while in the continuous measures of state types imply that 
proportions of votes (f>n are won or lost. Hence, with a continuum of states, 
A v  reflects the actual change in electoral college votes won by the incumbent, 
not the expected change in electoral college votes.
Recall that u is the pro-incumbent shock in electoral college votes won. 
Moreover, let Vj denote the electoral college votes won by the incumbent when 
he sets trade policy r in his first term of office. Similarly, vTc  denote those 
won by the challenger, given r. Let u rv — (vj — Vq ) denote the incumbent’s 
lead over the challenger in the electoral college, given r, where ufv can take
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values between —1 and 1 and reflects the degree of electoral competition at 
the national level.
For the incumbent to be re-elected, given r, it must be the case that 
Vj +  u > Vq — u. Hence, 2v =  77 must exceed vrc  — vrj. Finally, let 9r denote 
the incumbent’s probability of re-election, given trade policy selection r in the 
first term of office. Given distribution F(r/) probabilities 00 and 61 can be 
expressed as:
0“ = Pr („ > t,° -  „°) =  1 -  F  («& -  «?) = F K )  (188)
e1 = Pr (n > vb -  v}) =  1 -  F (v'c — V j ) = F  (wi) (189)
Since Av reflects the change in electoral college votes won by the incumbent 
from a policy shift, it follows that v j = V j - f  Av and Vq  =  Vq  — Av. Hence, 
u v — vi ~  vc  ~  v/ — VC +  ^Av =  a;® +  2Av. The re-election probabilities can
thus be re-written as:
6° — F  (190)
01 =  F  (wj +  2Av) (191)
Defining A0 as the change in re-election probability from a policy shift, it 
follows directly from (190) and (191) that A9 = 91 — 9° = F  (w® 4- 2Av) —
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F  (u;®). Furthermore, symmetry of f(rj) allows A 0 to be summarised by:
A0 =  F  ( m | + 2 A „ ) - F  flu^l) (192)
It follows from (192) that the incumbent enjoys an improvement in re- 
election probability (A0 > 0) from the implementation of trade protection 
provided there is an overall gain in electoral college votes from the policy 
(Av > 0 ) .  If Av > 0, then the expected payoff from implementing trade 
protection in the first term is (AO) /?£ for a free-trader incumbent of either 
party. For r  =  1 to be an optimal strategy, the expected payoff must exceed 
the incumbent’s utility cost draw. Since (A6) /?£ < /3£ and cjj > the anal­
ysis confirms that a free-trader incumbent with a high utility cost draw never 
finds it optimal to deviate from free trade. If a low utility cost cl is drawn, 
then (A#) /?£ must be larger than cl for the reputation-building strategy to 
be optimal.
In the symmetric equilibrium where Av < 0, a protectionist incumbent 
improves his re-election probability by setting r — 0 in his first term. Since 
AO is defined as the change in re-election probability from a policy shift, then 
AO =  0° -  01 > 0. If the expected payoff exceeds cjr, then his reputation- 
building strategy is optimal.
Proposition 36 I f  (A 0 )  > c l, then there is a unique equilibrium in which
incumbent politicians with a low utility cost draw (ci) deviate from their pre­
ferred trade policy in their first term of office if  this increases their re-election
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probability and follow their private preferences otherwise.
Proof. It follows from (186) that Apn — H  (\up \ +w ") — H  (|^p | — v?) 
is the change in the probability of winning the electoral college vote of a 
state of type n. The resulting change in type n electoral college votes won 
is <f>nApn. Aggregating over state types gives the total change in electoral 
college votes from a policy shift, A v = Yln=i ^n^P n- ^  Av > 0, then a free­
trader incumbent of either party enjoys a gain in re-election probability Ad 
from setting r  =  1 in his first term of office. Provided a low cost is drawn 
and (A9) PC > CL, the F  incumbent enjoys a positive net expected payoff 
from setting r = 1, so finds it optimal to deviate from his preferred private 
policy. If a high utility cost c# is drawn by an F  incumbent or the gain in re- 
election probability A 9 is not sufficiently large for (A#) /3£ > c l  to be satisfied, 
then the incumbent sets his preferred policy, free trade. In this equilibrium, 
a protectionist incumbent cannot increase his re-election probability through 
a policy shift, so always finds it optimal to follow his private preferences and 
set r  =  1.
Conversely, if Av < 0 , then a protectionist incumbent of either party enjoys 
a gain in re-election probability A9 from setting r  =  0 in his first term of office. 
Provided a low cost is drawn and (A#)/?C > cl, the P  incumbent enjoys a 
positive net expected payoff from setting r  =  0, so finds it optimal to deviate 
from his preferred private policy. If a high utility cost c# is drawn by a P  
incumbent or the gain in re-election probability A9 is not sufficiently large
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for (A9) /3£ > cl to be satisfied, then the incumbent sets his preferred policy, 
trade protection. In this equilibrium, a free-trader incumbent cannot increase 
his re-election probability through a policy shift, so always finds it optimal to 
follow his private preferences and set r  =  1.
For a given distribution of voters in the electoral college, and thus given 
A v , the equilibrium in which reputation-building forms part of incumbent’s 
optimal strategies is the unique equilibrium. A proof of uniqueness can be 
found in Appendix B. ■
Inspection of (192) reveals that the reputation-building equilibrium de­
pends on two key national-level parameters of the model. First, the closeness 
of electoral competition at the national level, as measured by |u;®| and second, 
the gain in electoral college votes A v  from a policy shift. The characteristics of 
f(rj) imply that a closer degree of electoral competition between candidates at 
the national level, the greater the probability gain from an increase in electoral 
college votes from a policy shift.
Intuitively, the closer the competition between the two candidates, that is 
the smaller is |w®|, then the more likely it is that the pro-incumbent shock 
perturbs the election outcome. Since the pro-incumbent shock is more likely 
to be near 0 , a given gain in electoral college votes through a strategic trade 
policy decision is more beneficial the closer |u;®| is to 0 .
Conversely, relatively weak electoral competition, reflected by high 
implies that one of the candidates has a large lead in electoral college votes
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over the other. The probability that a sufficiently large shock is realised to 
change the election outcome is relatively low. A gain A v  implies a smaller 
shock is sufficient to change the election result, but the further from 0 is the 
initial difference in electoral college votes, the smaller the associated gain in 
probability.
Furthermore, for any given degree of national electoral competition, the 
greater the increase in electoral college votes A v  that can be won through 
a policy shift, the greater is the incumbent’s gain in re-election probability. 
Intuitively, the more votes that can be ‘swung’ at the national level from 
trade policy, the larger the impact of the trade policy decision on re-election 
probability.
A change in either |u^| or A v  has an impact on re-election probability A & 
and thus on the likelihood that condition41 (A9) (}(, > c i is satisfied. These 
results are summarised in proposition (37).
P ropo sitio n  37 An increase in the number of electoral college votes that can 
be won by deviating from preferred trade policy (Av) or an increase in electoral 
competition at the national level (lower make reputation-building through 
the strategic selection of trade policy more likely.
Proof. Consider a distribution of voters such that A v  > 0. It follows directly 
from A9  =  F  (|^S| +  2Au) — F  (| |) that an increase in Av, ceteris paribus,
41 An increase in the discounted ego-rent, /3£, or decrease in cl also increase the likelihood 
of there being a reputation-building equilibrium.
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increases the change in the incumbent’s re-election probability from the im­
plementation of trade protection. Moreover, since f(rj) is symmetric around 0 
and single-peaked, A6 increases as [w® | —> 0. A higher A6 from either increase 
makes it more likely that condition (A#) /?C > CL is satisfied, and thus that 
reputation building takes place. ■
Propositions (36) and (37) confirm the same properties apply in the multi- 
jurisdictional framework as in the related literature with one jurisdiction. 
Namely, that there exists a unique reputation-building equilibrium that is 
more likely the larger the number of votes that can be swung through a policy 
decision, and the closer is electoral competition between candidates.
The multi-jurisdictional framework extends the literature in two ways. 
First, the electoral college structure provides new insights into how state-level 
characteristics in the electoral college combine to influence the incentives for 
strategic trade protection at the national level. This provides for a more nu- 
anced analysis of how swing-voters affect policy decisions. Second, the frame­
work adds a spatial dimension that allows distributional effects to be examined 
in a highly tractable way. The analysis delivers three new propositions that 
describe how the distribution of voters in the electoral college influence trade 
policy decisions. These effects are analysed in the next section.
4.1.5 Distribution of Voters and Electoral Incentives
Section 4.1.4 establishes that the reputation building equilibrium depends 
on parameters, |u;®| and Av, that contribute to the change in the incum­
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bent’s re-election probability arising from a first term policy shift. While 
these national-level parameters confirm the importance of electoral competi­
tion and the change in electoral college votes won as key determinants, they 
represent summary statistics of the underlying state-level characteristics in 
the electoral college. Expressing A$  in terms of state-level parameters gives 
rise to proposition (38).
P ro p o sitio n  38 The likelihood of strategic trade policy implementation de­
pends on the distribution of swing voters and ideologists within states of a given 
type (\wp \ ,d t ) ,  the distribution of state types in the electoral college (<pn) and 
the probability distributions of state-level (H{es)) and national shocks (F(r])).
P roof. Consider the change in re-election probability summarised by (192). 
Recall that A v = Y in - l ^n^P n- This can be expressed in terms of state-level 
characteristics by substituting for Apn. This yields:
A « =  £ * „ a P" =  + « ' ? ) - J d K I - O )  (193)71=1 71=1
Moreover, electoral competition at the national level |o;®| =  \vj — Vq \, 
where v® and v^  are the electoral college votes won by the incumbent and 
challenger, respectively, under free trade in the first term. Vj is the weighted 
sum of electoral college votes won by state type, when r — 0. Thus Vj = 
Y2n=i 07iPp=o- Moreover, since Vj -I- =  1, it is straightforward to express
the challenger’s electoral college votes as v^  =  1 — Y2n=i Combining
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these allows national-level electoral competition to be expressed in terms of 
state-level characteristics:
"2  =  2 E  M U  -  1 =  2 E  <t>„H ( K l  -  «?) - 1  (194)
n=  1 n= 1
Substituting (193) and (194) into (192) allows the incumbents re-election prob­
ability to be expressed in terms of state-level variables and distributional pa­
rameters:
Afl = F (|Ui | ) - F ( |US|)
= F  (2  jC 4>„H (|u£| + w") — l j —F (2  f  4>nH (|w"| -  «?) -  l )
(195)
Inspection of (195) shows that the change in re-election probability, and thus 
the likelihood of strategic trade policy implementation, hinges on (i) the dis­
tribution of swing voters and ideologists within states of a given type, sum­
marised by (|u/j| ,oj”), (ii) the distribution of state types in the electoral col­
lege, reflected by proportions (f>n and (iii) the distributions of state-level and 
national-level shocks, H(es) and F(rj). ■
To show how the spatial position of swing voters can influence policy de­
cisions, we consider two redistribution experiments that satisfy the following 
conditions:
1. The aggregate population of each voter type in the electoral college is
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kept constant. In particular, if we let Tk denote the total measure of k 
voters in the electoral college, then the distribution of k voters across n 
state types, as reflected by 7^, must satisfy the following condition:
r t =  E  K i l  . where k e  {D, R, F, P \  (196)
n = l
2. All states always have a unit measure of voters, so =  1* This 
implies that an increase in the measure of voters of a particular type in 
a state, must be accompanied by a decrease in voters of some other type. 
Denoting the total measure of voters by T, conditions 1 and 2 imply that 
the total measure of voters in the electoral college must be 1:
r  =  E r t  =  E E 0 n 7 ?  =  E ^ n E 7 t  =  i  (197)
k k n n k
3. Feasibility constraints regarding pairs of values (a;” , a;”) for all state 
types n  are adhered to. To see how these apply, consider pair ([a;™| ,a>™) 
that describes states of type n. Since the sum of all voter types is 1 in 
each state, there is a finite range of values that leads oj™ and may 
feasibly take. In particular, the larger is the lead in any one dimension, 
the smaller the scope for variability in the lead in the other dimension. 
For example, if d™ = 1 (or —1), then a state of type n is made up 
entirely of D voters (or R  voters) so a;” =  0. At the other extreme, 
w™ =  1 (or —1) implies | =  0. Figure (30) illustrates the set of all
235
feasible combinations of (u;” ,a;”), given =  1* Consider \w™\ =  a.
k
This implies that D voters exceed R  voters by a, or vice versa. For 
example, suppose 7 ^  =  0.4 and 7 ^  =  0.2, in states of type n, implying 
a Democratic lead w™ =  0.2. The sum of ideologists is 0.6, so the swing 
voters represent 0.4 of each state. If all swing voters are protectionist, 
then l0™ = 0.4, while if all are free-traders, then a?™ = —0.4. Suppose 
instead that =  0.2 arises from 7 ^  =  0.3 and 7 ^  =  0.1. In this case, 
uj™ ranges from —0.5 to 0.5. It is straightforward to see that if there 
axe no R  voters at all, then a?” ranges from —0.8 to 0.8. This gives the 
largest possible range consistent with u™ =  7 ^  =  0.2. Similar reasoning 
applies for a state where u =  —0 .2 .
In general, the maximum measure of single-issue voters consistent with 
\ujp \ =  a  is 1 — a. Hence, the maximum trade policy lead is a;” =  1 — a, 
where all swing voters are protectionists. Conversely, the minimum trade 
policy lead consistent with |u;£ | =  a  is wf =  a — 1, where all single-issue 
voters are free-traders. These maximum and minimum leads form the 
rhombus in figure (30). States with positive measures of all voter types 
are described by ([u}p,u”) that fie inside the rhombus. The discussion 
can be summarised by the following range for a;” , given |w” |:
a;” G [a — 1,1 — a ] , if = a , where a  6 [0,1] (198)
Any redistribution of voters across state types must be consistent with
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(198).
The analysis in the chapter up to this point has been concerned with 
politicians’ optimal strategies for a given distribution of voters. The two re­
distribution experiments in this section address a different set of questions. 
In particular, how a change in the spatial location of a measure of swing vot­
ers can alter the electoral incentives for trade protection of a given industry, 
whether through variation in the degree of state-level competition across the 
electoral college, or through institutional parameters, such as variation in the 
contribution of electoral votes of different state types in the electoral college. 
While we model the redistribution as a physical migration of voters with fixed 
preferences, this need not be the case. Preferences of voters may change in a 
given location, without migration, through changes in the pattern of industrial 
concentration and employment. The experiments reveal two key distributional 
determinants of electoral incentives. First, state ‘swingness’, as measured by 
the closeness of state-level electoral competition, and second, state ‘decisive­
ness’, as measured by the proportion of electoral college votes represented by 
states of a given type.
Let us define the initial distribution of swing voters prior to any redistri­
bution. This is referred to as the ‘benchmark distribution’ in the rest of the 
section. Suppose the N  state types are ranked such that 1 >  |wj| >  .. > 
|a# | >  .. >  K |  > 0 . Condition (198) implies that the maximum measure of 
single-issue voters in states of type n consistent with [cj” | is 1 — \u™ |. Assume
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Figure 30: Feasible pairs of political and trade leads.
the maximum feasible measure of single-issue voters is present in all states of 
types n. It follows that the measure of swing voters is increasing with n since 
|wp| is decreasing with n. Further assume that in the benchmark distribution, 
the swing voters of each state of type n are split evenly between P  and F  
voters, such that 7 p = 7*p = ^ [l — |^p|]- This implies that for each state 
of type n, w” =  0, thereby placing the distribution of state types along the 
Up axis in Figure (30). Hence, by construction, the benchmark distribution is 
characterised by Apn =  A vn = 0, Vn, and thus A v — A 6 = 0, so trade policy 
has no impact on re-election probability. The conditions for a reputation- 
building equilibrium are not satisfied under the benchmark distribution so all 
incumbents set their preferred trade policy in their first term of office.
238
R ed is trib u tio n  A - ‘Swingness’ From the benchmark distribution, con­
sider a redistribution of P  and F  voters that increases the concentration of 
protectionist voters in states with relatively low |wp|, and vice versa for free­
traders. The additional assumption is made that all state types contribute 
equally to the electoral college42, such that <pn = &■> ^ n- Under these as­
sumptions and provided the redistribution satisfies conditions (1) to (3), the 
following proposition holds.
P ropo sitio n  39 A redistribution of protectionist voters from states with weaker 
electoral competition (higher \co™\) to states with stronger electoral competition 
(lower \tVp\) makes it more likely that incumbents engage in strategic trade 
protection.
Proof. Starting from the initial distribution where there are \  [l — |]
protectionists and free traders in each state of type n, and state types are 
ranked in decreasing |, it follows by construction that if a positive measure 
k < \  [l — |u;p|] of protectionist voters is redistributed from each state of type 
i to each state of type j ,  where i < j ,  then:
(i) there are sufficient free-trader voters in each state of type j  to replace the 
k voters redistributed to j  from state i, since ^ [l — k | ]  < \
(ii) this exchange of swing voters redistributes P  voters towards a measure of
states with a closer electoral competition and F  voters towards states with
weaker electoral competition.
42This simplifying assumption controls for the effects on reputation-building incentives 
arising from different state-type contributions of electoral college votes.
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i - k  •
In each j  state, the measure of protectionists rises by k and the measure of 
free traders falls by k , hence uPt — Jp  — — 2k > 0. Conversely, in each state
i, uj\ — 7 p — 7 ^  =  —2k < 0. For all states of type n, where n  ^  {«, j} ,  w™ =  0. 
Consider the effects of a deviation from free trade by an incumbent in his first
term of office post-redistribution. For states of type i and j , the change in a
free-trader incumbent’s probability of winning a majority from setting r — 1 
in his first term are:
A f t  = H (\ujJp\ + 2 k ) - H ( \ u j Jp\ - 2 k ) > 0  (199)
Api = H(\u)ip\ - 2 k ) - H ( \ u ip\ +2k)  < 0 (200)
It follows from (199) and (200) that setting r = 1 improves the incumbent’s 
probability of winning j  state electoral college votes, where P  voters exceed F , 
but worsens his chances of winning i state electoral votes where the opposite 
is the case. The overall change in electoral college votes is given by:
A v = <f)Ap{ +  (j)Aft + $ £  Apn = (f) (Ap* +  Ap?) (201)
= 0 [H (|wj| +  2 k ) - H  (|wj| -  2k)} ( | 4 |  + 2 k) -  H  ( | 4 |  -  2fc)] > 0
Since \up\ > u 3p , it follows from the characteristics of h (sn) that the change 
in electoral college votes won by the incumbent increases, from 0 in the bench­
mark distribution, to Av  > 0 .  It follows that from having no effect on re- 
election probability under the benchmark distribution, the redistribution of
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protectionists to states with closer electoral competition increases their rel­
ative importance in the electoral college, giving rises to an improvement in 
re-election probability through first term trade protection. Thus an increase 
in the concentration of protectionists in states with closer electoral competition 
makes strategic trade protection by incumbents more likely. ■
The redistribution considered has the dual effect of giving protectionists 
a lead in one group of states, and free-traders a lead in another group of 
states, where both groups have equal measure. It is the closeness of electoral 
competition in the former group of states that gives protectionists a greater 
weight in the overall assessment of the change in electoral college votes and 
thus in re-election probability. If the degree of electoral competition were the 
same in the two state types, then these probability changes would entirely 
offset each other. It is the difference in the ‘swingness’ of states across which 
redistribution takes place that drives the electoral incentives to implement 
trade protection after the redistribution.
A symmetric redistribution that gives free-traders a lead in groups of states 
that-are more competitive has the opposite effect, such that Av  < 0 holds 
post-redistribution. This corresponds to the symmetric reputation-building 
equilibrium where protectionist incumbents override their protectionist views 
and choose free-trade in their first term following a low cost draw. Thus a 
population-preserving redistribution of swing voters can generate either of the 
two symmetric reputation-building equilibria.
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Intuitively, the preferences of concentrations of swing voters that con­
tribute most in probability terms to election outcomes are given more weight 
by incumbents when making policy decisions. Moreover, the concentrations 
that contribute most are those in swing states whose electoral outcome is most 
uncertain.
R ed is trib u tio n  B - ‘D ecisiveness’ From the benchmark distribution, con­
sider a redistribution of protectionists from states of type i to states of type j ,  
where both states types are characterised by the same degree of electoral com­
petition, but where j  states represent a larger proportion of electoral college 
votes than do i states. The assumption that |cjp| =  uPp =  \up\ controls for the 
‘swingness’ effect, while (fij > ^  isolates the effect of distributing swing voters 
across larger or smaller measures of swing states. Suppose that all states of 
type n, where n ^  {i , j }  remain unchanged.
Starting from =  cjj = 0, the redistribution described has the effect of 
concentrating a measure of F  voters over a smaller measure of swing states, i, 
while the same volume of P  voters is spread evenly over a larger measure of 
states, j ,  with an identical degree of electoral competitiveness. This gives rise 
to two conflicting effects on the electoral incentives for trade protection. On 
the one hand, the relatively large concentration of free-traders in i states im­
plies that a first term protectionist policy reduces the incumbent’s probability 
of winning a majority in each state i by more than the probability gain in 
winning a majority in each state j , where protectionists are less concentrated.
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On the other hand, j  states represent a larger measure of electoral college 
votes than i states.
Whether the former ‘concentration effect’ or the latter ‘decisiveness effect’ 
dominates determines whether the redistribution increases or decreases the 
electoral college votes won overall by setting r = 1 in the first term of office. If 
Av > 0 overall, then trade protection is more likely than under the benchmark 
distribution of swing voters. Otherwise, Av < 0 and the symmetric reputation- 
building equilibrium is more likely.
The decisiveness effect dominates the concentration effect when the degree 
of electoral competition is strong in states i and j .  Intuitively, the greater 
the swingness of states, the greater the impact in probability terms of even 
a small lead in protectionist swing voters. Thus the gain in electoral college 
votes from trade protection is larger, ceteris paribus, when a given measure of 
protectionist voters is spread over a large measure of highly swing states, than 
when concentrated over a smaller measure of identical states. Conversely, a 
small protectionist lead has less potency when electoral competition is weak 
than when electoral competition is strong, causing the concentration effect to 
outweigh the decisiveness effect such that the more concentrated F  voters in 
states of type i have a larger impact on electoral college votes won than the 
less concentrated P  voters in type j  states, under first term strategic trade 
protection.
P ropo sitio n  40 A redistribution of protectionist voters from swing states that
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constitute a smaller proportion of electoral college votes (lower 4>) to swing 
states that constitute a larger proportion of electoral college votes (higher 4>) 
makes it more likely that incumbents engage in strategic trade protection.
U r = \up\ and > <f)PProof. Consider state types i and j  where \ulp\
The total population of swing voters over states of type i is fa [1 — 
which is less than the total population of swing voters over j  states, given 
by fa [1 — \up\}. Recall that P  and F  voters are assumed to have equal mea­
sure in the benchmark distribution, such that T%p — Tp =  ^  [1 — [u;p|] and 
Tjp = TjF = ^ - [ l -  |cl>p|]. Since, by construction, Tp < T^, any redistribution 
of protectionist voters from i to j  states is feasible up to Tp. Suppose k pro­
tectionist voters from each state i are redistributed evenly across states j .  It 
follows that (frik voters are distributed evenly over (f)j states. Let A denote the 
additional protectionist voters in each state j  , where A =  ^ k .  Moreover, (f)jX 
free-traders are redistributed evenly across i states. Thus fak — <fjX. Since 
<fj > fa, it follows that X < k.
In each j  state, the measure of protectionist rises and free traders falls by 
^ k . Hence, u{ =  — 2k ^  > 0. Conversely, in each state z,
u\  =  7 p — 7 p =  —2k < 0. For all states of type n, where n  ^  =  0.
Consider the effects of a deviation from free trade by an incumbent in his first 
term of office post-redistribution. For states of type z and j , the change in a 
free-trader incumbent’s probability of winning a majority from setting r  =  1
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in his first term are:
A (P =  H ^ \ u p\ + 2 k ^ j - H ^ \ o j p\ - 2 k ^ j > 0  (202)
A pi = H( \ up\ - 2 k ) - H { \ u p\ + 2 k ) < 0  (203)
Since (f>j > < ,^ it follows that 2k ^  < 2k so the protectionist lead in j  states 
is smaller than the free-trader lead in i states. Inspection of (202) and (203) 
reveal that setting r =  1 improves the incumbent’s probability of winning each 
j  state electoral college vote but worsens his chances of winning each i state 
electoral college vote. Moreover, since the degree of electoral competition is the 
same across the two state types, it follows that A fP < —Ap%. This reflects the 
‘concentration effect’ of the redistribution of swing voters across state types of 
different measure. However, <f>j > < ,^ so there is also a ‘decisiveness effect’ since 
there are more j  state than i state electoral college votes. Using A =  k ^  < k 
and (f)j = > (j)i for simplification allows the overall change in electoral
college votes won by the incumbent as a result of first term protectionist to 
be expressed as:
A v  =  (t>iAp% -I- <f)jAfP +  (j>nApn = faAp1 +  (j>jApP (204)
=  4>~ [H (K l +  2A ) - H  (\up\ -  2A)] -  <j>i [H (|u„| +  2 k ) - H  {\wv\ -  2k)]
Inspection of (204) reveals the trade-off between the two conflicting effects. 
The first term shows a smaller probability change per j  state, with weight ^
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magnified by j  as a result of the larger scale of electoral college votes. The 
second term shows the larger probability change for i states weighted only by 
<f>i. The characteristics of H  (•) imply that A v  > 0 when electoral competition 
is sufficiently close. Hence, when states i and j  are characterised by low \up\ 
and thus a high degree of swingness, the redistribution of protectionist voters 
across a measure of more decisive states makes strategic trade protection more 
likely. ■
Propositions (39) and (40) provide new insights concerning how the distri­
bution of voters can influence the decisions of policy makers driven by electoral 
incentives. The model emphasizes the differences between direct and indirect 
voting for a presidential candidate by showing how the electoral college system 
places different weights on the preferences of swing voters, depending on their 
location. The propositions show analytically that incremental distributional 
changes between states that alter the distribution of leads within states can 
have a significant effect on the incentives for policy implementation.
The propositions show that concentrations of swing voters with a particular 
trade policy stance have a larger impact on electoral outcomes when located 
in swing states. Moreover, their overall impact on the re-election probability 
of incumbents increases if their influence is spread over swing states that con­
stitute a larger proportion of electoral college votes and are thus more decisive 
for the election.
The propositions thus combine to give the overall prediction that the trade
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policy preferences of a measure of swing voters are more likely to be satisfied if 
these swing voters are concentrated in states that are both swing and decisive 
for the election outcome. Since voters with strong views over the protection 
of a particular industry are likely to be stakeholders in that industry, whether 
employees, entrepreneurs, shareholders etc., the main testable empirical im­
plication of the model is that industries that are concentrated in swing and 
decisive states are more likely to be protected. The next section describes the 
results of our empirical investigation using US data that tests for the empirical 
implication of the model.
4 .2  E m pirical A n alysis
This section provides evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that in­
dustries with large concentrations in swing and decisive states axe more likely 
to be protected. The empirical analysis employs a benchmark test of the 
“Protection for Sale” mechanism of Grossman and Helpman (1994) using the 
empirical model and data of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). This base- 
fine constitutes the “state-of-the-art” in empirical political economy of trade. 
We augment it with the data necessary to test our hypothesis that industrial 
concentration in key political districts is a significant determinant of trade pol­
icy. While the empirical specification does not form a direct test of our model, 
we present reduced form evidence that suggests previous empirical studies of 
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model have omitted variables from their 
analysis that our theoretical analysis puts forward as being relevant.
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The rest of the section proceeds as follows. First we outline the model and 
data of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Second, we present the data 
and method of construction for the measure used to capture the swingness 
and decisiveness elements of the model. Finally, our results are described.
4.2.1 D ata and Empirical Specification
The theoretical model developed in section 1 considers how electoral incen­
tives influence a binary trade policy decision that reflects either free trade or 
trade protection. The precise nature of this trade protection instrument is 
unspecified in the model, but is distinguished by the discretion the political 
incumbent is assumed to have over it.
In practice, unilateral political discretion over trade policy, in particular 
import tariffs, is constrained by multilateral agreements. Import tariffs are 
thus jointly determined through multilateral trade negotiations rather than 
the sole result of a government’s political agenda. Moreover, tariff levels for 
manufacturing products are very low since they have been greatly reduced over 
last few decades under the GATT and WTO. In contrast, Non-Tariff Barri­
ers (NTBs) allow governments to exercise more discretion in trade protection 
since these are not regulated to the extent of tariffs. For this reason, the liter­
ature has mainly employed coverage ratios for non-tariff barriers as a measure 
of trade protection, where these represent the share of products within an 
industry that benefit from one or more quantitative or qualitative trade re­
strictions: quantity-oriented barriers such as voluntary export restraints and
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quotas, price-oriented measures such as antidumping and countervailing du­
ties, and threats of quantity and quality monitoring. We therefore adopt the 
same approach as in the related literature43 in considering NTB coverage ra­
tios as our measure of trade protection. Data on Non-Tariff Barriers for 198344 
has been collected by the UNCTAD45 and combined with data from World 
Bank tapes46.
The benchmark specification by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) tests 
the original “Protection for Sale” equation of Grossman and Helpman (1994), 
reproduced in (205), where denotes the protection of industry z, Zi is the 
inverse of the import penetration ratio, e* is the price elasticity of imports and 
Ii describes whether sector i is politically organised and represented by a lobby. 
Further, represents the proportion of the population that is organised and 
a  denotes the weight of contributions to the linear welfare function of the 
government.
h  a L Z i  (205)
1 + U a +  a L ei
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) demonstrate that lobbying competition 
and lobbying spending have an influence on protection in the US by estimating 
a system of three equations, of which only one is relevant to this analysis. This
43Learner (1990) details the construction of NTB coverage ratios. These have been widely 
used, for example, in Learner (1990), Trefler (1993), Gawande (1998), Lee and Swagel (1997), 
Goldberg and Maggi (1997), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Bombardini (2005).
44 Since 1983 is the only year for which NTB data is available, it is not possible to  test the 
term limit effects predicted by the model.
45UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
46This dataset has been kindly provided by Kishore Gawande.
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equation is reproduced in (206), where U is the coverage ratio for industry 
i , Z{ is the inverse of the import penetration ratio, the share of imports to 
total production in sector i, e* is the price elasticity of imports and U is a 
dummy variable that describes whether the sector is politically organised and 
represented by a lobby. Moreover, Zu  includes tariffs on intermediate goods 
and Z2i includes NTBs on intermediate goods as controls. The error term is 
denoted by s*.
— 7o d- 7l 1% 1" l 2 ~  +  Z\i -f Z 2i +  Si (206)
1  ■(■ t i  &i 6 j
A simultaneity problem was raised by Trefler (1993). Higher trade protection 
is likely to reduce import penetration, as reflected in the following equation, 
in which e; is the error term47.
— -  <f> * 4- Ei (207)Zi 1  - f-  ti
Import penetration and trade protection are therefore determined simul­
taneously. In order to correct for the simultaneity bias implied by the system 
of equations (206) and (207), an instrumental variables approach is adopted. 
The capital-labour ratio interacted with industry dummies and comparative 
advantage variables (fractions of managers, scientists and unskilled labour per 
industry) are used as instruments, as in Trefler (1993). A complete list of the
Note that coefficient <j> is not the same character employed in the theoretical section.
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instruments used is reported in Appendix D. As in Gawande and Bandyopad­
hyay (2000), we use a two-stage least-squares estimator, and include for each 
of the instruments a linear term, a squared term, and the interactions of the 
linear term with, et- ,the price elasticity of imports.
The data used for import penetration ratios for the US are identical to 
those used by Trefler (1993). Considered as the most accurate estimate of 
sector-level price elasticity of imports, the data was taken originally from 
Shiells et al. (1986). The dummy variable, /{, indicates whether a sector 
is politically organised and is constructed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) based on US data from the Federal Election Commission48.
4.2.2 M easuring Concentration
To test the hypothesis that sectors whose activity is concentrated in US states 
with strong electoral competition (‘swingness’) and with the electoral votes to 
influence electoral outcomes (‘decisiveness’) are more likely to be protected, we 
require a measure to capture this form of geopolitical concentration. We there­
fore construct a measure of this concentration by combining two datasets. The 
first dataset allows us to construct the geographical concentration of industries 
across US states, based on employment. We use the 1987 Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) for the year 1983, which gives us
48 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) give a detailed desription of the derivation of this 
dummy.
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state-level employment at the four digit SIC.
The second dataset measures the swingness and decisiveness of electoral 
states in the presidential election49 of 1984. Stromberg (2005) develops a prob­
abilistic voting approach to presidential election campaigns and estimates an 
approximate measure Qs of the joint probability of a state s being both de­
cisive in the Electoral College and a swing state with a very close state-level 
election. It therefore encompasses the two factors put forward by Proposi­
tions (39) and (40) as being important in determining trade policy. He shows 
how measure Qs depends on several factors, such as the variance of national 
popularity-swings or the variance of electoral vote distribution, which could 
be interpreted as the state level and aggregate level uncertainties in the model 
of Section 1.
The Q-values are estimated for each presidential election using national 
and state-level measures. We use measure Qs, estimated by David Stromberg 
for the 1984 presidential election for each state, whose mean is 0.02 and that 
ranges between a value close to zero and 0.07. The probability of being swing 
and decisive is never 0 or 1, reflecting, as in our model, that no state is ex­
pected to be won with certainty. The NTBs in place in 1983 would, according 
to our model, be related to the expected swingness and decisiveness for the 
forthcoming election. This is exactly what the Q]984 measure. At the national 
level, the Democrat proportion of the two-party vote share in trial-heat polls,
4 9 This data was kindly provided by David Stromberg.
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economic growth, incumbency and incumbent president running for re-election 
are used. Moreover, at the state level, the difference from the national mean 
of the Democrat proportion of the two-party vote share in the 1980 election, 
the average ADA-scores50 of each state’s Congress members the year prior to 
the election and the difference between state and national polls are included.
The well-established Qs measure of Stromberg (2005) constitutes a conve­
nient measure for the reduced form specification as it combines the ‘swingness’ 
of states, reflecting the electoral competitiveness, with ‘decisiveness’, reflecting 
the size of states and the necessity of winning a certain number of states to 
win the overall election. To check the suitability of this measure, we calculate 
the correlation between the Qs for the 1984 presidential election and a state- 
industry Herfindahl index in 1983. This is found to be -0.4 (significant at the 
1% level), showing that industrial concentration is not directly correlated with 
the probability of being swing and decisive.
Since the political data, encapsulated by measure Qs, is constructed at the 
state level, while trade protection is measured at the industry level, we use 
the BLS dataset to link the two dimensions by creating an industry-specific 
measure of swingness and decisiveness, qi. Besides being necessary for the 
empirical analysis, it also corresponds to the assumption of our model that 
employees of a sector in a state are protectionist swing voters in that state. 
In order to abstract from any size effects, we measure the state specialisation
50ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores, ranging from 0 to 100, are used as a 
measure of legislator ideology.
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of each industry as the deviation in each state from its mean share of national 
employment. We can then compute a 4-digit SIC lQs7 measure, denoted by qi 
using:
where i £ I  denotes each of the 242 4-digit SIC industries used by Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and s £ S  denotes each of the 48 continental
and state employment are respectively Li and Ls. Industries that constitute 
a higher proportion of a state’s employment than their proportion of national 
employment, for a given Qs, have a higher qi. Conversely, if an industry 
constitutes a lower proportion of a state’s employment than it does of national 
employment, then qi is lower. Moreover, for a given proportion of a state’s 
employment, if the state has a low joint probability of being both swing and 
decisive, then qi is low. Taking the deviation from the mean rather than a 
pure state level measure of concentration allows to abstract from the possibility 
that nationally important industries will be important in all states. The sum 
is multiplied by 1000 as multiplying the probability Qs by a share yields very 
small numbers.
Table (7) presents the descriptive statistics of this constructed measure, 
which show that qi varies widely across industries. This confirms that indus­
trial concentration through space and in specific swing and decisive states is
51 Excluding the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawai, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
(208)
states51. Total US employment is represented by L , while aggregate industry
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of qi
Descriptive statistics of qj Correlation of qi with
Mean Min Labour intensity
0.07 -0.49 0.14
Median Max Proportion of unskilled workers
0.03 1.45 -0.04
sd Range Total employment
0.17 1.94 0.49
Notes: Industry- specific measure o f  swingness and decisiveness, qi, computed 
from data for 242 four-digit SIC industries using Stromberg’s (2005) measure 
o f  the probability o f  being swing and decisive and the Bureau o f  Labour 
Statistics employment dataset. Summary statistics are provided in the first two 
columns o f  the table. The third column reports the correlation o f  the measure 
with three other industry characteristics: Labour intensity, as the fraction o f  
payroll in value added in 1982, Proportion o f  unskilled workers as the share o f  
employees in an industry classified as unskilled in 1982, and total employment 
measured in millions o f  persons for 1982. Source: BLS (1983), 1982 Census o f  
Manufacturing, Stromberg (2005).__________________________________________
not uniform. We check that our results are robust to excluding outlying obser­
vations of qi. The correlations with other industry characteristics are reported 
in the third column of the table. Total employment, labour and skill intensity 
axe not correlated with qi, demonstrating that larger, or more skill or labour 
intensive industries do not systematically concentrate more in states that are 
more likely to be swing and decisive.
Augmenting the specification of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) to 
include the constructed industry level swingness and decisiveness variable, qi, 
gives the following specification:
— — — 7o +  7i Ii  b 72 h 73Qi +  Zli +  %2i +  Si (209)1 + U ei ei
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which is also corrected for the simultaneity bias by using IV. The campaign 
contributions literature does not suggest the concentration of industries in 
swing and decisive states as a determinant for trade policy decision-making, 
implying that 73 is zero. The next section provides evidence that qi is a 
significant determinant of NTB protection of an industry, thus lending support 
to our theoretical results.
4.2.3 Empirical Results
Our findings are reported in table (8). The first column reports the results 
of the benchmark specification given by (206). It is consistent with the coef­
ficients reported52 in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and qualitatively 
close to those obtained by Goldberg and Maggi (1999). As predicted by Gross­
man and Helpman (1995), in politically organised sectors, higher industry out­
put relative to imports and a lower price elasticity of imports increases the 
level of protection (7 X > 0 ). In politically disorganised sectors, the coefficient 
has the opposite sign (7 2 < 0).
The results from specification (209) appear in column (2). Our measure 
of “industry swingness and decisiveness” does not affect the sign, magnitude 
of the coefficients on Ii(zi/ei) and ^/e*. Their significance is only slightly 
reduced, indicating a relative robustness of the Grossman Helpman model. 
The point estimate of 73 is 0.192 (significant at the 1%, with a robust stan-
52The significance levels of the coefficients are smaller than those reported in their paper 
due to our use of robust standard errors.
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Table 8: Reduced form regression results
Dependent Variable:
0)
NTBi /(1+NTBi)
(2)
Beta Beta
0.192** 0.233
(0.038)
Ii (z;/ei) 4.761+ 1.383 3.330 0.967
(2.781) (2.532)
Zi/ei -4.704+ -1.384 -3.319 -0.977
(2.664) (2.402)
Intermediates’ tariffs 0.734* 0.190 0.809** 0209
(0.319) (0.312)
Intermediates’ NTBs 0.378** 0.388 0.337** 0.345
(0.090) (0.086)
Observations 242 242 242 242
F-test model (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
J-test overidentification (p-value) 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08
Centered R2 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.28
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions, instruments reported in appendix D. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Includes constant not reported. The dependent variable is the Non Tariff Barriers 
coverage ratio. In both specifications, (zj/e,) is the ratio o f inverse import penetration to import elasticity. Ii (zj/ei) 
is the same ratio multiplied by a dummy Ij that indicates -whether a sector is politically organized or not. 
Intermediates tariff is computed as the average tariff on intermediate goods used by industry i and Intermediates 
Ntbs the average Non Tariff Barriers coverage o f these intermediates. In the second specification, an additional 
explanatory variable is added. Industry- specific measure o f swingness and decisiveness, qi. computed from data for 
242 four-digit SIC industries using Stromberg (2005) measure o f the probability o f  being swing and decisive and 
the Bureau o f Labor Statistics employment dataset. The beta coefficients are reported for both specifications. The 
p-values o f the F-test mode) and J-test overidentification are reported. Data source: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000), Stromberg (2005), BLS (1983) and authors’ own calculations.
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dard error of 0.038). Thus sectors that concentrate more than their national 
average in swing and decisive states receive more protection. This estimate 
translates into a normalised beta coefficient of 0.233, such that a one standard 
deviation increase in the industry’s swingness and decisiveness will increase 
the US NTB coverage ratio for that sector by approximately 0.233 standard 
deviations. Although this beta is smaller than that of the Grossman-Helpman 
variables, it is more significant, and as important as the trade protection mea­
sures on intermediates. Moreover, including our measure of swingness and 
decisiveness explains a larger proportion of the variation of protection levels 
across sectors, as it increases the centered R 2 by 30% relative to the Gawande 
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) benchmark specification.
These findings provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that indus­
trial concentration in swing and decisive states is an important determinant 
of trade protection of that industry, highlighting geographical concentration 
of industries in politically key states an important, and previously overlooked, 
determinant of trade protection in the US Electoral College.
4 .3  C onclusion
The political agency model developed in this chapter offers a multi-jurisdictional 
framework for analysing electoral incentives for trade protection. For distribu­
tions of voters where support by swing voters increases re-election probability, 
a unique equilibrium is shown to exist where political incumbents build a rep­
utation of protectionism through their policy decisions in their first term of
258
office. The extension to a multi-state framework modelled as an electoral col­
lege introduces a spatial dimension that shows how the incentives driving trade 
policy hinge on the distribution of swing voters across swing states. We show 
that strategic trade protection is more likely when protectionist swing voters 
have a lead over free-trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral 
competition, swing states, that also represent a larger proportion of electoral 
votes, thus being more decisive in the overall election. The analytical results 
offer a theoretical explanation for why governments may sometimes push for 
the protection of industries with concentrations in pivotal locations, such as 
the US steel production industry. Moreover, our empirical strategy augments 
the benchmark test of the lobbying political economy of trade literature to 
include a measure of how industries specialise geographically in these swing 
and decisive states. The reduced form evidence is that the concentration of 
industries in politically important states is a significant element in explaining 
trade policy. These findings provide support for the theory highlighting an 
important, and previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection.
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A p p en d ix  A . V oter V alue F unctions
Section 1 establishes the optimality of the incumbents’ strategies, given voters’ 
strategies, for the equilibrium where A v > 0. This appendix shows that the 
re-election rule of the infinitely-lived F  and P  swing voters is also optimal, 
given politicians’ strategies. This confirms that the politicians’ and voters’ 
strategies constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game.
Let V p  denote the value function for a protectionist voter. Further, let a p  
denote the probability that a P  voter votes for the incumbent, given policy r  
in his first term of office. a rp  contributes to the incumbent’s re-election prob­
ability by a tiny amount, thus marginally affecting his prospective payoffs. 
a p  is thus introduced in V p  as an argument of the incumbent’s re-election 
probability, /( • ) , which is smooth and continuous from the assumptions of 
the model. Further, let U p  (7r) denote the utility of P  voters in the incum­
bent’s first term of office, where 7r is the probability of the incumbent having 
protectionist views. Similarly, denote P  voters’ second term utility as u 2p  ( t F ), 
where this is a function of update beliefs after observing r  in the first term. 
Finally, yd is the common discount factor. Combining these allows the value 
function, Vp, to be expressed as follows:
V p  =  u ) ,  (tt) +  p  £  [ /  (ffJO ( u 2p  ( y ) +  p v P )  +  ( l - f  ( o TP ) )  V p ]  (210)
r
The following proof uses (210) to show that given incumbents’ strategies, uQp  =
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0 and <7p — 1 are optimal responses. That is, protectionists vote for the 
incumbent if he chooses trade protection in his first term and for the challenger 
if free trade is chosen. In order for arp — 1 to be an optimal response, it must 
be true from (210) that Up (7rr ) +  /3Vp >  Vp. This can be rearranged to the 
following condition:
4 ( 5 f r ) > ( l - / ? ) V p  (211)
To see this, consider that /  (<7p) and 1—/  (<jp) are weights for u2p  (irT)+pVp 
and Vp, respectively, in the value function. Voter P  maximises his effect 
on /(<Jp) through arp = 1, and thus places the largest possible weight on 
Up (ifr ) +  P V P  relative to V p .  Hence, arp = 1 can only be optimal if (211) 
holds.
Recall that P  voters receive a payoff x  if r — 1 and 0 otherwise. Since 
Pr(r =  1 in 1st term) =  7r+ (1 —tt)p, it follows that Up (7r) =  [7r +  (1 — 7r)p] x  > 
0. Moreover, since Pr(r =  1 in 2nd term | r = 0 in 1st term) =  0, it follows 
that u2p (7?°) == 0. That is, the incumbent reveals himself to be a free-trader 
if he chooses r = 0 in his first term, given A v > 0. Since the incumbent 
follows his preferences in his final term in office, so P  voters can be certain 
of a 0 payoff. If the incumbent sets r = 1 in his first term, then voters can 
update their beliefs regarding the probability of r = 1 being chosen in his 
second term, if re-elected. Applying Bayes’ rule for if1, P  voters can expect
It must be true that Vp > jhpUp (7 r ) ,  where (7r) is the discounted
stream of period 1 utihties, if the incumbent is never re-elected. Substituting 
into (211) yields:
u% (irr) > Up (1r) (212)
This must hold for arp  =  1 to be optimal, for all r, but leads to a con­
tradiction. It cannot be true that u2p  (5?°) > up (it) since u2p  (7?°) — 0 and 
up  (7r) >  0. Hence, ap  — 1 (for all r ) cannot be an optimal response. Since 
u2p  (7T °) < Up (7r), a new politician is always a better bet than an incumbent 
who set r = 0 in his first term. Hence, crp =  0 is optimal. Moreover, continua­
tion payoff YrpUp (7r) must be smaller than j ^ U p  (7T1) under the equilibrium 
strategies of incumbents’, so <jp  =  1 is an optimal response.
The value function of free-traders, Vp, is symmetric to Vp and the optimal­
ity strategies Op =  1 and a lF =  0 follows with arguments symmetric to those 
used above. We can thus conclude that the politicians’ and voters’ strategies 
constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game.
A ppendix B . Equilibrium  U niqueness
There are two symmetric cases, A v > 0 and A v < 0, where reputation- 
building through strategic policy implementation forms part of incumbents’ 
optimal strategies. In each of these symmetric cases, there is a unique equilib­
rium. To show that the equilibrium found in the chapter is unique, consider
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a distribution of swing voters under which A v  > 0 from the implementation 
of trade protection in the first term.
Recall that when a high cost c# is drawn, it is a dominant strategy for 
free-trader politicians to set r = 1. Moreover, let arp  denote the probability 
that a P  voter votes for the incumbent, given policy r  in his first term of office. 
Under a sufficiently low cost draw, cl, it must be the case that <jp > Op for 
a free-trader to deviate from r = 0. Similarly, for a protectionist to deviate 
from r = 1 in his first term of office, it must be true that a lp < ap . Hence, 
in any equilibrium at most one type of politician deviates from his preferred 
policy in the first term.
Moreover, to show that mixing between r — 0 and r  =  1 cannot be an 
equilibrium, consider a strategy where a free-trader incumbent sets r  =  1 
with a probability less than 1 when c =  cl. For this to be an equilibrium, it 
must be the case that crp PC — cl = v%PC and hence that cl = (cp  — crp ) PC- 
Inspection of Vp in Appendix A shows that a lp  =  1 and aQp  =  0 remain 
optimal. This, however, implies that cl = /3£ that contradicts the assumption 
that PC > CL-
It can similarly be shown that a strategy in which a protectionist sets 
r — 1 with less than certainty can never form part of an equilibrium. Such a 
strategy requires that cr^PC —  a(pPC ~  CL » that implies c l  =  ( < 7 p  —  0 p )  PC• 
This is impossible, however, since voters’ optimal strategy in this case is to 
set <Tp =  1 and (jp =  0. It follows that the unique equilibrium outcome is for
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an F  incumbent to set r = 1 when c = cl and for a P  incumbent to also set 
r = 1 under a low cost draw.
We can conclude that the equilibrium discussed in the chapter is unique 
for distributions of swing voters that satisfy the conditions for this case, and 
sufficiently low p  and c^. Symmetric arguments apply for the alternative case 
where A v  < 0.
A ppendix C. U ntested  C andidates
Consider an election taking place between two randomly selected candidates, 
each with a probability 7r of being protectionist. Since neither candidate has 
a history of a trade policy decision on which swing voters can condition their 
voting decision, the swing voters cast their vote on the basis of a coin toss. 
Each candidate can thus expect to gain ^ (7 p  +  7 ^). Hence, the Democrat 
candidate gains 7 ^  +  \  (7 SP +  7 ^) 4- Vs  and the Republican candidate gains 
\  (7P +  7 f )  — 1/3* F°r the D  candidate to win a majority in state s, 
2vs =  es must exceed ')sr ~  l b  ~  ~ u p- Let psdenote the probability that the 
D  candidate wins a majority in state s. It follows from the distribution of es 
that:
p’ =  Pr (e s > - w ; )  =  l - H ( - w ’p)
=  H  K )
(213)
(214)
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Hence, 1 — H  (a;®) is the probability that R  wins majority in state s. Hence 
state-level outcomes depend only on the political lead in s and H{es). This 
stems from the assumption that single-issue voters randomly select between 
the two candidates, so each candidate can expect to gain support by half. An 
alternative voting strategy could allocate swing voters in a different proportion. 
For example, when candidates are not distinguishable with regards to trade 
policy, voters may cast a vote on the basis of underlying ideological position, 
that is otherwise dominated by trade policy considerations.
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A ppendix D . Variables and Instrum ents
The following table provide a descriptions of all the variables and instruments 
used in the empirical analysis of section 4.2.
Table 9: Variables and instruments list
Variable Description
NTBj Aggregate US Non Tariff Barriers coverage ratio across all partners for industry i 
Constructed measure of the concentration of 4-digit SIC industry i in swing and decisive
9 political states
Ii Dummy variable, value 1 when sector i is politically organized
Inverse o f  import penetration ratio divided by 10000 (= (US consumption in 1983/ US
Zj total imports)/10000) in sector i
e* Price elasticity of imports in sector i, corrected for errors-in-variables (GB, 2000)
Interm, tariffs Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i
Interm. NTBs Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i
Instrument
1 Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i
2 Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i
3 Price elasticity o f imports (1986)
4 Logarithm of the price elasticity o f imports es
5 Measure of the size o f firms in an industry; Value added per firm, 1982, ($Bn/firm)
6 Share o f output in a sector produced by the four largest producers, concentration ratio, 1982
7 Share of employees in the industry defined as sdentistsand engineers, 1982
8 Share of employees in the industry defined as managerial, 1982
9 Share of employees in the industry defined as unskilled, 1982
10 Real Exchange Rate elasticity o f imports
11 Cross price elasticity o f imports with resepct to domestic prices, corrected for errors-in- variables (GB, 2000)
12 Log percentage o f an industry’s output used as intermediate good in other sectors
13 Logarithm o f the intermediate goods buyer concentration
14 Herfindahl index of the industry
15 Ad valorem tariff
16 Capital-Labor ratio o f the industry x Dummy for food processing industry
17 Capital-Labor ratio o f the industry x Dummy for resource-intensive industry
18 Capital-Labor ratio o f the industry x Dummy for general manufacturing industry
19 Capital-Labor ratio o f the industry x Dummy for capital intensive industry
20-36 Instruments 3 to 19 squared
37-52 Instruments 4 to 19 x price elasticity o f imports e,
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C onclusion
This thesis theoretically examined how information costs, minimum quality 
standards and electoral incentives affect international trade and trade policy 
choice.
A new pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry 
was presented and used to analyse the impact of information costs on en­
dogenous network-building and matching by information intermediaries. In­
termediation was found to raise expected trade volume and social welfare 
by expanding the set of matching technologies available to traders. Network 
building incentives were analysed under both linear and convex costs of net­
work expansion and convexity proved necessary for both direct and indirect 
trade to arise in equilibrium. Moreover, optimal network size and the pat­
tern of direct and intermediated trade was shown to depend on the level of 
information costs and the relative effectiveness of direct and indirect matching 
technologies, shedding light on the relationship between information frictions 
and trade.
The model was extended to analyse the strategic interaction between two 
information intermediaries. Competition in commission rates and network size 
was shown to give rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure in equilib­
rium. The coordination game of traders was shown to present the possibility 
of coordination failure between trade pairs. Intermediaries’ inability to price 
discriminate between the competitive and non-competitive market segments,
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was shown to give rise to an undercutting game with no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was shown to exist. The anal­
ysis concluded that either a monopoly or a fragmented duopoly can prevail in 
equilibrium, depending on the network-building technology. Under convexity 
assumptions, both intermediaries invest in a network and compete over com­
mon matches, while randomising commission rates. In contrast, linear network 
development costs can only give rise to a monopoly outcome.
Furthermore, the thesis developed an open economy model of vertical prod­
uct differentiation to analyse governments’ incentives for the unilateral setting 
of minimum quality standards. National minimum quality standards were 
endogenously determined in a standard-setting game between governments, 
which yielded four unregulated Nash equilibria, two symmetric and two asym­
metric, depending on the quality ranking of firms in each market. The analysis 
established that in all four cases, unilaterally selected minimum quality stan­
dards are inefficient as a result of cross-country externalities. Furthermore, 
minimum quality standards were shown to operate as non-tariff barriers to 
trade. The analysis of international cooperation in minimum quality stan­
dards established that the world welfare maximising symmetric standard can 
be reached through reciprocal adjustments in national minimum standards 
from either of the two symmetric Nash equilibria. In the case of asymmetric 
cross-country externalities, the scope for mutually beneficial cooperation was 
shown to be significantly restricted.
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The final chapter of the thesis developed a new multi-jurisdictional political 
agency model for analysing electoral incentives for trade protection. A unique 
equilibrium was shown to exist where political incumbents build a reputation 
of protectionism through their policy decisions in their first term of office. The 
incentives driving trade policy were shown to depend on the distribution of 
voters across swing and decisive states. Finally, the results of the empirical 
analysis testing the theoretical hypothesis were reported and shown to provide 
supporting evidence.
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